Samples v. Fla. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 16 May 2013
• Docket Number: No. SC10–1295.,SC10–1295.
• Citation: 114 So.3d 912
• Parties: Angela SAMPLES, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. FLORIDA BIRTH–RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

114 So.3d 912

Angela SAMPLES, etc., et al., Petitioners,

v.FLORIDA BIRTH–RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION ASSOCIATION, Respondent.

No. SC10–1295.

Supreme Court of Florida.

May 16, 2013.

Scott Ramsey McMillen, and Allison Claire McMillen of McMillen Law Firm, P.A., Mayanne Downs, and Kimberly D. Healy of Gray Robinson, P.A., Frederick Stanton Wermuth of King, Blackwell Zehnder & Wermuth, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Petitioners.

Wilbur E. Brewton, Kelly Brewton Plante, and Tana Duden Storey of Brewton Plante, P.A., Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

In this case, we consider a certified question concerning the award of compensation under the Florida Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (the Plan). We have for review the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Samples v. Florida Birth–Related Neurological, 40 So.3d 18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). The Fifth District upheld the constitutionality of section 766.31(1)(b) 1, Florida Statutes (2010), which provides for an award not exceeding $100,000 to the parents or legal guardians of an infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury. The court held that the statute does not violate equal protection, is not void for vagueness, and does not violate the Samples' right to access the courts.

The Fifth District certified the following question to be of great public importance:

Does the limitation in section 766.31(1)(b) 1., Florida Statutes, of a single award of $100,000 to both parents violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions?

Id. at 31. We have jurisdiction. Seeart. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the negative, and we approve the result of the Fifth District's decision in Samples.

I. BACKGROUND

In its decision below, the Fifth District set forth the following facts and procedural history:

In August 2007, MacKenzie Samples was born with birth-related neurological injuries, as defined in section 766.302(2), Florida Statutes (2007). Her parents, Angela and Kenneth Samples (“the Samples”), filed a claim with the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) for compensation under the Florida Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (“Plan”). The Florida Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (“NICA”) agreed that MacKenzie's injuries were compensable under the plan.

Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, NICA agreed to pay expenses for MacKenzie's care pursuant to section 766.31(1)(a) and reasonable attorney's fees and other expenses pursuant to section 766.31(1)(c). The stipulation resolved the Samples' major claims except for the amount of parental compensation under section 766.31(1)(b) 1. NICA agreed to make a lump sum payment of $100,000 to both parents jointly. However, the Samples reserved the right to have a hearing before an [administrative law judge (ALJ) ] to raise the issue of the interpretation and constitutionality of section 766.31(1)(b) 1.

The ALJ approved the stipulation and afforded the parties a hearing to offer any proof they perceived pertinent to the interpretation of section 766.31(1)(b) 1. The parties filed a Joint Pre–Hearing Stipulation which included the following “Admitted Facts”:

(1) Once NICA ascertains that a claim is covered, NICA frequently offers a lump sum payment of a parental award totaling $100,000, regardless of whether there are one or two parents involved in the claim. Such offer is subject to the subsequent approval of the ALJ.

(2) Pursuant to section 766.309, Florida Statutes, the ALJ must make all NICA Awards, which includes the parental award pursuant to section 766.31(1)(b) 1., Florida Statutes. An ALJ has never ordered NICA to pay a parental award in excess of $100,000, regardless of whether there was one parent or two parents involved in the claim.

(3) In a typical covered claim, NICA does not customarily argue that the parental award should be less than the full $100,000 authorized.

(4) Once the ALJ has ordered payment of a parental award in the amount of $100,000, NICA pays the $100,000 parental award by check made payable to both parents jointly, unless otherwise ordered by the ALJ.

(5) In the past, when there was a dispute between the parents with respect to the amount of the parental award to go to each parent, the ALJ has specified in the Final Order how much of the parental award would be paid to the mother and how much would be paid to the father. In those instances, the combined parental award was typically for the full $100,000.

