Rust v. Reyer

• Decision Date: 02 April 1998
• Citation: 91 N.Y.2d 355,670 N.Y.S.2d 822,693 N.E.2d 1074
• Parties: , 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 3017 Carol RUST, Appellant, v. Arthur REYER et al., Defendants, and Heidi Reyer, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 822

670 N.Y.S.2d 822

91 N.Y.2d 355, 693 N.E.2d 1074, 1998

N.Y. Slip Op. 3017

Carol RUST, Appellant, v. Arthur REYER et al., Defendants and Heidi Reyer, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 2, 1998.

Carlucci & Legum, L.L.P., Mineola (Steven G. Legum, of counsel), for appellant.

Devitt, Spellman, Barrett, Callahan, Leyden & Kenney, L.L.P., Smithtown (L. Kevin Sheridan, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

KAYE, Chief Judge.

This appeal centers on the question whether the host of a "keg party" for minors, in the circumstances presented, might be liable as a person who, by "unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic beverages" for minors, caused the injuries of a third party (General Obligations Law § 11-100). We conclude that there are material factual issues to be resolved and consequently reverse the Appellate Division order summarily dismissing the second cause of action against defendant Heidi Reyer.

Plaintiff Carol Rust, a minor, was injured when she was punched in the face by Stephen Tarantino, also a minor, after a party at Reyer's house on October 7, 1989. Tarantino had been drinking heavily at the party, and in his inebriated state struck plaintiff during a brawl on the street outside Reyer's house in Merrick, New York.

The facts, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiff, are as follows. When Reyer, then 17, learned that her parents were going to be on vacation over the weekend of October 7, 1989, she planned a party in their absence. Word of the party reached the ears of a high school fraternity--of which Tarantino was a member--known as the Marquis. Representatives of the fraternity approached Reyer and attempted to convince her to allow them to bring beer. Those attending the party would pay a one-time fee to receive a 16-ounce cup, allowing them unlimited access to the beer. Reyer agreed to have the beer at her party, in exchange for a portion of the proceeds.

On the day of the party, fraternity members arrived with several kegs of beer, which Reyer allowed them to store in the garage. Fraternity members later set up the kegs, where they could be accessed from the Reyers' backyard. As the party started, the fraternity stationed three individuals at the entrance to the backyard, one to collect money, a second to stamp the hands of those who had paid, and a third to hand out cups. Reyer attempted to arrange for her friends to have free beer, and she observed many of the estimated 150 underaged guests consuming alcohol. She did not herself drink or dispense beer at the party, collect money, stamp hands or distribute cups.

Later, responding to neighbors' complaints, the police arrived. Reyer and the police dispersed the party but the guests, including Rust and Tarantino, milled around in the street near Reyer's house. There, a melee erupted and Tarantino--impaired by the alcohol he had consumed at the party--punched plaintiff once in the face, severely injuring her. After the party the kegs were stored in the Reyers' garage, where they were later retrieved by the fraternity. Reyer never received the promised share of the fees, although she sought payment several times after the party.

Rust ultimately brought suit against Reyer, her parents and Tarantino, alleging negligence and violations of General Obligations Law §§ 11-100 and 11-101. Tarantino settled with plaintiff, and after joinder of issue the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Plaintiff opposed only that portion of the motion dismissing the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim against Reyer. Supreme Court first dismissed the uncontested claims and then granted the remainder of defendant's motion. Relying on the principle that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be narrowly construed, the court held that while "Heidi Reyer may be said to have 'facilitated' the furnishing of beer to Stephen Tarantino and other party guests, the statute cannot be stretched to impose liability for this type of conduct." The court further concluded that Reyer had not assisted in procuring the alcohol, because fraternity members had purchased the beer, brought it to the party and personally dispensed it.

Plaintiff appealed only that portion of Supreme Court's order dismissing the General Obligations Law § 11-100 claim against Reyer, and the Appellate Division affirmed. That court held that "General Obligations Law § 11-100 is not applicable to a homeowner who has neither supplied alcohol to nor procured alcohol for consumption by an underage person" (235 A.D.2d 413, 652 N.Y.S.2d 309). We granted plaintiff leave to appeal and now reverse.

Analysis

Underage drinking is a significant societal problem that has generated widespread concern (see, e.g., French, Kaput and Wildman, Special Project: Social Host Liability for the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 70 Cornell L.Rev. 1058 [1985]; Comment, Killer Party: Proposing Civil Liability for Social Hosts who Serve Alcohol to Minors, 30 J Marshall L Rev 245, 257-258 [1996] ["Killer Party "] ). All 50 States have set minimum drinking ages, a measure which has to some extent prevented minors from themselves purchasing alcohol at bars and liquor stores. ¹ Those same laws, however, have proven far less effective in stopping minors from obtaining alcohol in a social setting, where it is provided to them by individuals who have little, if any, financial disincentive for doing so (see, e.g., Killer Party, op. cit., at 260).

States have responded to this circumvention of their minimum age laws in a variety of ways. Some have by statute imposed civil liability, criminal liability or both on gratuitous providers of alcohol. In other States, courts have recognized a common-law duty of the provider (see generally, Annotation, Social Host's Liability For Injuries Incurred By Third Parties As A Result Of Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R.4th 16). New York has taken the former approach: in addition to making it a crime to furnish alcoholic beverages to a minor in most cases (Penal Law § 260.20[2] ), in 1983 the Legislature enacted General Obligations Law § 11-100, which provides:

"Any person who shall be injured in person, property, means of support or otherwise, by reason of the intoxication or impairment of ability of any person under the age of twenty-one years, whether resulting in his death or not, shall have a right of action to recover actual damages against any person who knowingly causes such intoxication or impairment of ability by unlawfully furnishing to or unlawfully assisting in procuring alcoholic beverages for such person with knowledge or reasonable cause to believe that such person was under the age of twenty-one years" (General Obligations Law § 11-100[1] [emphasis supplied] ). ²

Conceding that Reyer herself never actually served alcohol to any party guest, plaintiff nonetheless contends that Reyer's actions constituted "furnishing" under the statute. Neither the relevant statutes (including related enactments General Obligations Law § 11-101 and Alcoholic Beverage Control Law § 65) nor our prior cases define the term "furnishing," which is ordinarily understood to mean "to provide in any way," "to supply" or "to give" (see, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 675 [6th ed.1990]; Webster's Deluxe Unabridged Dictionary 743 [2d ed.1983]; accord, Ball v. Allstate Ins. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 22, 25, 595 N.Y.S.2d 711, 611 N.E.2d 750).

Here, Reyer allegedly gave...