Ruffin v. State
Decision Date | 29 October 1991 |
Docket Number | No. A91A1062,A91A1062 |
Citation | 412 S.E.2d 850,201 Ga.App. 792 |
Parties | RUFFIN v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
C. Jackson Burch, for appellant.
Spencer Lawton, Jr., Dist. Atty., David T. Lock, Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Ricky L. Ruffin was convicted of possession of cocaine in violation of OCGA § 16-13-30. He appeals from the trial court's denial of his amended motion for new trial.
1. Appellant contends the trial court erred by failing to suppress contraband found in his possession on the basis that it was found as the result of a stop which was not based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). OCGA § 17-5-30(b) provides that a motion to suppress evidence "shall be in writing and state facts showing that the search and seizure were unlawful." It is undisputed that appellant did not file a motion to suppress either prior to or during the trial. Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327, 333(7), 240 S.E.2d 833 (1977). Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.
2. In his second enumeration of error, appellant maintains the trial court erred by denying his motion for new trial made on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. Thompson v. State, 188 Ga.App. 508, 509, 373 S.E.2d 292 (1988).
(a) As evidence of ineffectiveness, appellant first points to counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488(III), 83 S.Ct. 407, 417-418(III), 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained as the result of an illegal search because it is "fruit of the poisonous tree." However, Id. at 488, 83 S.Ct. at 417. Thus, even if evidence would not have been discovered but for the illegal police conduct, if the derivative evidence has only an attenuated link to the illegality, it need not be suppressed. Id. at 487, 83 S.Ct. at 417.
The evidence adduced at trial showed that at approximately 10:00 p.m. on December 26, 1988, Officer Dauphinee of the Savannah Police Department was on routine patrol of an area of downtown Savannah in which frequent car break-ins had occurred and in which was located a known crack house. While patrolling, Dauphinee noticed appellant walking on the east side of the neighborhood. Before leaving the area for approximately 30 minutes on official business, Dauphinee observed appellant again closer to the crack house. Upon returning, he saw appellant standing with another man in a parking lot behind a motel. Dauphinee testified that upon seeing the patrol car appellant and the other man parted company and appellant walked briskly away. Dauphinee crossed through traffic to stop appellant, placed him against the patrol car, and patted him down for weapons. Neither weapons nor drugs were found as a result of the patdown. However, after Dauphinee's routine computer check indicated an outstanding warrant for appellant's arrest for probation violation, appellant was arrested pursuant to the warrant and taken to jail. After appellant's arrival at the jail, Dauphinee searched the police car and found a ziplock plastic bag with several pieces of what was later determined to be rock cocaine behind the back seat. A search of appellant's person at the jail revealed another ziplock bag in his jacket pocket containing brownish white residue which later tested positive for cocaine.
We agree with appellant that under the holding of Terry, supra, the initial stop in the case sub judice was unlawful. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). When urging ineffective assistance of counsel on the basis of counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, appellant must Rubiano v. State, 147 Ga.App. 142, 144, 248 S.E.2d 207 (1978). Given that cocaine residue was discovered on appellant's person during a search incident to his arrest pursuant to the outstanding warrant, see OCGA § 17-5-1(b), we look first to the issue whether suppression of that cocaine residue would have been required. If suppression of that evidence would not have been required, we need not consider whether the cocaine recovered from the police car should have been suppressed had a proper motion been made on the ground that it was found only because appellant was present in the police car during an illegal stop. See Brown v. State, 191 Ga.App. 779, 383 S.E.2d 170 (1989).
We have found no Georgia case specifically addressing the issue whether a valid outstanding arrest warrant which is discovered in the course of a routine check during an unlawful Terry stop sufficiently attenuates the connection between the illegal stop and a subsequent search incident to an arrest pursuant to the warrant so as to render contraband found in that search admissible into evidence. Our review of applicable federal decisions,...
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