SAD 3 Educ. Ass'n v. RSU 3 Bd. of Dirs.

• Decision Date: 01 March 2018
• Docket Number: Docket: Ken–17–75
• Citation: 180 A.3d 125
• Parties: SAD 3 EDUCATION ASSOCIATION v. RSU 3 BOARD OF DIRECTORS et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

180 A.3d 125

SAD 3 EDUCATION ASSOCIATION

v.RSU 3 BOARD OF DIRECTORS et al.

Docket: Ken–17–75

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: October 11, 2017

Decided: March 1, 2018

Andrew T. Mason, Esq. (orally), Maine Education Association, Augusta, for appellant SAD 3 Education Association

S. Campbell Badger, Esq. (orally), and Laurel A.V. McClead, Esq., Drummond Woodsum & MacMahon, PA, Portland, for appellee RSU 3 Board of Directors

Lisa Copenhaver, Esq. (orally), Maine Labor Relations Board, Augusta, for appellee Maine Labor Relations Board

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J.,^* and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

HUMPHREY, J.

[¶ 1] School Administrative District 3 Education Association MEA/NEA (the Association) appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Murphy, J. ) on consolidated Rule 80C appeals from the decision of the Maine Labor Relations Board (MLRB) on the Association's prohibited practice complaint.¹ The Association argues that the MLRB erred when it held that the 120–day notice provision in 26 M.R.S. § 965(1) (2017) applies to the request for impact bargaining in this case. We disagree and affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] Regional School Unit 3 (RSU 3) is a rural school district serving towns that span a large geographic area in Waldo County. The Board of Directors of RSU 3 (the School Board) is a public employer as defined in 26 M.R.S. § 962(7) (2017). The Association is the recognized bargaining agent within the meaning of 26 M.R.S. § 962(2) (2017) for employees of the School Board, including classroom teachers.

[¶ 3] At the beginning of the 2012–2013 school year, RSU 3 transitioned from a system of double bus runs to transport the students in the school district to a system of single bus runs. This cost-saving measure resulted in students at the outlying elementary schools being dropped off at school earlier in the morning and picked up later in the afternoon than they had been under the prior system. In order to accommodate this change, teachers at the outlying schools had to work longer hours than their colleagues at other schools in the district. The School Board and the Association agreed to discuss the effects of the change after the system of single bus runs was implemented.

[¶ 4] In early January 2013, the Association informed the School Board of its demand to enter into "impact bargaining"² regarding the change in working conditions due to the transition to the system of single bus runs.³ The School Board and the Association engaged in impact bargaining over the change in working conditions for the affected teachers on three occasions in February, March, and April 2013. During these bargaining sessions, the Association and the School Board discussed compensation for the affected teachers, but the School Board opposed that approach.⁴ By the end of the third meeting, the parties had yet to come to an agreement.

[¶ 5] After the start of the new school year, the Association submitted a proposal to the School Board that included a request for $1,500 in compensation for each of the affected teachers. The School Board rejected the Association's proposal, and the Association filed a request for mediation with the MLRB in December 2013.

[¶ 6] Before the mediation took place, the Association requested to collectively bargain a successor contract between it and the School Board because the parties' existing contract was set to expire in August 2014. During the negotiations for the successor contract, the parties agreed on uniform working hours for teachers throughout the district, taking into account the different schedules that resulted from the system of single bus runs. The successor contract, which covered the period from September 1, 2014, to August 31, 2017, was signed on April 1, 2014.

[¶ 7] The parties engaged in mediation sessions regarding the impact bargaining matter on April 8 and May 7, 2014, but failed to come to an agreement. On July 3, 2014, the Association filed a request for fact-finding with the MLRB and the School Board. The Executive Director of the MLRB requested that the parties select their representatives for a fact-finding panel, but only the Association responded to this request. In October 2014, the School Board communicated to the Association and the MLRB that it was unwilling to participate in fact-finding for the impact bargaining matter. In January 2015, the Executive Director of the MLRB informed the parties that, in light of the School Board's October letter, he would not schedule a fact-finding proceeding.

