Ryan v. City of Providence

• Decision Date: 06 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2009-311-Appeal.,2009-311-Appeal.
• Citation: 11 A.3d 68
• Parties: John J. RYAN v. CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

11 A.3d 68

John J. RYAN

v.CITY OF PROVIDENCE et al.

No. 2009-311-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 6, 2011.

Joseph F. Penza, Jr., Esq., Warwick, for Plaintiff.

Anthony F. Cottone, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice FLAHERTY, for the Court.

Before the Court is the appeal of John J. Ryan, a retired captain of the ProvidencePolice Department. Ryan asks us to vacate a declaratory judgment of the Superior Court in which the trial justice held (1) that the city's Honest Service Ordinance of the Providence Code of Ordinances (HSO) does not require that there be a criminal conviction before action properly may be taken to reduce or revoke a retiree's pension, and (2) that any action taken by the city's retirement board (the board) pursuant to the ordinance will be reviewed by the Superior Court with deference toward the board's findings of fact. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.

Facts and Travel

There can be no argument that in the recent past, the municipal government in the city of Providence has been plagued by scandal and corruption. In the aftermath of a wide-ranging corruption probe, dubbed "Operation Plunder Dome" by the United States Attorney, a number of city officials were convicted in federal court of various acts of malfeasance.¹ During the course of the federal investigation, retired police chief Urbano Prignano, Jr. described a nefarious scheme within the police department in years past in which applicants for promotion were supplied surreptitiously with source materials for written examinations. In his statements about this sordid affair, Prignano implicated the plaintiff. Although Ryan neither was charged with any criminal wrongdoing, nor admitted any involvement in the scheme, the city, although allowing the issue to fester for several years, did not allow it to wither and die.²

Ryan began receiving monthly pension benefits when he retired from the police department on June 11, 2002. Six years later, on October 21, 2008, the board served Ryan with notice of its intention to hold a pre-deprivation hearing to consider a reduction or revocation of his retirement benefits.³ As grounds, the board alleged that Ryan violated the city's HSO during his tenure with the police department when he (1) "received under-priced or free vehicles, vehicle repairs, and other gifts from [a city vendor] while responsible for supervising [that vendor's] contract with the City;" (2) "participated in corrupting the Providence Police Department promotional processes by assisting certain favored officers in obtaining promotions and so-called source sheets for promotional examinations * * *;" and (3) "participated in corrupting the Providence Police Department promotional processes by accepting a source sheet * * * in advance of * * * taking the 1996 Captain promotional examination."

On November 18, 2008, Ryan filed suit in Superior Court seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the applicability of the HSO. In his complaint, Ryan asserted that the HSO requires an employee be convicted of or plead guilty or nolo contendere to a crime related to his public employment before the board can convene a reduction or revocation hearing. He further sought an injunction to prevent the board from proceeding with his hearing until the court could determine the applicability of the HSO.⁴

To address what it considered to be common legal questions, the court consolidated Ryan's case with those of several individuals who already had had their pensions revoked or substantially reduced by the board, namely Anthony Annarino, Frank Corrente, Kathleen Parsons, and Urbano Prignano. ⁵ The board agreed to stay the hearing process pending the trial court's determination of questions of first impression pertaining to the HSO: (1) Is a criminal conviction a prerequisite to action by the board in all cases?; (2) Does the Superior Court have jurisdiction to hear an action brought by the board to enforce its recommendations under the HSO?; (3) If that court does have jurisdiction, should it apply a deferential or a de novo standard of review when reviewing decisions made by the board?

The trial justice issued his decision on September 8, 2009.⁶ He held that an employee's pension could be reduced or revoked if he failed to give "honorable service," and therefore, that a criminal conviction was not a necessary condition to reduce or revoke an employee's pension under the HSO. He further determined that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over actions brought under the HSO, and that once the board filed a civil case in Superior Court under § 17-189.1(a)(5) of the HSO, deference would be given to the board's decisions.⁷

On appeal, Ryan asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial justice and hold that a conviction is a prerequisite for the board to hold a hearing to seek to reduce or revoke an employee's pension, and that the Superior Court must review the board's findings de novo in civil actions brought under § 17-189.1(a)(5) of the HSO.⁸ There are no material facts in dispute, and we are called upon to interpret § 17-189.1 of Providence's Code of Ordinances.

