Salem Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board
| Decision Date | 27 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | 062308 |
| Citation | 2007 MBAR 346 |
| Parties | Salem Retirement Board v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Board et al.[1] |
| Court | Massachusetts Superior Court |
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Lu, John T., J.
The plaintiff Salem Retirement Board (Salem Board), pursuant to G.L.c. 30A, appeals the Contributory Retirement Appeal Board's (Appeal Board) decision reversing the Division of Administrative Law Appeals' (Division) affirmance of the Salem Board's decision denying Claire Cole's (Cole) application for accidental disability retirement benefits.
The Salem Board moves for judgment on the pleadings, and requests the court vacate the Appeal Board's decision because Cole is not entitled to an award of benefits under G.L.c. 32, §7. Cole contends that the Appeal Board's decision is supported by the evidence, and is legally and procedurally sound.
In 1975 Cole began her employment as an Administrative Assistant in the City of Salem's Department of Public Works and, a year later, she became a member of the contributory retirement system. Cole had a long history of medical conditions, including obesity, hypertension, borderline lipid abnormalities, asthma, migraine headaches, anxiety depression, and hypothyroidism.
On the morning of March 22, 2000, City Engineer Stan Borenstein (Borenstein), Cole's supervisor, called Cole into his office and told her that her position was being eliminated as of July 1, 2000, and that she should try to find other employment. Cole became teary and Borenstein agreed to her request to leave for the day. At 4: 00 p.m. that afternoon Cole developed severe retrostemal chest pain and went to the emergency room at Salem Hospital. The admitting physician, Andrew J. Kemper (Kemper), diagnosed Cole as suffering an acute myocardial infarction (commonly known as a heart attack), and Cole remained at the hospital until March 27, 2000. Kemper noted in his report that Cole had been in her usual state of health until she heard about her termination from Borenstein, and that her past medical history included "major work related stresses with her job in jeopardy after 25 years working at City Hall."
On March 30, 2000, Cole's doctor advised her that both he and Kemper recommended that she take twelve weeks to recuperate and then retire. That same day, Cole applied for accidental disability retirement benefits and did not return to her job.
Although the Salem Board approved Cole's application, on December 1, 2000, the Public Employee Retirement Administration Commission (Commission) reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Salem Board.[2] On reconsideration, the Salem Board again voted to approve the application. The Commission once again reversed the decision and remanded the case to the Salem Board requesting that the Salem Board make further findings of fact as to whether "the stress of Ms. Cole's job or termination caused her physical injury (i.e., heart attack)" and "whether the stress of Ms. Cole's job and the stress of her termination were not common to many jobs and constitute a personal injury which caused the member's permanent disability, or that her supervisor's actions amounted to intentional infliction of emotional harm, rather than being a bona fide personnel action."[3]
On July 26, 2001, the Salem Board denied Cole's application for accidental disability retirement benefits, based upon its findings that: (1) the stress of Ms. Cole's job and the stress of her termination were common to many jobs and did not constitute a personal injury sustained which caused the member's permanent disability; and, (2) Borenstein's actions did not amount to intentional infliction of emotional harm, but, rather, constituted a bona fide personnel action.[4]
Cole appealed the Salem Board's decision to the Division. However, on May 31, 2002, the Division affirmed the Salem Board's decision. Cole applied to the full Appeal Board, but the Appeal Board adopted the Division's Findings of Fact and affirmed the Division's affirmance of the Salem Board's denial of benefits.
Cole filed a complaint for judicial review of the Appeal Board's decision under G.L.c. 30A, §14, and moved this court for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Salem Board also moved for Judgment on the Pleadings. This Superior Court (Billings, J.) denied the Salem Board's motion, allowed Cole's motion in part, and remanded the case to the Appeal Board "for further findings as to whether or not the plaintiff's heart attack was caused by stress attendant on her receiving news of the elimination of her position, and whether or not the plaintiff is currently disabled due to physical, rather than purely psychological, causes."
