Sand v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 08 September 1983
• Docket Number: S.F. 24496
• Citation: 34 Cal.3d 567,668 P.2d 787,194 Cal.Rptr. 480
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 668 P.2d 787 Douglas SAND, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

Page 480

194 Cal.Rptr. 480

34 Cal.3d 567, 668 P.2d 787

Douglas SAND, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF SOLANO COUNTY, Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

S.F. 24496.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Sept. 8, 1983.

Honeychurch, Finkas & Villarreal and Denis Honeychurch, Fairfield, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

George Deukmejian and John K. Van de Kamp, Attys. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, Thomas A. Brady and Ronald A. Bass, Deputy Attys. Gen., for real party in interest.

MOSK, Justice.

Douglas Sand, an indigent criminal defendant, seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent superior court to grant his motion for public funds to pay for ancillary defense services. He relies on Penal Code section 987.9 in support of his request. ¹ For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the motion was properly denied.

Defendant was charged with assault by a life prisoner causing death (§ 4500), and with murder (§ 187) with special circumstances (§ 190.2, subds. (a)(2) and (a)(15)). He was found to be indigent and an attorney was appointed to represent him. Prior to and during defendant's first trial, his attorney requested and was granted funds pursuant to section 987.9 to pay for the services of an investigator, two experts in the field of prison environment, and jury selection consultants. The jury was unable to reach a verdict and a mistrial was declared. Retrial has been stayed pending our resolution of this proceeding.

At a hearing on defendant's motion for a continuance of his retrial, the prosecutor stated on the record that he would not seek the death penalty, but would ask for a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole in the event special circumstances were proved. Defendant, through his attorney, then moved for additional funds under section 987.9 to assist in the second trial. The court denied the motion on the ground that defendant's prosecution was no longer a "capital case" because the death penalty could not be imposed. Defendant contends that his case remains "capital" because special circumstances have been alleged.

Section 987.9 provides in part that "In the trial of a capital case the indigent defendant, through his counsel, may request the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense." We are asked to construe the phrase "capital case" as used in this provision.

Initially, we examine the words at issue to determine whether their meaning is ambiguous. (Smith v. Rhea (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 361, 365, 140 Cal.Rptr. 116.) The word "capital," when used to modify "punishment," is unambiguous: capital punishment means punishment by death. However, defendant contends that the phrase "capital case" should be construed more broadly to include any prosecution in which death is a statutorily permissible punishment; thus, a "capital case," in defendant's view, is any case in which special circumstances have been alleged, regardless of whether the prosecutor has stipulated that the death penalty will not in fact be sought.

Arguably the term "capital case" might be understood either to define the nature of the offense charged--i.e., murder with special circumstances--or to describe the permissible punishment--i.e., that the death penalty may be imposed. This ambiguity invites statutory construction: "Where the language [of a statute] is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained." (Stillwell v. State Bar (1946) 29 Cal.2d 119, 124, 173 P.2d 313.) In Select Base Materials, Inc. v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672, this court reiterated that "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Accord, West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pacific Finance Loans (1970) 2 Cal.3d 594, 607, 86 Cal.Rptr. 793, 469 P.2d 665; People v. Superior Court (Smith) (1969) 70 Cal.2d 123, 132, 74 Cal.Rptr. 294, 449 P.2d 230; Standard Fruit and Steamship Co. v. Metropolitan Stevedore Co. (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 305, 310, 125 Cal.Rptr. 111.) To discern legislative intent, we must examine the legislative history and statutory context of the act under scrutiny. (Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 726, 732, 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260; English v. County of Alameda (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 226, 233-234, 138 Cal.Rptr. 634; Steilberg v. Lackner (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 780, 785, 138 Cal.Rptr. 378.)

We begin this exercise by observing that the Legislature expressly conditioned the effectiveness of section 987.9 (Stats.1977, ch. 1048, § 2, p. 3179) on passage of the 1977 death penalty legislation (Stats.1977, ch. 316, §§ 4-14, pp. 1256-1262). Therefore we must consider section 987.9 in the context of this broader statutory scheme. (Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 489, 134 Cal.Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081; Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 918, 80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33.)

Former sections 190 through 190.4 of the 1977 legislation provided that when a defendant is charged with murder and special circumstances are alleged the trial shall proceed in two phases. In the first or guilt phase the trier of fact must determine whether the defendant is guilty of the offense and, if so, whether the special circumstances have been proved. In the second or penalty phase the trier of fact must determine whether the sentence of death or of life imprisonment without possibility of parole should be imposed. Nowhere is the term "capital case" defined, and no distinction relevant for purposes of construing section 987.9 is made between death and life imprisonment without parole. However, because the ultimate purpose of the 1977 statute was to reinstate the death penalty, we may reasonably conclude that its companion section 987.9 was intended to insure that in cases in which the defendant actually risks death he or she will be afforded such ancillary defense services as are necessary to a "complete and full defense."

This construction of "capital case" is compatible with the following statement by the Legislature explaining why the enactment both of the death penalty statute and of section 987.9 was an urgency measure: "The California Supreme Court has declared the existing death penalty law unconstitutional. This act remedies one aspect of the constitutional infirmities found to be in existing law, and in order to guarantee the public the protection inherent in an operative death penalty law, it is necessary that this act takes effect immediately." (Italics added.) (Stats.1977, ch. 1048, § 4, p. 3179; id. ch. 316, § 26, p. 1266.) By explicitly linking enactment of section 987.9 to passage of a statutory scheme denominated a "death penalty law" the Legislature has expressed its intention that the defense services funding provision apply in those cases in which death remains a possible punishment. (See Criminal Procedure: Investigation and Presentation Funds in Capital Cases (1978) 9 Pacific L.J. 454-455.)

Furthermore, had the Legislature intended section 987.9 to apply when either the death penalty or the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole might be imposed, it could readily have said so explicitly, as it has done elsewhere. For example, section 1018, reenacted in 1977 as part of the death penalty law (Stats.1977, ch. 316, § 17, p. 1263), provides in part that "No plea of guilty of a felony for which the maximum punishment is death, or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, shall be received from a defendant who does not appear with counsel, nor shall any such plea be received without the consent of the defendant's counsel." (Italics added.) Section 987.9, in contrast, provides for ancillary defense funds in "capital cases" only--i.e., only when the death penalty may be imposed.

In those murder cases, such as that of defendant, in which the death penalty will not be sought, even though the offense charged is statutorily punishable by death, section 987.9 is inapplicable. If defendant is found guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances he will be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Because he does not risk capital punishment, his is not a "capital case" within the meaning of section 987.9 as construed in light of the 1977 death penalty statute. ²

Our conclusion that this is not a "capital case" because the death penalty may not be imposed is consistent with United States Supreme Court decisions holding that the death penalty is fundamentally and qualitatively different from any other punishment, including life without parole. The Supreme Court equated "capital" with "death penalty" in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d 944: in striking down a North Carolina mandatory death penalty statute the Woodson court held that the Eighth Amendment requires individualized sentencing in "capital cases," and then explained that "This conclusion rests squarely on the predicate that the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two." (Italics added; id. at p. 305, 96 S.Ct. at p. 2991 [plurality opn.]; accord, Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2931, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 [plurality opn.]; see also Rockwell v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 420, 428, 134 Cal.Rptr. 650, 556 P.2d 1101.)

Our views are also supported by the recent decision in Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108. In Keenan a defendant charged with murder with special circumstances sought funds...