Sanders v. State
Decision Date | 31 March 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 1D01-5033.,1D01-5033. |
Citation | 847 So.2d 504 |
Parties | Robert Lavon SANDERS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Appellant, pro se.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and James W. Rogers, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
EN BANC
In order to accommodate Judge Ervin's desire to revise his separate opinion, the court withdraws its opinion of November 15, 2002, and reissues its original opinion with the revised separate opinion. No motion for rehearing will be entertained.
Asserting three grounds for reversal, Sanders appeals the summary denial of his rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief. We affirm the order under review and find it necessary to address only one of the appellant's arguments, his argument that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction as to a one-step-removed lesser included offense of one of the crimes of which he was convicted. We consider this case en banc to recede from a line of authority holding that such a claim is a colorable claim under rule 3.850.
As recently explained in Hill v. State, 788 So.2d 315 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001),review denied, 807 So.2d 655 (Fla.2002), many decisions from this and other district courts of appeal hold that a defendant states a colorable basis for relief under rule 3.850 when he asserts that his trial counsel incompetently failed to request an instruction as to a one-step-removed lesser included offense of the crime of which the defendant has been convicted. The first of these decisions was Bateson v. State, 516 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), decided just three years after the seminal decision on ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Although Bateson makes no reference to Strickland, we assume that the Bateson panel was aware of the Strickland decision. However, it must be acknowledged that the precise contours of the holding in Strickland are much more clearly defined now than they were just three years after Strickland was decided.
We are confronted in the present case with an issue materially indistinguishable from the issue presented in Bateson, but the knowledge gained from eighteen years of experience in applying Strickland to postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel claims persuades us that Bateson was wrongly decided. We are now convinced that the type of claim involved in Bateson, in Hill, and in the present case cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland. Our reasons for this conclusion were expressed in Hill as follows:
; Goodwin v. State, 751 So.2d 537, 546 (Fla.1999). Thus, as Goodwin explains, the test for prejudice on direct appeal is the harmless error test of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), under which trial court error will result in reversal unless the prosecution can prove "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Conversely, however, as explained in Strickland, prejudice may be found in a collateral proceeding in which ineffective assistance of counsel is claimed only upon a showing by the defendant that there is a "reasonable probability" that counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceeding.
. But we have difficulty accepting the proposition that there is even a substantial possibility that a jury which has found every element of an offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt, would have, given the opportunity, ignored its own findings of fact and the trial court's instructions on the law and found a defendant guilty of only a lesser included offense. In fact, we confess some discomfort with the proposition that members of the judiciary should even engage in such speculation. And we believe our reservations find support in the reasoning employed by the supreme court in Gragg v. State, 429 So.2d 1204 (Fla.1983).
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...counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceeding.” ' “855 So.2d at 1159, quoting in part Sanders v. State, 847 So.2d 504, 506 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2003). See also Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 645 A.2d 1300 (1994). Because the Supreme Court specifically held that the......
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...counsel's deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceeding."' "855 So. 2d at 1159, quoting in part Sanders v. State, 847 So. 2d 504, 506 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 2003). See also Commonwealth v. Howard, 538 Pa. 86, 645 A.2d 1300 (1994). Because the Supreme Court specifically held that t......
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...fact and the trial court's instructions on the law and found a defendant guilty of only a lesser included offense.Sanders v. State, 847 So. 2d 504, 506-07 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Although Defendant is correct that trespass is a lesser-included offense of burglary, the record reflects that the ......
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