Rubio v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.

Decision Date04 March 1985
Citation165 Cal.App.3d 196,211 Cal.Rptr. 461
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesGregory RUBIO, Petitioner, v. The WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD of the State of California, and Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Company, Respondents. Civ. 24028.

Beeman & Beeman and Paul L. Beeman, Vallejo, for petitioner.

Mullen & Filippi and Mark A. Fudem, San Francisco, for respondent Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.

No appearance for W.C.A.B.

CARR, Associate Justice.

We granted a petition for writ of review to consider an order of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board ("Board") dismissing petitioner's amended application for additional compensation based on the alleged serious and willful misconduct of his employer, Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company. Petitioner contends the Board acted unreasonably and in excess of its powers in dismissing his application as untimely. We agree and shall annul the Board's decision.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 29, 1980, petitioner Gregory Rubio filed an application for adjudication of claim with the Board arising out of an employment-related injury which occurred on April 16, 1980. On the application, petitioner specified as one of the contested issues, "serious and wilful misconduct by employer." 1 (Ibid.) However, petitioner did not set forth the specific factual basis of his claim with respect to this issue.

On June 22, 1980, Pacific Telephone's attorney wrote to petitioner's attorney advising he had received "an Application For Adjudication 80 SRO 28715 alleging serious and willful misconduct" and requesting "the nature and circumstances of this allegation so that we can affirm or deny your client's claim." Petitioner's attorney thereafter fully advised Pacific Telephone's attorney of the specific facts of the alleged employer misconduct together with the names of two employee members of Pacific Telephone's internal safety committee who had cited safety hazards in the area where petitioner was injured. 2

On February 3, 1983, a prehearing conference was held in which the serious and willful misconduct issue was bifurcated from the ordinary compensation issues and ordered off calendar for separate adjudication. After hearing on the ordinary compensation On August 16, 1983, petitioner filed an amended application setting forth the specific facts upon which the serious and willful misconduct claim was based. Petitioner alleged Pacific Telephone's internal safety inspection committee had noted the dangerous condition which caused petitioner's injury and had urged corrective action for at least two years without results.

issues, the Board, on May 25, 1983, made an award in favor of petitioner.

On September 20, Pacific Telephone petitioned for dismissal of the amended application as being barred by the statute of limitations in that petitioner did not file a sufficiently detailed application within one year after the injury. (Lab.Code, § 5407; Rules of Practice and Procedure, Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, §§ 10440, 10445, subd. (b).) 3 The Board dismissed petitioner's amended application as untimely and, by a two-to-one majority, denied his petition for reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

It is not disputed that petitioner's original written application for benefits failed to specify the factual basis for the claim of serious and willful misconduct. It was therefore technically deficient under section 10440 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure. (See fn. 3, ante.) The issue confronting us is whether an amended application which sets forth the required detail but is filed more than one year after the injury relates back to the original timely application and preserves the jurisdiction of the Board to hear the matter. We hold that it does.

It is well established that " '[l]imitations provisions in the workmen's compensation law must be liberally construed in favor of the employee unless otherwise compelled by the language of the statute, and such enactments should not be interpreted in a manner which will result in' a loss of compensation." (Bland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 324, 330-331, 90 Cal.Rptr. 431, 475 P.2d 663; italics added; see also, Blanchard v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 590, 595, 126 Cal.Rptr. 187; Beaida v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 204, 208-209, 69 Cal.Rptr. 516.) Moreover, informality of pleading in proceedings before the Board is recognized and courts have repeatedly rejected pleading technicalities as grounds for depriving the Board of jurisdiction. (See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 148, 152-153, 167 Cal.Rptr. 57.)

No statute or rule compels the result reached by the Board. Petitioner initiated his action by filing an application specifying the issue of serious and willful misconduct by the employer (Rules of Practice and Procedure, Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 10400). Such action was thereby commenced though the application was irregular with respect to details. (Ray v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1956) 146 Cal.App.2d 393, 397, 303 P.2d 793.) In workers' compensation proceedings, as in civil proceedings generally, " '[t]he statute of limitations will not bar amendment of an application where the original application was timely and the amendment does not present a different legal theory or set of facts constituting a separate cause of action.' (1 Hanna, Cal. Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen's Compensation (2d ed.) § 501[e].)" (Blanchard v. Worker's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 595, 126 Cal.Rptr. 187.) Petitioner's amended application presented no new legal theory or set of facts constituting a new cause of action. It "merely set forth in detail the facts required by [section 10440] and therefore, being merely an amplification of the original application, it is deemed to have been filed as of the date of the original application." (Ray v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 146 Cal.App.2d at p. 398, 303 P.2d 793.)

The Board's procedural rules "serve the convenience of the tribunal and the litigant[s] and facilitate the proceedings. They do not deprive the tribunal of the power to dispense with compliance when the purposes of justice require it, particularly when the violation is formal and does not substantially prejudice the other party." (Beaida v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at p. 210, 69 Cal.Rptr. 516; Blanchard v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 53 Cal.App.3d at p. 595, 126 Cal.Rptr. 187.) If a party is disadvantaged by the insufficiency of a pleading, the remedy is to grant that party a reasonable continuance to permit it to prepare its case or defense. (Rules of Practice and Procedure, Cal.Admin.Code, tit. 8, § 10490; Blanchard, supra, at p. 595, 126 Cal.Rptr. 187.) Necessarily, failure to comply with the rules as to details is not jurisdictional. (Ray v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 146 Cal.App.2d at p. 398, 303 P.2d 793.) 4

Pacific Telephone chose not to avail itself of this remedy. Instead, it requested petitioner to provide specifics of his claim and, according to petitioner's uncontested allegation, he did so. The issue of serious and willful misconduct was then bifurcated from the other issues for separate adjudication without any motion by Pacific Telephone to dismiss that claim or set it forth in more detail. 5 At no time has petitioner attempted to deceive or surprise Pacific Telephone with his claim. Petitioner's original application is not vague as to the issue presented, only as to underlying facts. These facts were provided informally at Pacific Telephone's request and later set forth in an amended application.

There is no evidence petitioner's failure to comply strictly with the formalisms of the Board's rules prejudiced Pacific Telephone. In the absence thereof, the Board's "hands were not tied by its own procedural rules. There was no lack of power here. In failing to consider exercise of the dispensing power relative to its own procedural rules, the board acted unreasonably, indulging in a strict interpretation of the limitation statutes, an interpretation unfavorable to the injured employee and uncompelled by law." (Beaida v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 263 Cal.App.2d at p. 210, 69 Cal.Rptr. 516.) 6

The authorities upon which Pacific Telephone relies are distinguishable. In Peterson v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1947) 81 Cal.App.2d 352, 183 P.2d 927, the petitioner did not allege serious and willful misconduct at all in his original application. He...

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  • McGee Street v. Appeals Bd.
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 12 mai 2003
    ...on Entertainment constituted timely service on McGee Street. Ms. Peterson further contended that Rubio v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 196, 211 Cal.Rptr. 461, supported a rule that amendments adding new parties relate back to the original This rule, she argued, was consi......
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    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
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    ...(See Bland v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 324, 330-331, 90 Cal.Rptr. 431, 475 P.2d 663; Rubio v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 196, 200, 211 Cal.Rptr. 461; see also § 5303; Chavez v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 5, 14, 106 Cal.Rptr. 853; B......
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    ...rules of procedure that would defeat an employee's entitlement to rehabilitation benefits. (See e.g., Rubio v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 196, 200, 211 Cal.Rptr. 461 ["The Board's procedural rules `serve the convenience of the tribunal and the litigant[s] and facilitat......

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