Santiago v. NYS Dept. of Correctional Services

• Decision Date: 29 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89 Civ. 2069 (RPP).,89 Civ. 2069 (RPP).
• Parties: Rafael SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES and Dr. Melvin J. Steinhart, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

725 F. Supp. 780

Rafael SANTIAGO, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES and Dr. Melvin J. Steinhart, Defendants.

No. 89 Civ. 2069 (RPP).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

November 29, 1989.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of the State of New York, New York City (Ellen J. Fried, Marilyn T. Trautfield, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for defendant New York State Dept. of Correctional Services.

Martin, Clearwater & Bell, Barbara Goldberg, Richard A. Young, Stacie Young, New York City, for defendant Dr. Steinhart.

Michael H. Sussman, Yonkers, N.Y., for plaintiff.

OPINION

ROBERT P. PATTERSON, JR., District Judge.

This is a motion to dismiss for improper service of process under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d), for failure to state a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3).

Plaintiff Rafael Santiago, a hispanic employee of the New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), seeks redress for damages incurred as a result of incidents surrounding his being placed on involuntary leave in August 1987. The defendants are DOCS and Dr. Melvin J. Steinhart, a psychiatrist whose evaluation allegedly played a role in the involuntary leave order.

Plaintiff claims relief under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against both defendants. Plaintiff also sues Dr. Steinhart under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has been employed by DOCS as a corrections officer since 1978. On June 15, 1987, plaintiff purportedly had an altercation with a superior officer at the Otisville Correctional Facility in Orange County, New York. Plaintiff then requested a leave of absence which was granted. The Complaint alleges that the leave of absence was necessary to relieve

tension ... caused by (a) false accusations against him; (b) his superiors' failure to support his rational, job-related decisions and (c) his receipt of an unjustifiably poor work rating.

Comp. at 2, ¶ 9.

Plaintiff subsequently requested reinstatement after receiving treatment from a privately retained doctor. DOCS, however, refused to allow plaintiff to return to work until a physician from the Employee Health Service (EHS), a division of the New York State Department of Civil Services, conducted an evaluation. On July 6, 1987, Dr. John Hargraves examined plaintiff. Dr. Hargraves then referred plaintiff to defendant Dr. Melvin Steinhart for additional psychiatric evaluation.

Dr. Steinhart is a private psychiatrist, licensed to practice in New York, to whom EHS regularly refers patients. In early July 1987, Dr. Steinhart met with plaintiff for a session of approximately ninety minutes. On July 27, 1989, Dr. David Horenstein performed additional psychological testing. Based on Dr. Horenstein's report and his own observations, Dr. Steinhart wrote in August 1987 to EHS recommending continued medical leave of absence and no disciplinary action.

DOCS then informed plaintiff that as of August 13, 1987, he would be placed on involuntary leave of absence and subject to further evaluations pursuant to New York Civil Service Law §§ 72(1) and 72(5).

On August 20, 1987, plaintiff filed with DOCS an appeal of the involuntary leave decision. DOCS responded by referring plaintiff to Dr. Steinhart for another evaluation. On September 15, 1987, Dr. Steinhart interviewed plaintiff for fifteen minutes. The Complaint alleges, "The doctor then prepared a materially misleading and false report, dated September 15, 1987, which the DOCS relied upon in determining that Santiago continued to be mentally unfit for service." Comp. at 3, ¶ 18.

The Complaint alleges that Dr. Steinhart and DOCS engaged in an

effort to label Santiago mentally unfit ... contrived to avoid invoking disciplinary proceedings which would have focused attention on the continued abuse plaintiff suffered at the instance of superior officers.

Comp. at 4, ¶ 24.

In October 1987, DOCS conducted several days of hearings on the involuntary leave decision. The hearing officer affirmed that plaintiff should not be allowed to return to work because of mental unfitness. In late December 1987, DOCS notified plaintiff that, in light of the hearing officer's opinion, involuntary leave would continue indefinitely.

Plaintiff contends that DOCS's decision to continue involuntary leave was part of "a pattern of systematic and intentional discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment practiced by defendant DOCS against minority (Black and Hispanic) Corrections Officers." Comp. at 5, ¶ 27.

