Sapp v. State, No. A03A1374.
Decision Date | 10 September 2003 |
Docket Number | No. A03A1374. |
Citation | 587 S.E.2d 267,263 Ga. App. 122 |
Parties | SAPP v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Buford & Buford, Floyd M. Buford, Jr., Macon, for appellant.
Howard Z. Simms, Dist. Atty., Eugene Felton, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Carl Sapp appeals from his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. On appeal he contends that the trial court erred by prohibiting him from cross-examining a State's witness regarding a dead-docketed drug charge that had arisen months after the witness had already given his sworn statement incriminating Sapp to police. We discern no error and affirm.
The evidence reveals that a fatal shooting occurred on December 9, 2001. A few hours after the incident, Shontrell Harper gave a sworn statement to police identifying Sapp as the shooter. Nearly three months later, Harper was charged with having possessed cocaine and marijuana on February 23, 2002. These charges against Harper were dead docketed on March 4, 2002 (prior to Sapp being indicted for the December 9 shooting).
At trial, Sapp requested permission to cross-examine Harper regarding the dead-docketed drug charges. The trial court did not allow such cross-examination, reasoning that the cross-examination would be improper because (i) there were no pending charges against Harper, (ii) the case against Harper had been dead docketed prior to Sapp being indicted, and (iii) there was no immunity deal or even any discussion of a deal between the State and Harper in connection with his testimony against Sapp.
Sapp was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and following the denial of his motion for new trial, Sapp appeals.
In his sole enumeration of error, Sapp contends that the trial court erred in disallowing his cross-examination on the dead-docketed drug charges against Harper. We disagree.
A criminal defendant has wide latitude to cross-examine and impeach a witness concerning pending criminal charges to show the witness's motivation in testifying, such as bias, partiality, or an agreement between the government and the witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-317(2), 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974); Hines v. State, 249 Ga. 257, 259-260(2), 290 S.E.2d 911 (1982). However, the extent of such cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 402-403(3), 480 S.E.2d 1 (1996).
(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson, supra, 244 Ga.App. at 131-132(1), 534 S.E.2d 480. Where the defendant cannot show evidence of a deal or any hope of a...
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