Sanders v. Baggerly

• Citation: 131 S.W. 49,96 Ark. 117
• Parties: SANDERS v. BAGGERLY
• Decision Date: 11 July 1910
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

131 S.W. 49

96 Ark. 117

SANDERS v. BAGGERLY

Supreme Court of Arkansas

July 11, 1910

Appeal from Nevada Chancery Court; James D. Shaver, Chancellor reversed.

Decree reversed and cause remanded.

John M Gaut, McRae & Tompkins and D. L. McRae, for appellants.

Ecclesiastical decisions are binding on the courts so far as concerns ecclesiastical questions. 91 Tenn. 328; 92 F. 214; 106 P 395; 129 Ga. 1; 154 Ill. 394; 58 Ill. 509; 23 Ill. 456; 13 Wall. 679; 218 Ill. 503. The local church is bound by the orders and judgments of the courts of the church. 102 Tex 324. Union among churches is a perfectly legitimate part of their purpose and their freedom. 41 Pa. 9; 88 Pa. 60. The General Conference represents the sovereign power of the church. 16 How. 288; 90 S.W. 106; 17 Ia. 204; 21 N.Y. 9; 115 S.W. 691. Their union does not destroy the identity of either. 134 Ill.App. 620; 129 Ga. 1. A specific trust is one in which the muniment of title specifies the doctrine to be taught. 13 Wall. 679; 129 Ind. 486; 14 L. R. A. 518; 91 Tenn. 328; 15 L. R. A. 801. Every donation is made with an implied reference to all of the powers of the church. 198 Ill. 626. A State adopting a statute or constitution of another State adopts it with the construction placed upon it by the State of its creation. 187 Ill. 65; 61 Ill.App. 476; 97 Ill. 421; 161 U.S. 591; 117 F. 123; 146 Ind. 466; 150 Ind. 216; 1 Cranch 299; 146 U.S. 37; 41 Pa. 9; 16 How. 288; 14 Bush 256. Where a particular construction is long acquiesced by the church, it becomes established law. 17 Mass. 143; 9 Am. Dec. 123; I Cranch 299. The court will take judicial notice of the recorded history of the church. I Wheat. 304; 4 Yerg. 528; 18 N.J.Eq. 13. A legislative body is presumed to be consistent with the general policy of the church or State. 92 Tex. 275; 47 S.W. 967; 82 Me. 265; 19 Ala. 465.

Hamby, Haynie & Hamby and W. C. Caldwell, for appellees.

The conveyance created a specific trust for the support of the doctrines of that church. 145 Ind. 361; 32 L. R. A. 839; 83 Ia. 147; 13 L. R. A. 198; 96 Ia. 55; 31 L. R. A. 141; 63 N.H. 9; 16 Am. R. 82; 67 Pa. 138; 5 Am. R. 415; 87 Va. 103; 11 L. R. A. 214; 91 Tenn. 305; 11 Heisk. 458; 79 Miss. 488; 30 So. 714; 121 Tenn. 676; 222 Mo. 613. A court of equity will prevent a diversion of church property in every instance. 12 Wright 20; 67 Pa. 138; 1 Dan. 1; 3 Meriwale 353; 13 Wall. 680; 67 Pa. 138; 7 B. Mon. 489; 108 Tenn. 173; 10 Bush 318; 80 Ky. 443; 5 Bush 112; 14 B. Mon. 39; 54 Mo. 343; 42 Ga. 562. The scheme contemplated the absorption and extinguishment of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and is therefore void. 121 Tenn. 556; 120 S.W. 873; 222 Mo. 613; 121 S.W. 805; 87 N.E. 1091. The powers of the higher courts of the Presbyterian Church are defined and limited by its constitution. 2 Bush 333; 5 Bush 115; 89 Pa. 97; 5 Yerg. 272; 15 N.Y. 543; 108 S.W. 447; 8 Lea 167; 4 N.J.Eq. 69; 222 Mo. 613. Where the organic law provides for a change to be made in some particular manner, such change can be effected in no other way. 14 L. R. A. 528; 24 Id. 621; 6 Id. 422; 22 Id. 175; 98 Mich. 279; 156 Pa. 119; 93 Pa. 479; 22 Neb. 375; 69 Ind. 505; 46 O. St. 677; 24 Kan. 709; 14 R. I. 651; 26 L. R. A. 78; 24 Ala. 109; 54 Wis. 318; 60 Ia. 543. Church constitutions are treated as contracts. 2 Sawy. 655; 94 U.S. 523; 2 Daly 239; 4 Abb. N. C. 300; 2 Brewst. 571; 25 Kan. 177; 75 N.C. 134; 11 Phila. 166; 14 Bush 278. Constitutional authority must be shown by those asserting it. 89 Pa. 97; 67 Pa. 138; 5 Am. Rep. 415; 2 Bush 332; 5 Bush 110. Civil courts decide civil rights for themselves. 156 Ind. 209; 145 Ind. 361; 97 Ind. 423; 35 Ind. 201; 15 Wall. 131; 12 Bush 541; 71 N.E. 627; 163 Pa. 534; 29 L. R. A. 476; 24 S.W. 52; 36 Neb. 564; 113 Mich. 375; 71 N.W. 627; 62 Ia. 567; 17 N.W. 747; 89 Pa. 97; 56 N.J.L. 401; 18 Vt. 511; 79 Miss. 488; 98 Mich. 279; 24 L. R. A. 615; 11 Heisk. 458; Id. 523; 91 Tenn. 304; 104 Tenn. 665; 108 Tenn. 173; 54 Mo. 377; 31 Ill. 35; 149 Mass. 341; 21 N.E. 868; 222 Mo. 613; 121 S.W. 805; 121 Tenn. 556; 120 S.W. 873.

