Vivian v. Madison

• Decision Date: 13 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-849.,98-849.
• Citation: 601 N.W.2d 872
• Parties: Wendy VIVIAN, Plaintiff, v. Gerry MADISON, Defendant-Movant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

601 N.W.2d 872

Wendy VIVIAN, Plaintiff, v. Gerry MADISON, Defendant-Movant.

No. 98-849.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 13, 1999.

Victoria L. Herring, Des Moines, for defendant-movant.

Roxanne Barton Conlin of Roxanne Conlin & Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for plaintiff.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and LARSON, LAVORATO, NEUMAN, and SNELL, JJ.

SNELL, Justice.

This case comes to us as a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Specifically, we are asked:

Is a supervisory employee subject to individual liability for unfair employment practices under Iowa Code section 216.6(1) of the Iowa Civil Rights Act?

This question is certified to us pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 684A (1997). We conclude that the Iowa Civil Rights Act does authorize the subjecting of a supervisory employee to individual liability.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Plaintiff, Wendy Vivian, filed a multi-count complaint in federal district court against her employer, United Parcel Service (UPS), and her supervisor, Gerry Madison. Among other claims, Vivian alleges that during her tenure with UPS she was subjected to repeated acts of racial and sexual discrimination in employment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and Iowa Code chapter 216 (1995) (ICRA).

Defendant Madison filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the ICRA does not impose individual liability on supervisory employees. District Judge Ronald E. Longstaff noted that a split of authority exists among Iowa federal courts that have considered the matter. See, e.g., Bales v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 972 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.Iowa 1997),aff'd without addressing the Iowa claim, 143 F.3d 1103 (8th Cir. 1998); Fee v. Bridgestone Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., No. 4-95-CV-70666 (S.D.Iowa Oct. 6, 1997); Wells v. Lamson & Sessions, No. 3-97-CV-10019 (S.D. Iowa April 8, 1997); Moshier v. Linn County, No. C95-196 (N.D. Iowa June 19, 1996); Tenny v. Basilica of Saint John, 1995 WL 935700, No. 4-94-CV-30102 (S.D.Iowa May 23, 1995); Williamson v. Altorfer Mach. Co., No. 3-94-CV-80130 (S.D.Iowa Jan. 13, 1995). Absent an unqualified precedent, he concluded that the issue required a definitive interpretation and construction of the Iowa Civil Rights Act, which gave rise to this certified question of state law.¹

II. Discussion

A. Iowa Statutes

The Iowa Civil Rights Act, chapter 216 of the Iowa Code, prohibits various forms of discrimination in employment. It was passed in 1965 in an effort to establish parity in the workplace and market opportunity for all. The ICRA was modeled after Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act. Iowa courts therefore traditionally turn to federal law for guidance in evaluating the ICRA. King v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 334 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1983). Federal law, however, is not controlling. We look simply to the analytical framework utilized by the federal courts in assessing federal law and not to a substitution of the language of the federal statutes for the clear words of the ICRA. Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989).

In Harbit v. Voss Petroleum, 553 N.W.2d 329 (Iowa 1996), for example, we agreed with the logic propounded by a majority of the federal circuits in ruling that there was no individual liability for supervisors under Title VII. Harbit, 553 N.W.2d at 330. Title VII, however, differs from the ICRA in several key respects. First, Iowa Code section 216.6(1)(a) provides in pertinent part that:

It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for any:

a. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the age, race, creed, color, sex, national origin, religion or disability of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation.

(Emphasis added.)

Title VII, on the other hand, states only that:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer:

1. To fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added).

Second, the ICRA incorporates an aiding and abetting provision codified at section 216.11 under which:

It shall be an unfair or discriminatory practice for:

1. Any person to intentionally aid, abet, compel, or coerce another person to engage in any of the practices declared unfair or discriminatory by this chapter.

Iowa Code § 216.11.

Title VII contains no similar language.