At the hearing, NICA introduced various documents comprising the legislative history of the Plan. The ALJ also took official notice of two final orders: Waddell v. Florida Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 1999 WL 1483760, DOAH Case No. 98–2991N (May 11, 1999), and Wojtowicz v. Florida Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 1994 WL 1027875, DOAH Case No. 93–4268N (July 22, 1994). The ALJ entered a Final Order denying the Samples' claim for an additional $100,000 as part of the parental award. He found that the legislative history of section 766.31(1)(b) 1. showed that the Legislature clearly intended that the maximum award of $100,000 was for “both parents or legal guardians, and not for each parent or legal guardian.” The ALJ allowed the parties to make arguments and present evidence on the constitutional issues but did not rule on them.

Samples, 40 So.3d at 20–21.

The Samples appealed the ALJ's final order, claiming that section 766.31(1)(b) 1 (the “parental award provision”) was ambiguous and challenging the provision on three constitutional grounds: equal protection, vagueness, and access to courts. Samples, 40 So.3d at 23. The Fifth District first held that the parental award provision “clearly and unambiguously provides” for a single award of $100,000 to both parents in the aggregate. Id. at 22. The Fifth District then denied each of the Samples' constitutional claims, holding that the parental award provision: (1) does not cause disparate treatment among similarly situated persons and—even assuming discrimination did exist—is rationally related to the State's legitimate interest in maintaining the actuarial soundness of the Plan, id. at 25–26; (2) “is sufficiently clear in its intent to provide no—fault economic compensation to parents” and thus allows for an award to be split—if at all—“based on articulable economic reasons supported by detailed factual findings,” id. at 28; and (3) “provides both a reasonable alternative remedy and a commensurate benefit” to the Samples' right of access to courts and is the only method of meeting the overpowering public necessity of ending the medical malpractice crisis. Id. at 30.

The Samples now ask this Court to answer the certified question in the affirmative and quash the Fifth District's decision in Samples. Additionally, the Samples ask this Court to review the Fifth District's holdings that the parental award provision unambiguously provides for a single award of $100,000 to the parents of an injured child, that the parental award provision is not unconstitutionally vague, and that the parental award provision does not violate the Samples' right of access to the courts.

II. ANALYSIS

We review a district court's decision regarding the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d 835, 841 (Fla.2007). In the analysis that follows, we first explain that the parental award provision unambiguously provides for only a single award of $100,000. We then answer the certified question in the negative, explaining why the parental award provision does not violate equal protection. After that, we explain why the parental award provision neither is void for vagueness nor unconstitutionally limits the right of access to courts.

A. Statutory Interpretation

The Samples assert that the parental award provision is ambiguous because it could reasonably be interpreted as either providing for an award of $100,000 per parent or as providing for only a single $100,000 award per claim. We have previously explained that “[w]hen the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning.” Fla. Birth–Related Neurological Injury Comp. Ass'n v. Dep't of Admin. Hearings, 29 So.3d 992, 997 (Fla.2010) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). The parental award provision provides for “[p]eriodic payments of an award to the parents or legal guardians of the infant found to have sustained a birth-related neurological injury, which award shall not exceed $100,000. However, at the discretion of the administrative law judge, such award may be made in a lump sum.” § 766.31(1)(b) 1, Fla. Stat. (2010). We agree with the Fifth District that “[t]his language cannot be reasonably interpreted to provide multiple awards of $100,000 to each parent of a qualifying child.” Samples, 40 So.3d at 22.

The plain language of the parental award provision clearly states that a singular “award” shall be paid to the plural “parents or legal guardians” of an injured child, “which award shall not exceed $100,000.” § 766.31(1)(b) 1, Fla. Stat. (2010). This language does not lend itself to the interpretation—advanced by the Samples—that more than one award may be given or that the total sum of the parental award may amount to more than $100,000. If such a meaning had been intended, the Legislature would have stated that an award be made to “each parent or legal guardian,” which awards “shall not exceed $100,000 each.” Because the statute is unambiguous, we will not look behind the words of the parental award provision to determine if the Legislature intended otherwise. See Daniels v. Fla. Dep't of Health, 898 So.2d 61, 64 (Fla.2005) (holding that where a “statute is...