Plaintiff then appealed to the New York State Civil Service Commission under Civil Service Law § 72(3). After a hearing in April 1988, the Commission reversed DOCS's decision and found that as of July 15, 1987, plaintiff had been mentally fit for work. The Commission ordered plaintiff reinstated and awarded back pay and benefits. According to the Complaint, "the Civil Service Commission ... lacked the authority to, and did not, award him plaintiff compensation for the pain and suffering he endured at the hands of these defendants, or for the fees and costs sustained in defeating DOCS's claim that he was mentally unfit for work." Comp. at 4, ¶ 26.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the mental distress and the expenses incurred in fighting the alleged "determined effort to declare him mentally incapable of working." Comp. at 7, ¶ 39(b). Plaintiff also seeks to enjoin any retaliatory activity by DOCS in response to the initiation of this lawsuit.

DISCUSSION

I. Rule 4(d)

Dr. Steinhart contends that the complaint should be dismissed because plaintiff did not properly serve him with process. According to Dr. Steinhart, the process server delivered the summons and complaint to a colleague of Dr. Steinhart at the Albany Medical Center, Department of Psychiatry. Within the next fifteen minutes, Dr. Steinhart received the summons and complaint. Plaintiff does not contend that the colleague was an agent of Dr. Steinhart.

Technically, none of the specific provisions of Rule 4(d) are satisfied by this mode of service. However, the due process requirement that defendants receive notice of the proceedings was satisfied. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950).

Under the spirit of Rule 4(d), "actual receipt of the summons and complaint at the particular place where it is served may be the real key to the disposition of many cases." Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1096, at 78 (1987) (citing Knarlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir.1963)). Although service of process at one's place of work often is a grounds for dismissal, under the circumstances of this case "it makes little sense to construe Rule 4(d)(1) technically when actual notice has been received; to do so would be inconsistent with the spirit of the federal rules." Wright and Miller, supra at 80. The Court denies the motion to dismiss for improper service of process.

II. Section 1985(3)

Both defendants move to dismiss the claim under Section 1985(3) for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Section 1985(3) provides for relief when:

two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire ... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws....

Plaintiff's claim fails to satisfy Section 1985(3)'s threshold requirement of a conspiracy between "two or more persons." The only two possible "persons" in the complaint are Dr. Steinhart and DOCS. The latter is a state agency. The complaint names no individuals from DOCS.

"It is well settled that a state and its agencies are not `persons' under §§ 1983 and 1985." Rode v. Dellarciprete, 617 F.Supp. 721 (M.D.Pa.1985) (citations and footnote omitted). Plaintiff's brief fails to address any of the cases cited by defendants that stand squarely for the proposition that a state agency like DOCS cannot be used to satisfy the Section 1985(3) predicate of "two or more persons." See Richards v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, 572 F.Supp. 1168, 1172 (S.D.N.Y.1983); Thompson v. New York, 487 F.Supp. 212, 228 (N.D.N.Y.1979); Allah v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Corrections, 448 F.Supp. 1123, 1125 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995, 94 S.Ct. 2409, 40 L.Ed.2d 774 (1974)).

The Court also finds guidance in the Supreme Court's recent holding that "neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are `persons' under § 1983." Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). There is a principal that "under §§ 1983 and 1985 the term `persons' has the same meaning. An-Ti Chai v. Michigan Technological University, 493 F.Supp. 1137 (W.D.Mich.1980); Thompson v. State of New York, 487 F.Supp. 212, 228 (N.D. N.Y.1979)." Rode, 617 F.Supp. at 723 n. 2. Plaintiff was aware of the Will decision at the time of filing its brief, see Pl. Br. at 1 n. 1, and has made no attempt to establish that in 1871 Congress intended to define "persons" in Section 1985 differently than it had that same year in Section 1983. See Will, 109 S.Ct. at 2311 ("examination of the authorities of the era suggests that the phrase was ... not to include the States.") (citations omitted).

The Complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1985(3) because the prerequisite of "two or more persons" is unsatisfied.

III. Section 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

...