Samson v. Greenville Hosp. System
| Citation | 295 S.C. 359,368 S.E.2d 665 |
| Decision Date | 04 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 22868,22868 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | , 5 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 1274, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 11,809 Helen Marianne SAMSON, Plaintiff, v. The GREENVILLE HOSPITAL SYSTEM and the Carolina-Georgia Blood Center, Inc., Defendants. Russell Joseph SAMSON, Plaintiff, v. The GREENVILLE HOSPITAL SYSTEM and the Carolina-Georgia Blood Center, Inc., Defendants. Russell Joseph SAMSON, as Guardian ad Litem for Camaron Joseph Samson, a minor under the age of fourteen (14) years, Plaintiff, v. The GREENVILLE HOSPITAL SYSTEM and the Carolina-Georgia Blood Center, Inc., Defendants. . Heard |
G. Dewey Oxner, Jr., Frances D. Ellison, and James H. Ritchie, Jr. of Haynsworth, Marion, McKay and Guerard, Greenville, for defendant Greenville Hosp. System.
Paul J. Foster, Jr., and Robert P. Foster of Foster, Gaddy and Foster, Greenville, Janet Ann Napolitano of Lewis and Roca, Phoenix, Ariz., for defendant Carolina-Georgia Blood Center, Inc.
Stephen G. Morrison and David E. Dukes of Nelson, Mullins, Riley and Scarborough, Columbia, Bruce M. Chadwick, Fern P. O'Brian, and Brendan Collins of Arnold & Porter, Washington, D.C., amicus curiae for American National Red Cross; Associate Gen. Counsel Karen S. Lipton, of American Red Cross, Washington, D.C., of counsel.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46, we agreed to answer the following question certified by order of The Honorable Joe F. Anderson, Jr., United States District Court for the District of South Carolina:
Whether § 44-43-10 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, 1976, as amended, is unconstitutional as being violative of the Equal Protection Clause of article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina.
S.C.Code Ann. Section 44-43-10 (1985) is South Carolina's "blood shield" statute; it exempts providers of blood and blood products from implied warranty-based liability:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale, procurement, processing, distribution or use of human tissues such as corneas, bones or organs, whole blood, plasma, blood products, or blood derivatives. Such human tissues, whole blood, plasma, blood products or blood derivatives shall not be considered commodities subject to sale or barter and the transplanting, injection, transfusion or other transfer of such substances into the human body shall be considered a medical service.
Plaintiff (Mrs. Samson) was given a transfusion of blood in January 1984 while a patient at a hospital operated by defendant Greenville Hospital System (Hospital). Hospital obtained the blood from defendant Carolina-Georgia Blood Center (the Center), which had drawn the blood from volunteer donor "John Doe" in December 1983. The blood transfused into Mrs. Samson was allegedly tainted with the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus. Unaware of the possibility that she may have received a tainted transfusion, Mrs. Samson became pregnant in June or July 1985 and gave birth to her son, plaintiff Camaron Joseph Samson, in March 1986.
When Doe returned to donate more blood in September 1985, a laboratory screening device to detect prior exposure to the AIDS virus was in effect. Doe's blood was tested and indicated prior exposure to the AIDS virus. Through a "lookback" program, the Center notified Hospital that Hospital had received potentially AIDS--infected blood in 1984. Mrs. Samson was notified and a laboratory analysis was conducted. Mrs. Samson allegedly tested positive for the antibody indicating prior exposure to the AIDS virus. Her son also allegedly tested positive and is now in "full-blown" AIDS.
Plaintiffs have asserted four causes of action against defendants, including a cause for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. 1 Defendants have moved for summary judgment in the District Court, claiming that Section 44-43-10 insulates them from the implied warranties causes of action. Plaintiffs maintain that Section 44-43-10 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the South Carolina Constitution.
We begin our analysis by recognizing that a statute enacted pursuant to the legislature's powers is presumptively constitutional. Nichols v. South Carolina Research Authority, 290 S.C. 415, 351 S.E.2d 155 (1986). Other courts have noted that blood shield statutes are entitled to the same presumption. See McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 469 F.2d 230, 235 (6th Cir.1972) (applying Tennessee law); Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hospital, 62 Cal.App.3d 812, 133 Cal.Rptr. 339 (1976); Glass v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 32 Ill.App.3d 237, 336 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1975).
