S.M. v. San Jose Unified Sch. Dist., Case No. 14-CV-03613-LHK
| Decision Date | 13 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 14-CV-03613-LHK |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
| Parties | S.M., by and through his Guardian ad Litem, J.R., Plaintiff, v. SAN JOSE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
Plaintiff S.M. ("Plaintiff"), by and through his mother and guardian ad litem, J.R., has brought suit against Defendants San Jose Unified School District (the "School District"), superintendent Vincent Matthews ("Matthews"), assistant superintendent Nancy Albarran ("Albarran"), director of curriculum Jackie Zeller ("Zeller"), principal Deepa Mukherjee ("Mukherjee"), and assistant principal Brad Craycroft ("Craycroft") (collectively, "Defendants"). Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 27.
The Court finds this motion suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and hereby VACATES the motion hearing set for April 16, 2015, at 1:30 p.m. The initial case management conference scheduled for April 29, 2015, at 2:00 p.m. remains as set. Having considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Courthereby GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss with leave to amend.
In 2011, Plaintiff was diagnosed with Klinefelter Syndrome, a chromosomal condition that affects male physical and cognitive development. First Amended Complaint ("FAC"), ECF No. 26 ¶¶ 40-41. Plaintiff also suffers from attention deficit hyperactive disorder. Id. ¶ 42. Since 2011, Plaintiff has been eligible for accommodations under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794.
In August 2013, the beginning of Plaintiff's junior year of high school, Plaintiff enrolled in an advanced placement calculus course ("AP Calculus"). FAC ¶¶ 46, 50. On August 2, 2013, thirteen days before the start of school, Plaintiff's mother requested that Defendants convene a Section 504 meeting to discuss what accommodations would be necessary for Plaintiff during the upcoming year. Id. ¶¶ 51, 55. No meeting was held until September 27, 2013—the seventh week of the school year. Id. ¶ 52. In the meantime, Plaintiff struggled with AP Calculus, causing him anxiety and weight loss. Id. ¶ 58. Plaintiff's mother asked that he be allowed to drop the class, and, according to Plaintiff, his teacher encouraged him to do so. Id. ¶ 59. The problem, Plaintiff says, is that his parents were told by high school staff that Plaintiff could not drop a course after the third day of school, even though, unbeknownst to Plaintiff's parents at the time, the School District had a written policy allowing students six weeks to drop classes. Id. ¶ 53.
At the September 27, 2013 meeting, Plaintiff's mother was told once again that Plaintiff could not drop AP Calculus because the three-day window had passed. FAC ¶ 60. On October 29, 2013, Plaintiff's mother wrote an e-mail to Craycroft, the school's assistant principal, asking him to allow her son to enroll in a lower-level math class. Id. ¶ 62. She was told no exceptions would be made. Id. ¶ 63. Mukherjee, the school's principal, confirmed the three-day policy in an October 31, 2013 e-mail. Id. ¶ 64. Plaintiff's mother appealed to Zeller, the School District's director of curriculum, who wrote in a November 1, 2013 e-mail that Plaintiff would receive a failing grade if he dropped AP Calculus because more than six weeks of the semester had passed.Id. ¶ 65. Matthews and Albarran, respectively the School District's superintendent and assistant superintendent, affirmed Zeller's position. Id. ¶ 66.
On February 5, 2014, Plaintiff's mother requested another Section 504 hearing, this time to discuss Defendants' alleged failure to provide her son with appropriate accommodations. Id. ¶ 71. Five days later, Plaintiff was permitted to drop AP Calculus, but he was assigned a failing grade for both semesters. Id. ¶ 72. On May 29, 2014, the day before the scheduled Section 504 hearing, the hearing officer disqualified herself, prompting Defendants to cancel the hearing. Id. ¶¶ 80-81. The Section 504 hearing was ultimately convened on October 13, 2014, with Sue Hollingshead (the "Officer") presiding. Id. ¶¶ 83-84. At the hearing, Plaintiff requested that the Officer order the School District to fund an independent Section 504 evaluation of Plaintiff's accommodations and to remove the failing AP Calculus grade from Plaintiff's transcript. Id. ¶ 86. On November 21, 2014, the Officer issued a decision denying Plaintiff's requests for relief. Id. ¶ 87; see ECF No. 24 at 2.
On August 8, 2014, Plaintiff filed his original complaint in the instant lawsuit. ECF No. 1. On September 25, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss this action, ECF No. 10, which was reassigned to the undersigned on October 2, 2014, ECF No. 15. Following the Officer's November 21, 2014 decision, the parties stipulated on December 18, 2014, to allow Plaintiff to file the FAC. ECF No. 24. The next day, the Court granted the parties' stipulation and, accordingly, denied as moot Defendants' then-pending Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 25.
Plaintiff filed his FAC on December 30, 2014. ECF No. 26. In his FAC, Plaintiff asserted three causes of action: one for violating Section 504 and two under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") for violations of Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. FAC ¶¶ 88-116. The Section 504 claim is asserted against the School District, while the Section 1983 claims are asserted against the named individual defendants. See id. On January 13, 2015, Defendants again moved to dismiss this action. ECF No. 27 ("Mot."). Plaintiff opposed the motion on January 27, 2015. ECF No. 30 ("Opp."). Defendants replied on February 3, 2015. ECF No. 31 ("Reply").
A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Once a defendant has moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction. See Chandler v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). The plaintiff carries that burden by putting forth "the manner and degree of evidence required" by whatever stage of the litigation the case has reached. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A complaint that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court "accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008).
The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially noticeable facts, see Shwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it "may look beyond the plaintiff's complaint to matters of public record" without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995). Nor must the Court "assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast inthe form of factual allegations." Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere "conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004).
If the Court determines that the complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires," bearing in mind "the underlying purpose of Rule 15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities." Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, "a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." Id. at 1130 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ'g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).
Defendants offer several bases for dismissing this action. As to Plaintiff's Section 504 claim, Defendants argue that it should be dismissed on res judicata grounds and for failure to state a claim. Mot. at 5-13. Defendants argue next that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims should also be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Id. at 13-19. Although the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff's Section 504 claims on res judicata grounds, the Court...
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