Rutter v. Oakwood Living Centers of Va. Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 June 2011
• Docket Number: Record No. 100499.
• Citation: 710 S.E.2d 460,282 Va. 4
• Parties: Barbara A. RUTTER, Administratrix of the Estate of Virgil W. Rutter, Deceased.v.OAKWOOD LIVING CENTERS OF VIRGINIA, INC.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

282 Va. 4

710 S.E.2d 460

Barbara A. RUTTER, Administratrix of the Estate of Virgil W. Rutter, Deceased.

v.OAKWOOD LIVING CENTERS OF VIRGINIA, INC.

Record No. 100499.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

June 9, 2011.

John B. Gaidies (Joynes & Gaidies, on briefs), Virginia Beach, for appellant.Jontille D. Ray (Richard J. Cromwell; Erin Q. Ashcroft, Norfolk; McGuireWoods, Richmond, on brief), for appellee.Present: KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN, MILLETTE, and MIMS, JJ., and RUSSELL and KOONTZ, S.JJ.OPINION BY Chief Justice CYNTHIA D. KINSER.

In this appeal, we conclude that Code § 8.01–335(B), governing the discontinuance or dismissal of inactive cases, does not permit a trial court to discontinue or dismiss such a case with a self-executing, prospective order. As that conclusion renders the order appealed from not final for purposes of appeal, we will dismiss this appeal without prejudice.

RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Barbara A. Rutter (Rutter), in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband Virgil W. Rutter, filed a wrongful death action in July 2000 in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach. Rutter named as defendants Oakwood Living Centers of Virginia, Inc. (Oakwood), an assisted living facility where Virgil Rutter had lived prior to his death; Prism Rehab Systems, Inc. (Prism Rehab), a company that had contracted with Oakwood to provide physical therapy services to residents of Oakwood; Thomas P. Dixon (Dixon), the president of Prism Rehab; and Frank Knowlton (Knowlton), an employee of Prism Rehab whose alleged negligence caused the decedent to fall and sustain a hip fracture, allegedly resulting in his death. Rutter claimed that Oakwood, Prism Rehab, and Dixon were vicariously liable for Knowlton's negligence and sought damages against the defendants, jointly and severally.

In September 2000, Dixon and Prism Rehab filed a notice of bankruptcy stay, notifying the circuit court that both Prism Rehab and its parent company had filed bankruptcy proceedings and that Rutter's action against Prism Rehab and Dixon was stayed pursuant to federal bankruptcy law. In response, the circuit court entered an order on October 4, 2000 (the 2000 Order), stating:

[T]his action is removed from the docket of this [c]ourt with leave to counsel to place this action back on the docket of this [c]ourt upon resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding should such procedure be deemed advisable.

This action shall be ordered to be discontinued if after three years there has been no further order or proceeding under [Code] § 8.01–335(B)[.]

Following entry of this order, Rutter, however, continued discovery against Oakwood and in February 2001 filed a motion to compel Oakwood to answer interrogatories. Oakwood responded by filing a notice of the bankruptcy stay order. Asserting that the 2000 Order was “unclear ... as to whether the action against Oakwood was also removed” from the docket, Oakwood filed a motion requesting the circuit court to remove Rutter's action against it pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings. In March 2001, Knowlton also filed a motion to stay, claiming that the action against him was stayed pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceedings.

The circuit court did not rule on either motion, and the docket reflects no activity in the case until Rutter filed a motion in June 2005 to set a trial date. Rutter stated the bankruptcy stay was lifted in April 2002 and the action against the defendants thus could proceed pursuant to the circuit court's 2000 Order. Again, no orders or proceedings took place until April 2009, when Oakwood filed a plea of the statute of limitations and/or motion to dismiss. According to Oakwood, the 2000 Order served to discontinue Rutter's action on October 4, 2003 pursuant to Code § 8.01–335(B) because, as of that date, the action had been inactive for three years. Oakwood asserted that because the matter “abate[d]” as of October 4, 2003, Rutter then had two months, the balance of the statute of limitations remaining when she originally filed her complaint, in which to refile her action. Alternatively, Oakwood asserted that Rutter could have reinstated the discontinued action, pursuant to Code § 8.01–335(B), within one year of the discontinuance in October 2003. Oakwood argued that because Rutter had failed to employ either remedy, she could no longer pursue the action.