Our research indicates--and plaintiffs frankly concede--that of the 48 blood shield statutes enacted nationwide 2, not one has been ruled unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds. Numerous courts have flatly rejected Equal Protection-based attacks on blood shield statutes. See Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services, 506 F.2d 841 (5th Cir.1975); McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, supra; Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.App.3d 509, 220 Cal.Rptr. 590 (1985); Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hospital, supra; McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Foundation Blood Bank, 62 Cal.App.3d 866, 133 Cal.Rptr. 444 (1976); Hill v. Jackson Park Hospital, 39 Ill.App.3d 223, 349 N.E.2d 541 (1976); Bingham v. Lutheran General & Deaconess Hospitals, 34 Ill.App.3d 562, 340 N.E.2d 220 (1975).
In reviewing a statute challenged on Equal Protection grounds, we give great deference to a legislatively created classification, and the classification will be sustained if it is not plainly arbitrary and there is "any reasonable hypothesis" to support it. Smith v. Smith, 291 S.C. 420, 424, 354 S.E.2d 36, 39 (1987) (quoting Gary Concrete Products, Inc. v. Riley, 285 S.C. 498, 504, 331 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1985)). The Equal Protection clause is satisfied if: "1) the classification bears a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be effected; 2) the members of the class are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions; and 3) the classification rests on some reasonable basis." Smith v. Smith, supra; Gary Concrete Products, Inc. v. Riley, at 504, 331 S.E.2d at 339.
First, we must determine the legislative purpose sought to be effected through enactment of Section 44-43-10. Plaintiffs argue that the absence of legislative history behind the blood shield statute requires the conclusion that no legislative purpose underlay its enactment. We disagree.
Legislative intent is best determined by examining the language of the statute itself. See Gambrell v. Travelers Ins. Co., 280 S.C. 69, 71, 310 S.E.2d 814, 816 (1983). The language of Section 44-43-10 reflects a legislative intent to exempt blood providers from liability based on implied warranties; to remove human tissues and blood from the class of "products" which are bought and sold; and to characterize the transfusion of blood as a medical service rather than a sale.
The encouragement of a readily available supply of blood and blood products has long been recognized as the legislative purpose behind enactment of blood shield statutes in other states. See Heirs of Fruge v. Blood Services, supra (); Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 528 A.2d 805 (1987) (); Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, supra (); Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hospital, supra (); McDonald v. Sacramento Medical, supra (); accord Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F.Supp. 1048 (D.D.C.1987). We believe that protection of a continuing adequate blood supply also motivated the enactment of Section 44-43-10 in South Carolina.
Further, we believe the classification created by Section 44-43-10 bears a reasonable relation to that legislative goal. We agree with the Supreme Court of Connecticut's "reasonable relation" analysis of a blood shield statute nearly identical to South Carolina's:
These statutes reflect a legislative judgment that to require providers to serve as insurers of the safety of these materials might impose such an overwhelming burden as to discourage the gathering and distribution of blood. To ensure that such services remain adequate and affordable, legislatures have chosen to limit liability to defects that are the result of negligence ...
Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, supra, at 409, 528 A.2d at 810. The "overwhelming burden" referred to by the Connecticut court has been described elsewhere as the threat of "crippling legal liability." Heirs of Fruge, supra, at 844; McAllister v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 240 Ga. 246, 240 S.E.2d 247 (1977).
We have recently analyzed the legislative purpose underlying the statute of limitations for bringing medical malpractice actions. In Smith v. Smith, supra, this Court upheld the three year limit as bearing "a rational relationship to the legitimate legislative purpose of reducing health care providers' exposure to liability and continued delivery of reasonable health care services." Id. at 425, 354 S.E.2d at 39. We hold that a similar rational relationship exists here between Section 44-43-10 and the legitimate legislative goal of ensuring an adequate blood supply. The statute's classification and purpose are rationally linked by the legislature's "relatively modest restriction upon the theories available to plaintiffs such as these ..." 3 Hyland Therapeutics, supra, at 516, 220 Cal.Rptr. at 594.
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