State v. Frierson

• Decision Date: 09 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. SC03-1528.,SC03-1528.
• Citation: 926 So.2d 1139
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Anthony FRIERSON, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

926 So.2d 1139

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Anthony FRIERSON, Respondent.

No. SC03-1528.

Supreme Court of Florida.

February 9, 2006.

Rehearing Denied March 31, 2006.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief and Daniel P. Hyndman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Petitioner.

Carey Haughwout, Public Defender, Marcy K. Allen, Assistant Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

WELLS, J.

We have for review the decision in Frierson v. State, 851 So.2d 293 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), which certified conflict with the decision in State v. Foust, 262 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

CONFLICT ISSUES

In Foust, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed a trial court's decision to suppress certain evidence that was found after an arrest, holding in relevant part that "the reasonableness of the search after arrest was not affected by the fact that the original stopping of [the defendant] may have been without probable cause." 262 So.2d at 688. In the present case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal recognized that the basis for the holding in Foust was that the warrant was an intervening circumstance which rendered the subsequent search sufficiently attenuated from the illegality of the initial stop. However, the court reached a contrary conclusion, holding that an arrest warrant "does not validate an illegal detention." Frierson, 851 So.2d at 300 (quoting Rollins v. State, 578 So.2d 850, 851 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)); see also Solino v. State, 763 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Kimbrough v. State, 539 So.2d 619 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The Fourth District stated the conflict issue to be:

Where there is no reasonable cause to justify a traffic stop, may an outstanding arrest warrant constitute an intervening circumstance that dissipates the taint of the illegal action, so that evidence uncovered during a search incident to arrest is admissible in evidence?

Frierson, 851 So.2d at 294.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The Fourth District set forth the following findings of fact by the trial judge:

[O]n July 8, 2001, the defendant was driving an automobile at the intersection of Old Dixie Highway and Northlake Boulevard in Lake Park, Florida. The vehicle in which the defendant was riding was stopped at a traffic light facing north on Old Dixie Highway. Officer Steven Miller was stopped behind the defendant's vehicle. Upon the traffic light turning green, the defendant made a left hand turn onto Northlake Boulevard. Officer Miller testified that the defendant did not use a left turn signal prior to or during the left hand turn. Officer Miller also testified that neither he nor the drivers of other vehicles were affected by the defendant's failure to use a turn signal while making that turn. The officer's testimony also indicated that he observed a white light emanating from a crack in the plastic lens covering the tail light of the left rear of the defendant's vehicle. Officer Miller acknowledged that the plastic lens was cracked, but that the light was operating.

Because the defendant failed to use a turn signal in making his left hand turn and because white light was emanating from a crack in the plastic lens covering the taillight, Officer Miller effected a traffic stop of the defendant's vehicle. Upon being stopped by Officer Miller, the defendant provided the officer with identification. Officer Miller ran a check on the defendant, and learned that there was an outstanding warrant for the defendant's arrest for failure to appear in another proceeding. As a result of the outstanding warrant, the defendant was arrested. A search incident to the defendant's arrest revealed the firearm which formed the basis of the charge against him in this case. A subsequent investigation determined that the warrant which provided the basis for the defendant's arrest was issued due to another person's failure to appear. Someone other than the defendant was issued a notice to appear in the other case and wrongfully gave the issuing officer the defendant's name and date of birth. A fingerprint was taken of the individual to whom the notice to appear was issued. It is undisputed the print taken did not match that of the defendant's.

Id. at 294-95.

Respondent was charged in this case with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He sought to suppress the seizure of the firearm, contending that the traffic stop which preceded the arrest was unlawful and that the warrant which provided the basis for his arrest was wrongfully issued. The trial judge agreed with respondent that the traffic stop was unlawful based upon this Court's decisions in State v. Riley, 638 So.2d 507 (Fla.1994) (failure to use turn signal without driver's conduct creating reasonable safety concern does not constitute violation of statute), and Doctor v. State, 596 So.2d 442 (Fla.1992) (cracked taillight was not violation of law).

However, in the instant case, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the firearm. Relying upon Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995), and United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), the trial court held that the law enforcement officer justifiably relied upon the arrest warrant, although it was later determined that the arrest warrant had been erroneously issued. The trial court next held that the fact that the respondent was illegally stopped by the arresting officer did not require suppression of the firearm because the firearm was found in a search which was incident to the arrest based upon the outstanding warrant and was sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop. The trial court rested this portion of its holding upon United States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515 (7th Cir.1997); Wigfall v. State, 323 So.2d 587 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975); State v. Foust, 262 So.2d 686 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); and Ruffin v. State, 201 Ga.App. 792, 412 S.E.2d 850 (1991). Respondent pled nolo contendere to the felony firearm possession offense, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's order on the motion to suppress.

Respondent appealed to the Fourth District Court of Appeal. The district court agreed with the trial court that the traffic stop was without a legal basis and that the law enforcement officer, in arresting Frierson, justifiably relied on the outstanding but invalid warrant. However, based on its prior precedent, the district court concluded that because the traffic stop was without reasonable cause, the firearm seized in the search of respondent incident to the arrest on the outstanding warrant was subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree, notwithstanding the outstanding warrant. As earlier stated, the district court acknowledged conflict on this last issue and stated the conflict issue.

ANALYSIS

The State contends that the district court erred in respect to whether there was a lawful basis for the traffic stop. Respondent contends that the district court erred in determining that there was a lawful arrest based upon reliance on an invalid arrest warrant. We decline to review these issues and limit our review to the issue upon which the district court has certified conflict.

Decision on Jurisdiction

Although we clearly have jurisdiction based upon the Fourth District's certification, see art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const., we also have the discretion to determine that we should not exercise our jurisdiction in this case. Respondent initially asserts that we should exercise our discretion and discharge jurisdiction because Foust does not conflict expressly and directly with this case. Specifically, respondent maintains that the traffic stop of respondent in this case only required "founded suspicion," which is a different issue than that in Foust. See Foust, 262 So.2d at 688 ("[T]he reasonableness of the search after arrest was not affected by the fact that the original stopping . . . may have been without probable cause."). Thus, according to respondent, Foust should be read simply as rejecting the requirement of probable cause, as opposed to founded suspicion, which was the apparent standard for the stop in the Foust case. We agree with respondent that a stop for the violation of motor vehicle laws is similar to the investigative detention in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and may be made when there is founded suspicion. However, respondent gives Foust too narrow a reading. We read Foust to mean that the search incident to the outstanding warrant was sufficiently attenuated from the illegality of the original stop so as not to be sufficiently tainted by it to be the fruit of the poisonous tree, regardless of whether the standard for the original stop was probable cause or founded suspicion.

We likewise do not agree with respondent's assertion that even if the Foust decision conflicted with the Fourth District's decision in this case, the Third District's later case of Rozier v. State, 368 So.2d 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), changed the law in the Third District from Foust. See Rozier, 368 So.2d at 380 ("[T]he motion to suppress should have been granted because the police officers' initial stop of the defendant, which resulted in the arrest, was based on no more than a `bare suspicion of illegal activity' rather than the `founded' or `reasonable' suspicion constitutionally required to support it."). First, Rozier was a decision by another panel of the Third District which does not mention Foust and therefore could not and did not recede from Foust. Additionally, not only does the Fourth District certify that there is a present conflict with Foust, we note that the Second District in Mays v. State, 887 So.2d 402, 404 n. 3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), held that there is a present conflict on the issue.

Resolution of Conflict

We conclude that we should resolve the conflict. We frame the conflict...