Sahai v. Davies
| Decision Date | 22 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-1620,95-1620 |
| Parties | 72 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1820, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,522 Subhash SAHAI and Webster City Medical Clinic, Inc., Appellants, v. Stacey D. DAVIES and The Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, Carl D. Baker, Judge.
Physician and medical clinic appeal from order on judicial review upholding agency's finding that they had discriminated in employment based on their recommendation that a prospective employer not hire a pregnant female applicant for an assembly line job. REVERSED.
Joseph L. Fitzgibbons and David A. Lester of Fitzgibbons Brothers, Estherville, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Teresa Baustian, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
Considered en banc.
The appellants, Subhash Sahai, a physician, and Webster City Medical Clinic, Inc., a professional corporation for the practice of medicine, challenge the district court's order upholding a finding by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission that they were guilty of sexual discrimination in employment when, following a physical examination of a job applicant for a prospective employer, they recommended that a pregnant female applicant not be hired. Based on this finding, a monetary sanction of $11,000 plus interest was levied against appellants by the commission, and appellants were ordered to develop written policies concerning future recommendations to employers with respect to pregnant female applicants examined at the clinic at the employer's request.
This judicial proceeding is for review of agency action as provided in Iowa Code section 17A.19 (1995). The respondents in the district court and appellees in this court are the Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the complainant, Stacey D. Davies. After reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we reverse the judgment of the district court and the decision of the Iowa Civil Rights Commission.
The complainant, Stacey D. Davies, applied for work at the Nissen Company in Webster City in the summer of 1989. Nissen is a meat packing facility that does not have a kill floor. Work at that plant primarily involves packing smaller processed meats such as wieners or franks. Davies was interviewed for a position on the assembly line at Nissen on September 8, 1989.
The vice president of production determined that she was qualified for the job and advised her that she would be hired if she could pass a physical examination and drug test. The Nissen representative arranged for Davies to obtain a physical examination and drug test at the Webster City Medical Clinic. Pursuant to a contract with Nissen, the clinic regularly conducted physical examinations on prospective employees and provided Nissen with the results and recommendations concerning physical abilities to do the job. Davies was originally scheduled to see a Dr. Schoultz for her physical examination. When she informed Dr. Schoultz that she was fourteen weeks into a pregnancy and that Dr. Sahai of the same clinic had delivered her first child, Dr. Schoultz thought it preferable to have Dr. Sahai perform the examination.
Dr. Sahai is a graduate of the University of Iowa Medical School and a board-certified family practice specialist. He performed a complete physical examination on Davies, including obtaining a current patient history concerning alcohol usage, allergies, potential pulmonary problems, fractures, mental disease, diabetes, kidney trouble, hearing difficulties, coronary condition, tumors, prior back pain, prior surgeries, and medications that Davies was then taking. Davies' blood pressure was taken and recorded, and a physical examination was completed as to height, weight, vision, hearing, cardiovascular sufficiency, and respiratory sufficiency. An abdominal examination was performed as well as genito-urinary, gastrointestinal, nervous system and joint examinations.
Upon completing the examination, Dr. Sahai completed a medical form evidencing the results and, in a space on that form that indicated whether Davies was approved for the prospective work, checked a box indicating "No." That recommendation was communicated to Nissen officials by telephone the same day. In this conversation, Dr. Sahai informed Nissen personnel employees that his decision was made with respect to assembly line work and indicated that Davies was physically able to perform less-demanding work if available. Dr. Sahai testified at the administrative hearing that a written report followed approximately two days later.
Acting on Dr. Sahai's oral report, Nissen Company personnel managers declined to hire Davies for the available assembly line position. No less physically demanding position was available at that time. Approximately three months after the birth of her child, Davies reapplied for work with Nissen and was hired as a packager of hot dogs. She worked in that position for approximately four months.
Davies filed a complaint against Nissen, the clinic, and Dr. Sahai, contending that her failure to obtain the assembly line position as a result of her pregnancy was an unlawful discrimination in employment based on sex. The issues involving Nissen are not involved on this appeal. With respect to the claims against the clinic and Dr. Sahai, an administrative law judge took evidence and filed a proposed decision finding that (1) not only employers but all entities that play a role in hiring decisions are subject to the statutory prohibitions against employment discrimination, (2) any classification based on pregnancy is a distinction based on sex, and (3) the only defense available to the clinic and Dr. Sahai was to show that absence of pregnancy was a bona fide occupational qualification for an assembly line position at Nissen.
With respect to the third point listed above, the hearing officer concluded that the clinic and Dr. Sahai failed to establish a job-related physical disqualification based on pregnancy because their concerns were not with plaintiff's ability to perform the work but rather with the incremental increase in the health risk to her from assembly line work as her stages of pregnancy progressed. This proposed decision was adopted as the final agency action in the case. After being reviewed by the district court pursuant to section 17A.19, the final agency order, including imposition of sanctions, was affirmed.
In challenging the orders of the Civil Rights Commission, the clinic and Dr. Sahai urge that their only role in the hiring process was to conduct a physical examination of a job applicant and report the results to the prospective employer together with an opinion concerning the applicant's physical ability to perform the particular job. 1 The employer, appellants argue, was free to treat that opinion as it wished for purposes of the hiring decision. They maintain that in such instances the responsibility to evaluate the impact of the civil rights laws on the ultimate hiring decision is the employer's responsibility and should play no role in a physician's formulation of a medical judgment.
In seeking to counter these arguments, the commission and Davies argue that the clinic's arrangement with Nissen placed it in a position to control the latter's hiring decisions. As a result, she urges, the clinic and its member doctors should be subject to sanction under the employment discrimination statutes (Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a)) for recommendations that cause the employer to render discriminatory hiring decisions. We disagree with this contention.
The arguments that the commission and Davies set forth take note of the fact that the controlling statute, § 216.6(1)(a), prohibits "any person" from discriminating in employment based on sex rather than "any employer." Although we agree that this language extends the prohibition of the act to some situations in which a person guilty of discriminatory conduct is not the actual employer of the person discriminated against, it does not, in our view, embrace the actions of the clinic and Dr. Sahai in the present case. That is due to the fact that within the context of the Nissen hiring decision the clinic's role was advisory. The advice being sought was an independent medical judgment. Recommendations made in this context that are directly responsive to a prospective employer's request are not in our view discriminatory actions.
We reach the conclusion stated above as a matter of statutory interpretation in our review of agency action under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8)(a) (). Consequently, our task is to determine whether the district court's view as to the meaning of the statute accords with our own interpretation. Davenport Bank & Trust Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 457 N.W.2d 610, 612 (Iowa 1990); Iowa Auto Dealers Ass'n v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 301 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Iowa 1981). Whether a particular state of facts fall under the statute as interpreted by this court is an adjunct issue of statutory construction when that decision may be made by viewing the facts most favorably toward the opposing point of view.
The operative facts in the present dispute are such that it poses both sexual discrimination issues and physical disability issues. For this reason, we find that the conclusion of the commission that the case presents a straight bona fide occupational qualification issue is not well taken. As developed in our prior cases, the doctrine of bona fide occupational qualification has reference to general personnel policies applied to specific categories of employees. See Quaker Oats Co. v. Cedar Rapids Human Rights Comm'n, 268 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Iowa 1978); Cedar Rapids Community Sch. Dist. v. Parr, 227 N.W.2d 486, 496 (Iowa 1975). The present case, on the other hand, relates to an ad hoc evaluation of a single job applicant with respect to physical qualifications...
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