Smith v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 17 May 2016
• Docket Number: Record No. 1117–15–1.
• Citation: 785 S.E.2d 500,66 Va.App. 382
• Parties: Lamarr Ramon Masean SMITH v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

66 Va.App. 382

785 S.E.2d 500

Lamarr Ramon Masean SMITH

v.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 1117–15–1.

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Chesapeake.

May 17, 2016.

Kurt A. Gilchrist, for appellant.

Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Present: HUFF, C.J., and RUSSELL, J., and BUMGARDNER, S.J.

HUFF, Chief Judge.

Lamarr R. Smith (“appellant”) appeals his conviction of felony hit and run, in violation of Code § 46.2–894. After a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Portsmouth (“trial court”), appellant was sentenced to one year and six months of active incarceration. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he never left the scene of the accident and provided all required information to the police officer. Because appellant did not provide all the information required by Code § 46.2–894, this Court affirms appellant's conviction.

I. BACKGROUND

On appeal, “we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc ) (quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004) ). So viewed, the evidence is as follows.

In April 2013, appellant and his girlfriend, Sheryl Boone (“Boone”), lived in an apartment over a restaurant in Portsmouth. Sydney Meers (“Meers”), the restaurant's owner, lived directly across the street from the restaurant. Shortly after midnight on April 2, 2013, Meers heard a car's engine “rev up” and looked outside where he “saw a car run into [his] building.” Meers recognized appellant as the driver.

Detective Roesch (“Roesch”) of the Portsmouth Police Department arrived at the accident scene. As Roesch was taking photographs and inspecting the crime scene, he noticed that “a section of the driver's side air bag ... appeared to contain what looked like a blood stain.” During this investigation, appellant approached Roesch on “several occasions,” inquiring “in regards to any possible suspects ..., as he previously had stated that he believed someone had stolen his vehicle and then crashed it into the building....” After Roesch indicated that a portion of the “deployed driver's front air bag ... appeared to have a blood stain,” appellant responded that “he had previously cut his finger earlier in the day and was concerned that that would somehow have contaminated the air bag.” Appellant also told Roesch that he was not “driving the vehicle as it struck the building.”

On cross-examination, Roesch testified that appellant provided Roesch with his name and that all of his contact with appellant occurred at the site of the crash. Roesch also testified that upon receiving appellant's name he “would have ... checked to see if [appellant] had a valid driver's license....” Roesch knew that appellant resided in the apartment above the restaurant due to “[appellant's] statements later on,” and Roesch testified that the car was at the scene of the accident and, therefore, was “available [for him] to look at the registration.”

At the conclusion of the Commonwealth's evidence, appellant moved to strike the evidence on the ground that the hit and run statute required him to provide four pieces of information at the scene of the accident, all of which he either gave to Roesch or were “at [his] disposal.” The trial court denied the motion.

Testifying for appellant, Boone stated that on the night of the crash, she and appellant had an altercation after which appellant left with his friend, Richard. Around midnight, Boone heard a loud boom, which shook the building. She walked outside to see appellant standing outside her car, which was on the sidewalk. Additionally, appellant testified that Richard had been driving the car at the time of the crash and that Richard left the accident scene. He further testified that he injured his hand during the crash and that his bleeding finger touched the inflated airbag when he reached to turn the car off. When reminded that he initially told the police the vehicle had been stolen, appellant testified that he was in “panic mode” and was not thinking at the time.

At the close of all the evidence, appellant renewed his motions to strike arguing, in part, that appellant had provided all information required by Code § 46.2–894. The Commonwealth responded by arguing that “[h]aving been the driver, [appellant] was required to admit that to the police” under the statute. The trial court denied appellant's renewed motion to strike and found him guilty as charged. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony hit and run. Specifically, appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed because he never left the scene of the accident and provided Roesch with all the information that is required by Code § 46.2–894. The Commonwealth responds by arguing that appellant did not satisfy the requirements of Code § 46.2–894 because he did not inform Roesch that he was driving the vehicle.

Our standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is firmly established:

[W]hen the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the evidence and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. The trial court's judgment should be affirmed unless it appears that it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.

Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 283, 384 S.E.2d 775, 779 (1989) (citations omitted). Additionally, under this familiar standard of review, “[a]n appellate court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193, 677 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Id.

Appellant's argument also requires this Court to review the trial court's interpretation of Code § 46.2–894 ; such “[q]uestions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. ” Sarafin v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 320, 325, 764 S.E.2d 71, 74 (2014) (citing Belew v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 173, 177, 726 S.E.2d 257, 259 (2012) ). This Court construes statutes to “ ‘ascertain and give effect to the intention’ of the General Assembly.” Farhoumand v. Commonwealth, 288 Va. 338, 343, 764 S.E.2d 95, 98 (2014) (quoting Rutter v. Oakwood Living Ctrs. of Va., Inc., 282 Va. 4, 9, 710 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2011) ). “[W]e must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity.” Scott v. Commonwealth, 58 Va.App. 35, 48, 707 S.E.2d 17, 24 (2011) (quoting Evans v. Evans, 280 Va. 76, 82, 695 S.E.2d 173, 176 (2010) ). “Accordingly, ‘[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction.’ ” Id. (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) ). “Where the legislature has used words of a plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon them a construction which amounts to holding the legislature did not mean what it has actually expressed.” Crislip v. Commonwealth, 37 Va.App. 66, 71–72, 554 S.E.2d 96, 98 (2001) (quoting Dominion Trust Co. v. Kenbridge Constr., 248 Va. 393, 396, 448 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1994) ).

Code § 46.2–894 provides,

The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident in which a person is killed or injured or in which an attended vehicle or other attended property is damaged shall immediately stop as close to the scene of the accident as possible without obstructing traffic ... and report his name, address, driver's license number, and vehicle registration number forthwith to the State Police or local law-enforcement agency, to the person struck and injured ..., or to the driver or some other occupant of the vehicle collided with or to the custodian of other damaged property.

In interpreting a previous, but nearly identical, version of Code § 46.2–894,¹ the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he duty imposed upon the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident is not passive. It requires positive, affirmative action;—that is, to stop and give the aid and information specified.” Herchenbach v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 217, 220, 38 S.E.2d 328, 329 (1946). In the present case, appellant contends that his conviction under this statute should be reversed because he remained at the scene of the accident and provided Roesch with “all the information required by law.” While he admits that he did not tell Roesch that he was the driver of the vehicle—in fact, he expressly denied that he was the driver—he contends that Code § 46.2–894 does not require such a disclosure. We disagree.

In Smith v. Commonwealth, 8 Va.App. 109, 115, 379 S.E.2d 374, 377 (1989), this Court held that the purpose of a former version of Code § 46.2–894 “is to prevent motorists involved in accidents from evading civil or criminal liability by leaving the scene of an accident and to require drivers involved in an accident to provide identification information and render assistance to injured parties.” See also Milazzo v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 734, 736–37, 668 S.E.2d 158, 159 (2008). “While we acknowledge the requirement that we strictly construe ambiguous penal statutes against the Commonwealth, Welch v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 558, 563, 628 S.E.2d 340, 342 (2006), we are also aware ‘that the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction.’ ”...