Third, the remedial sections of the ICRA apparently extend beyond those found in Title VII in that a claimant may commence a cause of action for relief against a person, employer, employment agency, or labor organization alleged to have committed a discriminatory or unfair practice. Iowa Code § 216.15(1). Title VII does not authorize claims against persons. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

B. Issues

At issue is whether the statutory use of the word "person" entitles a plaintiff to seek a personal liability judgment against a supervisor accused of discrimination. Section 216.2(11) defines a person as "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, receivers, and the state of Iowa and all political subdivisions and agencies thereof." Although not referenced specifically, supervisors appear to fall within the gamut of persons, particularly in light of section 216.18 which instructs us to construe this chapter broadly to effectuate its purposes.

C. Contentions

Plaintiff, Vivian, maintains that use of the word "person" in section 216.6(1)(a) entitles her to seek a personal liability judgment against Madison in his individual capacity as supervisor. Vivian urges us to look to the plain meaning of the statute. She points to the express language used and the fact that the legislature makes a distinction between person, employer and numerous other designations within section 216.6(1)(a).

Defendant, Madison, on the other hand, likens the ICRA to Title VII of the U.S. Civil Rights Act. He contends that the two laws are analogous to one another and that the ICRA should be explicated in conformance with the national trend denying individual supervisor liability under the federal Act. Madison asserts that the language of section 216.6(1)(a) refers to an employer/employee relationship, a relationship connoting that only an employer can hire, fire, refer, accept, classify or otherwise discriminate in employment. He argues that the ICRA was only intended to hold employers liable for workplace discrimination and that had the legislature wished to subject supervisors to personal liability, it would have specifically said so.

In support of this view, Madison draws our attention to the seeming incongruity between Vivian's construction of the law and section 216.6(6)(a) which exempts employers of fewer than four persons from liability. Madison is unable to reconcile these ostensibly disparate schemes, under which he theorizes that a supervisor for an employer of three or less would escape liability while a supervisor working for an employer of four or more could be held liable for discrimination.

For the reasons expressed previously, we conclude that the ICRA is sufficiently distinct from Title VII so as to require an independent analysis. In so doing, we consider the intent of the legislature as expressed in the plain meaning of the law.

D. Legislative History

There is surprisingly little to discover with regard to the legislative history of the Iowa Civil Rights Act. It was apparently based on the federal statute codified under Title VII at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1964), although no direct reference to the law appears on the record. Few amendments have been made since its enactment.

Our only sources of interpretive guidance come from section 216.18, which states that the chapter should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes, and section 729.4, a criminal provision which actually preceded implementation of the ICRA. Iowa Code § 729.4 holds that:

1. Every person in this state is entitled to the opportunity for employment on equal terms with every other person. A person or employer shall not discriminate in the employment of individuals because of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, or ancestry....

....

3. Any person, employer, labor union or organization or officer of a labor union or organization convicted of a violation of subsections 1 or 2 shall be guilty of a simple misdemeanor.

We find it significant that the words "person" and "employer" are used in conjunction with one another, indicating the legislature's clear perception of their separate meanings.

E. The Iowa Courts

Two major cases to come through our court pertaining to the issue at hand are Grahek v. Voluntary Hospital Cooperative Ass'n of Iowa Inc., 473 N.W.2d 31 (Iowa 1991), and Sahai v. Davies, 557 N.W.2d 898 (Iowa 1997). In Grahek, the plaintiff, a hospital administrator, filed an age discrimination suit after being terminated from his post. The defendants, VHI, VHA and St. Luke's, filed a motion for summary judgment. The Iowa Civil Rights Commission and the district court both granted the motion because Grahek's petition was not timely filed in accordance with Iowa Code section 601A.15(12) (1987).² Grahek appealed insisting that several of his claims were actually founded in contract rather than discrimination law and should not be subject to the time limitations of the ICRA. We held that those causes of action which were indistinguishable from the civil rights complaints were effectively preempted. Grahek, 473 N.W.2d at 35.

A few of the claims were allowed to survive. In reaching our conclusions, we...