Standard of Review

This Court, as the final arbiter on questions of statutory construction, reviews such questions de novo. D'Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1224 (R.I.2005); Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I.2001). "When interpreting an ordinance, we employ the same rules of construction that we apply when interpreting statutes." Ruggiero v. City of Providence, 893 A.2d 235, 237 (R.I.2006); accord Mongony v. Bevilacqua, 432 A.2d 661, 663 (R.I.1981).

When we construe a statute or an ordinance, "our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intendedby the Legislature." D'Amico, 866 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Webster, 774 A.2d at 75 ). We must "determin[e] and effectuat[e] that legislative intent and attribut[e] to the enactment the most consistent meaning." In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1382 (R.I.1992). "That intent is discovered from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute." Berthiaume v. School Committee of Woonsocket, 121 R.I. 243, 247, 397 A.2d 889, 892 (1979). "It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meanings." Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1226 (R.I.1996). "This is particularly true where the Legislature has not defined or qualified the words used within the statute." D'Amico, 866 A.2d at 1224 (quoting Markham v. Allstate Insurance Co., 116 R.I. 152, 156, 352 A.2d 651, 654 (1976) ). In giving words their plain-meaning, however, we note that this "approach is not the equivalent of myopic literalism." In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 150 (R.I.2006). "When we determine the true import of statutory language, it is entirely proper for us to look to 'the sense and meaning fairly deducible from the context.' " Id. (quoting In re Estate of Roche, 16 N.J. 579, 109 A.2d 655, 659 (1954) ). As we previously have held, it would be "foolish and myopic literalism to focus narrowly on" one statutory section without regard for the broader context. In re Brown, 903 A.2d at 150.

Thus, in interpreting a statute or ordinance, we first accept the principle that "statutes should not be construed to achieve meaningless or absurd results." Berthiaume, 121 R.I. at 247, 397 A.2d at 892. "[W]e [then] consider the entire statute as a whole; individual sections must be considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other sections." Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I.1994); accord Bailey v. American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I.1992); Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d 216, 218 (R.I.1987).

IDefining Honorable Service

AProvidence's Honorable Service Ordinance

To interpret the ordinance, the endeavor that is our task in this appeal, we begin by quoting it in its entirety. The ordinance, § 17-189.1,—"Honorable service, revocation or reduction of retirement benefits of employees committing crime related to public employment," says:

"(a) General provisions.

"(1) Payment of an employee's retirement allowance or annuity or other benefit or payments as provided in chapter 17 shall be for honorable service only.

"(2) For purposes of this section, 'crime related to his or her public employment' shall mean any of the following:

"a. The committing, abiding or abetting of an embezzlement of public funds;

"b. The committing, aiding or abetting of any felonious theft by a public employee from his or her employer;

"c. Bribery in connection with employment of a public employee; and

"d. The committing of any felony by a public employee who willfully, and with the intent to defraud, realizes or obtains, or attempts to realize or obtain, a profit, gain, or advantage for himself or herself or for some other person through the use or attempted use of power, rights, privileges, duties,or position of his or her public office or employment.

"(3) For purposes of this section, 'public employee' or 'employee' shall mean any current or former city elected official, or any appointed official or employee of the city, or of a city board, commission or agency, who is otherwise entitled to receive a retirement allowance or annuity or other benefit or payment of any kind pursuant to chapter 17.

"(4) Revocation or reduction authorized. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any retirement allowance or annuity or other benefit or payment of any kind to which an employee is otherwise entitled to under chapter 17 shall be revoked or reduced in accordance with the provisions of this section if such employee is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to any crime related to his or her public employment.

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