Saldate v. Montgomery ex rel. Maricopa Cnty. Attorney's Office
| Decision Date | 31 January 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA–CV 11–0079.,1 CA–CV 11–0079. |
| Citation | 268 P.3d 1152,627 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 19,228 Ariz. 495 |
| Parties | Manuel SALDATE, a married man, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. William G. MONTGOMERY, Maricopa County Attorney ex rel. Maricopa County Attorney's Office, an elected officer of Maricopa County, Arizona; Maricopa County Merit System Commission, Defendants/Appellees. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Jaburg & Wilk, P.C. by Kraig J. Marton, David N. Farren, Adam S. Kunz, Mark D. Bogard, Phoenix, Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant.
William G. Montgomery, Maricopa County Attorney by Clarisse R. McCormick, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellees William G. Montgomery and Maricopa County Attorney's Office.
Jackson Lewis, L.L.P. by Justin S. Pierce, Phoenix, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Maricopa County Employee Merit System.
¶ 1 Plaintiff/Appellant Manuel Saldate (“Saldate”) appeals the superior court's order remanding his administrative appeal to the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission (“Commission”) for the purposes of issuing a final administrative decision. The basis of the superior court's ruling was that because the Commission voted 2–2 on whether to accept or reject the hearing officer's recommendation to affirm Saldate's employment termination, the Commission's decision was of no force and effect. We agree with the superior court and affirm its remand order.
¶ 2 Saldate, a certified peace officer and detective for the Maricopa County Attorney's Office (“MCAO”), was terminated from employment on December 9, 2008. Saldate appealed his termination to the Commission under the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Rules (“Rules”) established by the Maricopa County Employee Merit System Resolution (“Resolution”) and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 11–351 to –357 (2001 & Supp. 2011). See Resolution at §§ 1, 12.1
¶ 3 A hearing officer appointed to hear Saldate's appeal held a four-day hearing. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 11–356(D) (Supp.2011) 2 and Rule 10.12, the officer prepared a report for the Commission that proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. He recommended that the Commission sustain Saldate's termination and deny his appeal.
¶ 4 The Commission, with only four members present,3 considered Saldate's appeal and the hearing officer's recommendations. One Commissioner moved “ ‘not to uphold the Hearing Officer's proposed order because there is not sufficient evidence in the record ...’ and to grant [Saldate's] appeal and reverse the termination.” The motion was seconded and a vote resulted in a 2–2 tie.
¶ 5 The Commission denied Saldate's appeal the same day in an order stating that its “tie-vote also serves as a final Commission decision.” According to the order, “[n]o majority vote of the Commission existed.” Citing Resolution § 16(F) and Rule 10.16, the Commission stated that an “appeal may be sustained only when a majority of the Commission members vote in favor of such action/motion,” and “that absent a contrary majority vote, the appeal is dismissed.” Thus, it denied Saldate's appeal by “operation of the applicable Resolution/Rule” and sustained his termination.
¶ 6 Saldate filed a complaint in the superior court seeking review of the administrative proceedings and his termination. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Saldate argued that a tie vote means that he won his appeal and that his reinstatement was mandated under Wicks v. City of Tucson, 112 Ariz. 487, 543 P.2d 1116 (1975), and Wolkin v. Civil Service Commission of City of Tucson, 21 Ariz.App. 341, 519 P.2d 194 (1974). MCAO argued that under Maricopa County Sheriff's Office v. Maricopa County Employee Merit System Commission (Daniel Juarez), 211 Ariz. 219, 119 P.3d 1022 (2005), and Pima County v. Pima County Law Enforcement Merit System Council (Joseph Harvey), 211 Ariz. 224, 119 P.3d 1027 (2005), a tie meant that Saldate did not win his appeal and his termination must be upheld.4
¶ 7 The superior court ruled that “[the tie] vote of the Merit Commission is of no force and effect” because it was not a majority vote. The court vacated the Commission's October 7, 2009 order and remanded the proceedings for the Commission “to reconsider Plaintiff's appeal.” Saldate timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–2101(A)(1) (Supp.2011).