Rutter responded that the 2000 Order only removed the action from the circuit court's docket and did not actually discontinue it. Rutter maintained that the language of the 2000 Order contemplated a subsequent order being entered after three years of inactivity and noted that no such order had been entered. Rutter also contended that Code § 8.01–335(B) does not permit a prospective dismissal of a case, meaning the 2000 Order was void to the extent that it attempted to do so.

The circuit court sustained Oakwood's motion. In an order entered on December 18, 2009 (the 2009 Order), the court stated that the

case was removed from the [c]ourt's docket and discontinued as of October 4, 2003. Under the provisions of [Code] § 8.01–244 ..., a two year statute of limitations applies to wrongful death claims, leaving two months following the discontinuance of the case for [Rutter] to re-file her claim.

Because Rutter had not re-filed her action within that time, the circuit court dismissed “the Complaint against Oakwood” with prejudice.

Rutter appeals from the circuit court's judgment. She contends, inter alia, that Code § 8.01–335(B) does not permit a trial court to dismiss an action prospectively, but instead requires entry of an order subsequent to the period of inactivity. Thus, according to Rutter, the circuit court erred in sustaining Oakwood's plea of the statute of limitations and dismissing the action.

ANALYSIS

The primary question on appeal, whether the circuit court erred by treating the 2000 Order as a self-executing order prospectively discontinuing Rutter's action under Code § 8.01–335(B), requires the Court to interpret the provisions of that statute. Statutory interpretation is a pure question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007). In interpreting a statute, we must “ ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature,’ which is usually self-evident from the statutory language.” Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., Inc., 271 Va. 304, 309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006) (quoting Chase v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 (2003)). When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous, we apply the statute in accordance with its plain language. HCA Health Servs. of Va., Inc. v. Levin, 260 Va. 215, 220, 530 S.E.2d 417, 419–20 (2000).

The provisions of Code § 8.01–335(B) state:

Any court in which is pending a case wherein for more than three years there has been no order or proceeding, except to continue it, may, in its discretion, order it to be struck from its docket and the action shall thereby be discontinued. The court may dismiss cases under this subsection without any notice to the parties. The clerk shall provide the parties with a copy of the final order discontinuing or dismissing the case. Any case discontinued or dismissed under the provisions of this subsection may be reinstated, on motion, after notice to the parties in interest, if known, or their counsel of record within one year from the date of such order but not after.

The statute's purpose is

to enable trial courts to eliminate from their dockets cases for which there is no reasonable prospect of trial. In summarily dismissing such cases, trial courts may thus promote efficiency in the administration of justice by saving the time of court personnel which would otherwise be required to preserve on the courts' dockets actions long forgotten or abandoned by litigants and lawyers.

Nash v. Jewell, 227 Va. 230, 234, 315 S.E.2d 825, 827 (1984). As recently stated, that the “plain meaning of this statute is that any action in which there is no activity by the parties for three or more years may be removed from the court's docket, either by dismissal or discontinuance.” Conger v. Barrett, 280 Va. 627, 632, 702 S.E.2d 117, 119 (2010). That is, “[a] case must be inactive for three years before a circuit court may dismiss a case sua sponte under Code § 8.01–335(B).” Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 401, 649 S.E.2d 672, 677 (2007).

In light of the plain terms of Code § 8.01–335(B) and its purpose, we conclude that the circuit court erred when it held that the 2000 Order served to discontinue Rutter's action as of October 2003. The provisions of Code § 8.01–335(B) allow a discontinuance when, for three years or more, “ there has been no order or proceeding.” (Emphasis added.) A trial court's determination that there has been no order or proceeding for at least three years must be made contemporaneously with the entry of the order discontinuing or dismissing the action. This temporal requirement complies with the purpose of the statute: “to enable trial courts to eliminate from their dockets cases for which there is no reasonable prospect of trial.” Nash, 227 Va. at 234, 315 S.E.2d at 827 (emphasis added). A trial court prospectively entering a self-executing order is unable to determine whether there has in fact been “ no order or proceeding” for three or more years, or whether there is a reasonable prospect of trial. In short, such an order would preclude a trial court from considering factors relevant to the exercise of its discretion to discontinue an action under Code § 8.01–335(B).

That subsection also requires the clerk of the trial court to provide the parties with a copy of the final order discontinuing or dismissing the action and allows reinstatement of such within one year of the entry of the order. Code § 8.01–335(B). However, in the case of a...