[¶ 8] Pursuant to the Municipal Public Employees Labor Relations Law (MPELRL), the Association filed a prohibited practice complaint with the MLRB against the School Board, see 26 M.R.S. § 968(5) (2017), alleging that the School Board violated 26 M.R.S. § 964(1)(E) (2017) and § 965(1) when it refused to participate in mediation and fact-finding procedures with respect to the effect of the new bus system. In its answer, the School Board raised a number of defenses, including that the Association failed to provide the School Board with notice "at least 120 days before the conclusion of the current fiscal operating budget" that it intended to negotiate matters involving the appropriation of money during the impact bargaining sessions, as required by 26 M.R.S. § 965(1).

[¶ 9] In its decision, the MLRB rejected all of the School Board's affirmative defenses except for the alleged violation of the 120–day notice provision. The MLRB determined that the Association failed to comply with the 120–day requirement because aspects of the impact bargaining involved potential appropriations of money, and concluded that

the School Board was not legally obligated to bargain over matters requiring the appropriation of money. The failure of the Association to provide the 120–day notice had no impact, however, on the School Board's legal obligation to continue bargaining over non-monetary issues. Consequently, to the extent that the School Board has refused to participate in fact finding over non-monetary issues, it has violated § 965(1)(E).⁵

[¶ 10] Both parties appealed to the Superior Court pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80C and 26 M.R.S. § 968(5)(F) (2017). The School Board challenged the MLRB's conclusion that it violated 26 M.R.S. § 964(1)(E) and § 965(1) by failing to participate in fact-finding concerning the impact of the new busing system. The Association challenged the MLRB's determination that it was required to provide a 120–day notice, arguing that the 120–day notice provision in section 965(1) does not apply to impact bargaining.

[¶ 11] The Superior Court consolidated the appeals and affirmed the decision of the MLRB. The Association timely appealed to this Court the MLRB's determination that it was required to provide the 120–day notice.⁶ M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016);⁷ M.R. Civ. P. 80C(n).

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 12] The focus of this appeal is whether the 120–day notice requirement in 26 M.R.S. § 965(1) applies to impact bargaining where the association's request requires additional appropriations by the municipality or county. If we conclude that the 120–day notice provision applies, we must then determine whether the MLRB erred in determining that the Association did not comply with that requirement.

[¶ 13] "In an appeal from a Superior Court judgment entered upon intermediate appellate review of a Board decision, we review the Board's decision directly for error of law, abuse of discretion, or clear error." City of Augusta v. Me. Labor Relations Bd. , 2013 ME 63, ¶ 14, 70 A.3d 268 (quotation marks omitted). "We accord the Board considerable deference in construing the MPELRL because the Board is charged with its enforcement." Minot Sch. Comm. v. Minot Educ. Ass'n , 1998 ME 211, ¶ 6, 717 A.2d 372 (quotation marks omitted).

[¶ 14] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Town of Eagle Lake v. Comm'r, Dep't of Educ. , 2003 ME 37, ¶ 7, 818 A.2d 1034. In questions of statutory interpretation, "we first look to the plain language of the provisions to determine their meaning. If the language is unambiguous, we interpret the provisions according to their unambiguous meaning unless the result is illogical or absurd. If the plain meaning of a statute is ambiguous—that is, susceptible of different meanings—we will then go on to consider the statute's meaning in light of its legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent." Mainetoday Media, Inc. v. State , 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). When a dispute involves a board or agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, "the agency's interpretation, although not conclusive, is entitled to great deference and will be upheld unless the statute plainly compels a contrary result." Town of Eagle Lake , 2003 ME 37, ¶ 8, 818 A.2d 1034 (quotation marks omitted).

A. Interpretation of 26 M.R.S. § 965(1)

[¶ 15] The Association argues that the MLRB's determination that the 120–day notice requirement applies to impact bargaining is contrary to the language of section 965(1), public policy, and long-established past practice and case law. In contrast, the School Board and the MLRB contend that the statutory language clearly and unambiguously requires that bargaining agents comply with the 120–day notice provision whenever appropriations of money are at issue, regardless of whether the parties are engaging in impact bargaining or other types of collective bargaining. We agree with the School Board and the MLRB that the 120–day notice requirement applies whenever the parties engage in any type of collective bargaining, including impact bargaining, when the subject of the bargaining involves the appropriation of money by the municipality.

[¶ 16] The first step in our analysis is to look at the plain language of the statute.

Section 965(1) states in whole:

1. Negotiations. It is the obligation of the public employer and the bargaining agent to bargain

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