The Appeal Board remanded the case to the Division which ordered a Regional Medical Panel (Medical Panel) to respond to the questions posed by Judge Billings.[5] The Medical Panel answered the questions in the affirmative. After considering the answers given by the Medical Panel, the Division affirmed the Salem Board's decision denying Cole's claim for accidental disability retirement benefits.
Cole appealed to the Appeal Board, and on November 22, 2006, the Appeal Board added two Findings of Fact to the forty-nine it incorporated from the Division's decision: (1) Cole's "heart attack was caused by stress attendant on her receiving news of the elimination of her position"; and (2) Cole "was disabled at that time due to physical rather than purely psychological causes." The Appeal Board also made two rulings of law: (1) Cole's "communications [with Borenstein] with respect to her employment were made in the course of her employment"; and (2) Cole's "heart attack, which was caused by stress attendant on her receiving news of the elimination of her position, was as a result of her employment within the meaning of Chapter 32, §7." The Appeal Board reversed the Division's decision, and held that Cole was entitled to accidental disability retirement benefits under G.L.c. 32, §7.
A reviewing court may set aside an administrative decision if it finds that the substantial rights of a party may have been prejudiced because the decision is defective under G.L.c. 30 §14(7). The party appealing an administrative decision bears the burden of demonstrating the decision's invalidity. Merisme v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bds., 27 Mass.App.Ct. 470, 474 (1989).
A court's review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative record. G.L.c. 30A, §14(5). The reviewing court is required to give due weight to the agency's experience, technical competence, specialized knowledge, and the discretionary authority conferred upon it by statute. Town of Hingham v. Department of Telecomm. & Energy, 433 Mass. 198, 201 (2001); Flint v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, 412 Mass. 416, 420 (1992); Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 401 Mass. 713, 721 (1988); Evans v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 46 Mass.App.Ct. 229, 233 (1999); Hotchkiss v. State Racing Comm'n, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 684, 695-96 (1998). The reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Flemings v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 431 Mass. 374, 375 (2000); Southern Worcester County Reg'l Vocational Sch. Dist. v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 386 Mass. 414, 420-21 (1982), citing Olde Towne Liquor Store, Inc. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 372 Mass. 152, 154 (1977).
Unless the administrative decision is unsupported by substantial evidence, it will be allowed to stand. Dohoney v. Director of Div. of Employment Sec., 377 Mass. 333, 337 (1979). The findings and decision of the agency "are to be sustained wherever possible" and "are not to be reversed unless they are wholly lacking in evidentiary support or are tainted by errors of law." Woolfall's Case, 13 Mass.App.Ct. 1070, 1070 (1982) (internal citations omitted). A court may not dispute an administrative agency's choice between two conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter come before it de novo. Seagram Distillers Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Comm'n, 401 Mass. at 721; Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Wellesley v. Housing Appeals Comm'n, 385 Mass. 651, 657 (1982). That the reviewing court may disagree, on the merits, with the agency's findings is not grounds for reversal.
The Salem Board argues that the Appeal Board's decision is tainted by errors of law because: (1) Cole did not suffer a personal injury under G.L.c. 32, §7(1); and, (2) Cole has not established the causal relationship required under G.L.c. 32 §7(1).
G.L.c 32, §7(1) provides an award of benefits to one "who is unable to perform the essential duties of her job" due to "a personal injury sustained or a hazard undergone as a result of, and while in the performance of, [her] duties at some definite place and at some definite time," and whose inability to perform is "likely to be permanent." Because chapter 32 is silent on the definition of "personal injury," courts have turned to the Workers' Compensation Statute, G.L.c. 152, §26, for guidance. Barrufaldi v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 337 Mass. 495, 500-01 (1958); Sugrue v. Contributory Ret. Appeal Bd., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 4 n.4 (1998), and cases cited. Although a "personal injury" includes a disability which "stem[s] from a single work-related event or series of events," it does not include "mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide, personnel...
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