Rutledge v. Hewlett-Packard Co.

• Citation: 190 Cal.Rptr.3d 411,238 Cal.App.4th 1164
• Decision Date: 22 July 2015
• Docket Number: H036790
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Ed RUTLEDGE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HEWLETT–PACKARD COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent; Bizcom Electronics, Inc., Objector and Respondent.

238 Cal.App.4th 1164

190 Cal.Rptr.3d 411

Ed RUTLEDGE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants

v. HEWLETT–PACKARD COMPANY, Defendant and Respondent;Bizcom Electronics, Inc., Objector and Respondent.

H036790

Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.

Filed July 22, 2015

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing August 21, 2015

Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellants Ed Rutledge et al.: Green & Noblin, Robert S. Green, Bramson, Plutzik, Mahler & Birkhaeuser, Jenelle Welling, Kershaw, Cutter & Ratinoff, C. Brooks Cutter

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent Hewlett–Packard Company: Drinker Biddle & Reath, Michael J. Stortz, Beth O'Neal Arnese, Bergeson, Daniel J. Bergeson, John W. Fowler

No appearance for Objector and Respondent

Opinion

RUSHING, P.J.

This case is a class action brought by purchasers of notebook computers that were manufactured by Hewlett-Packard Company (HP). Appellants are I Braun Degenshein (Degenshein), and Susanna Giuliano-Ghahramani (Giuliano-Ghahramani), both of whom are representative plaintiffs of a class of California residents who purchased certain HP notebook computers.

The basis of appellants' consumer action against HP is that certain notebook computers manufactured by HP contained inverters that HP knew would likely fail and cause display screens to dim and darken at some point before the end of the notebook's useful life.

Appellants alleged claims against HP for violation of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200 et seq. ), violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) (Civ.Code, § 1750 et seq. ), unjust enrichment and breach of express warranty.

After years of litigation, the trial court ultimately made a “no merits” determination as to the CLRA claim, and granted HP's motion for summary judgment as to appellants' remaining claims.

On appeal, appellants challenge seven trial court orders: two summary adjudication orders related to two different class representatives and the class itself, two class certification orders related to denial of a nationwide class and the denial of certification of the CLRA claim, and three discovery sanctions orders.¹

Summary Adjudication

“ ‘The purpose of the law of summary judgment [or summary adjudication] is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.’ [Citation.] As such, the summary judgment statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c ), ‘provides a particularly suitable means to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's prima facie case and/or of the defendant's [defense].’ [Citation.]” (Law Offices of Dixon R. Howell v. Valley (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1091, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 499 (Valley ).)

The moving party “bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493, fn. omitted (Aguilar ).)

A cause of action has no merit under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (o), “if either of the following exists: [¶] (1) One or more of the elements of the cause of action cannot be separately established, even if that element is separately pleaded[, or] [¶] (2)[a] defendant establishes an affirmative defense to that cause of action.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.) The party moving for summary judgment “bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c ; Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493.)

Thus, as here, when a defendant moves for summary judgment, he must make a prima facie showing, i.e., “he must present evidence that would require a reasonable trier of fact not to find any underlying material fact more likely than not-otherwise, he would not be entitled to judgment as a matter of law, but would have to present his evidence to a trier of fact.” (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 851, 107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493, fn. omitted.)

“The moving party must satisfy his or her initial burden before the opposing party must controvert anything. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1) & (2).) Accordingly, a moving defendant who claims that the plaintiff cannot prove all the elements of his case must present evidence in support of this claim. The defendant cannot simply challenge the plaintiff to prove his case by opposition. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 854–855 [107 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 24 P.3d 493].)” (Y.K.A. Industries, Inc. v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 339, 353, 94 Cal.Rptr.3d 424 (Y.K.A. ).) In other words, “a plaintiff resisting a motion for summary judgment bears no burden to establish any element of his or her case unless and until the defendant presents evidence either affirmatively negating that element (proving its absence in fact), or affirmatively showing that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot acquire evidence to prove its existence.” (Reeves v. Safeway Stores, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 95, 107, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 717.)

The court's “primary function [in evaluating a summary judgment motion] is to identify issues rather than to determine [them]. [Citation.] ... If the evidence is in conflict, the factual issues must be resolved by trial.” (Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832, 839, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 540.) Thus, should the court determine that triable issues of fact exists, the summary judgment motion must be denied. (Chavez v. Carpenter (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1433, 1448, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 534.) “There is to be no weighing of evidence.” (Kids' Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 880, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 158.)

Our review of the granting or denial of summary judgment is de novo. (Valley, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 499.) In conducting such de novo review, we “consider[ ] all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained. [Citation.]” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089.) “This review consists of ‘an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court's ruling, [in which we] apply[ ] the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale. [Citation.]” (Valley, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1092, 29 Cal.Rptr.3d 499.)

Factual Background

Here, appellants challenge two orders of the trial court granting summary adjudication in favor of HP. The first is of Degenshein's claims in the first amended complaint.² The second is of Giuliano-Ghahramani's and the class claims in the second amended complaint.

The first amended complaint was filed on October 14, 2003, and alleged four causes of action against HP: Violation of the CLRA, violation of the UCL, unjust enrichment³ and breach of express warranty.

The first amended complaint included Degenshein as representative plaintiff. Degenshein purchased a Zinfandel 4.0 notebook computer in April 2002 that came with a standard one-year warranty from HP. Degenshein experienced problems with his display screen blacking out shortly before the expiration of his one-year warranty, but did not notify HP of the problem with his notebook until two months after the warranty had expired.

The second amended complaint was filed on February 24, 2010, asserting the same causes of action as the first amended complaint. The second amended complaint adds Giuliano-Ghahramani as representative plaintiff. Giuliano-Ghahramani purchased a Zinfandel 3.5 notebook computer in January 2002, and experienced problems with the display screen in November 2002. Giuliano-Ghahramani submitted the notebook to HP during the warranty and HP replaced the inverter.

In June 2009, the trial court granted HP's motion for summary adjudication and made a no merits determination as to Degenshein's claims. HP moved for entry of judgment against Degenshein. The court denied the motion, and instead, allowed Degenshein to amend the complaint to add Giuliano-Ghahramani as plaintiff. On October 7, 2009, the court approved Giuliano-Ghahramani as class representative. Giuliano-Ghahramani filed the second amended complaint in February 2010.

In June 2010, HP filed a motion for summary judgment as to Giuliano-Ghahramani and the class. The trial court granted the motion, and on April 11, 2011, the trial court entered judgment against Degenshein, Giuliano-Ghahramani, and the class as certified by the court.

CLRA⁴ and UCL Claims

“The CLRA proscribes particular ‘unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices' in transactions for the sale or lease of goods or services to consumers. (Civ.Code, § 1770, subd. (a)... .)” (Collins v. eMachines, Inc. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 249, 255, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 588 (Collins ).)

The CLRA “ ‘enacted in 1970, “established a nonexclusive statutory remedy for ‘unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer. ...’ [Citation.]” ' [Citation.] ‘The self-declared purposes of the act are “to protect consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection.” (Civ.Code, § 1760... .)’ ” (Wang v. Massey Chevrolet (20...