¶ 8 We summarize Saldate's issues on appeal as:
(1) The superior court erred by failing to determine that the Commission's tie vote is a final administrative decision that means MCAO failed to carry its burden of proof to terminate Saldate.5
(2) The superior court's remand order was overly broad and should be limited to reinstatement and a determination of back wages and leave accruals.
(3) The superior court erred by denying Saldate attorneys' fees under A.R.S. § 12–348(A)(2) (Supp.2011) and A.R.S. § 41–1001.01 (Supp.2011).
¶ 9 Both parties agree that remand is required, but they disagree about the scope of remand. Saldate's argument hinges on two factors, that a tie vote of the Commission: (1) is a final administrative decision; and (2) means MCAO did not meet its burden to prove cause for the termination. Appellees maintain that the Commission violated the Resolution and Rules by failing to adopt written findings of fact and conclusions of law and that the superior court correctly determined the Commission's holding was of no force and effect. Appellees also argue that the requested relief of reinstatement is beyond the Court's jurisdiction until the Commission corrects the error.6
¶ 10 In an administrative appeal, the superior A.R.S. § 12–910(E) (2003); see also Siegel v. Ariz. State Liquor Bd., 167 Ariz. 400, 401, 807 P.2d 1136, 1137 (App.1991). “This court reviews the superior court's judgment to determine whether the record contains evidence to support the judgment and, in doing so, we reach the underlying issue of whether the administrative action was illegal, arbitrary, capricious or involved an abuse of discretion.” Koepnick v. Ariz. State Land Dep't, 221 Ariz. 370, 374, ¶ 7, 212 P.3d 62, 66 (App.2009) (internal quotations and citation omitted). When an administrative decision is based on an interpretation of law, we review it de novo. Id. In construing statutes and rules, we rely on the plain meaning of the rule if it is unambiguous because that is the best indicator of the drafters' intent. Fragoso v. Fell, 210 Ariz. 427, 430, ¶ 7, 111 P.3d 1027, 1030 (App.2005). If there is ambiguity, we construe related statutes and rules to give effect to each provision without making any rule or statute superfluous. City of Phoenix v. Yates, 69 Ariz. 68, 72, 208 P.2d 1147, 1149 (1949) (); see also Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284, 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991) ().
¶ 11 With the enactment of A.R.S. § 11–352, the legislature granted counties limited authority to pass resolutions establishing employee merit systems. Under that authority, the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors adopted a resolution establishing both the Merit System and the Commission. Resolution § 1; see also A.R.S. § 11–353 (2001). The Resolution requires that the Commission adopt the Rules to properly enforce the Resolution. See Resolution § 12. While the legislature did not define the minimum requirements for a Commission vote on an employee's appeal, it did require that the Commission have five members and that the Commission issue findings of fact. A.R.S. § 11–353(A) (five members), –356(D) (the hearing officer shall submit to the Commission “proposed” findings of fact and conclusions of law).
¶ 12 Resolving this appeal requires us to construe the above statutes and the Resolution creating the Commission and Rules. Read together, these authorities impose two requisites for issuing a final Commission decision on appeal. First, it is clear that the Commission itself must act. A.R.S. § 11–356(D) (); A.R.S. § 11–356(F) (); A.R.S. § 11–356(G) (); Rule 10.17(B) (); Rule 10.04 (); Rule 10.14 (); Rule 10.16 ().
¶ 13 Second, the Commission generally is required to act by majority of its members present at a meeting. Resolution § 9(D) states: (Emphasis added.) It follows that when there are four voting members at a meeting, a majority of those present—three members—is required to take legal action, including issuing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders in an employee's appeal. See A.R.S. § 11–356(F) (); Resolution § 9(D) (); Rule...
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