MCCULLOCH C. J. WOOD and HART, JJ., dissent.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

This action, which was instituted in the chancery court of Nevada County, involves the question of title, control and use of certain real estate situated in that county at or near Artesian, which, in the year 1885, was conveyed by certain individual owners to a trustee as a site for a church house "to be under the control, care and direction of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church." It is insisted on one side (that of the defendants) that the above-quoted language in the deed created a specific trust for the propagation and support of definite religious doctrines or principles, and that, regardless of other questions in the case, it is the duty of the court to prevent a diversion of the property from the trust attached to its use, and to confine its use to the support of the particular doctrines mentioned. They invoke the following rule, stated by Mr. Justice Miller in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666:

"It seems hardly to admit of a rational doubt that an individual or an association of individuals may dedicate property by way of trust to the purpose of sustaining, supporting and propagating definite religious doctrines or principles, provided that in doing so they violate no law of morality, and give to the instrument by which their purpose is evidenced the formalities which the laws require. And it would seem also to be the obvious duty of the court, in a case properly made, to see that the property so dedicated is not diverted from the trust which is thus attached to its use. So long as there are persons qualified within the meaning of the original dedication, and who are also willing, to teach the doctrines or principles prescribed in the act of dedication, and so long as there is any one so interested in the execution of the trust as to have a standing in court, it must be that they can prevent the diversion of the property or fund to other and different uses. This is the general doctrine of courts of equity as to charities, and it seems equally applicable to ecclesiastical matters."

In that opinion Judge Miller classified under three general heads the questions which usually come before the civil courts concerning rights of property held by religious organizations:

"1. The first of these is when the property which is the subject of controversy has been, by the deed or will of the donor, or other instrument by which the property is held, by the express terms of the instrument, devoted to the teaching, support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or belief.

"2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical associations, and, so far as church government is concerned, owes no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.

"3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory over the whole membership of that general organization."

Of the first class above mentioned the learned judge used the language just quoted, and of the second class he said: "The second class of cases which we have described has reference to the case of a church of a strictly congregational or independent organization, governed solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government; and to property held by such a church, either by way of purchase or donation, with no other specific trust attached to it in the hands of the church than that it is for the use of that congregation as a religious society. In such cases, where there is a schism which leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property."

And of the third class he said: "It is the case of property acquired in any of the usual modes for the general use of a religious congregation which is itself part of a larger and general organization of some religious denomination, with which it is more or less intimately connected by religious views and ecclesiastical government. * * * Here is no case of property devoted forever by the instrument which conveyed it, or by any specific declaration of its owner, to the support of any special religious dogmas, or any peculiar form of worship, but of property purchased for the use of a religious congregation, and so long as any existing religious congregation can be ascertained to be that congregation, or its regular and legitimate successor, it is entitled to the use of the property. In the case of an independent congregation we have pointed out how this identity, or succession, is to be ascertained, but in cases of this character we are bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments."

We are of the opinion that the present case falls within the third class referred to, and not the first. For the language of the deed is not sufficient to dedicate the property conveyed to use in the propagation or support of...