Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc.

• Decision Date: 21 December 1995
• Docket Number: No. 84414,84414
• Citation: 667 So.2d 180
• Parties: 20 Fla. L. Weekly S600 SARASOTA COUNTY, Petitioner, v. SARASOTA CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 180

667 So.2d 180

20 Fla. L. Weekly S600

SARASOTA COUNTY, Petitioner, v. SARASOTA CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC., et al., Respondents.

No. 84414.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 21, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 6, 1996.

Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal--Direct Conflict of Decisions--Second District--Case No. 93-01902 (Sarasota County).

Richard E. Nelson, Richard L. Smith and Michael S. Drews of Nelson, Hesse, Cyril, Smith, Widman, Herb, Causey & Dooley, Sarasota, for Petitioner.

Stephen F. Ellis, Sarasota, Florida; and I.W. Whitesell, Jr., Sarasota, for Respondents.

Robert L. Nabors and Virginia Saunders Delegal of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, Special Counsel for Finance and Tax, Florida Association of Counties, Inc.; Emeline Acton, President, Florida Association of County Attorneys, Inc., Tampa, Florida; and Harry Morrison, Jr., General Counsel, Florida League of Cities, Inc., Tallahassee, Amici Curiae for Florida Association of Counties, Inc. Florida Association of County Attorneys, Inc., and Florida League of Cities, Inc.

Daniel C. Brown and Alan Harrison Brents of Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A., Tallahassee, Amici Curiae for Water Oak Management Corporation and John Richard Sellars.

Gloria Einstein, Jacksonville Area Legal Aid, Inc., Orange Park, and Alice M. Vickers, The Housing Workgroup of Florida Legal Services, Inc., Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae for Florida Legal Services, Inc.

Richard E. Gentry, Florida Home Builders Association, Tallahassee, and Robert M Rhodes and Victoria L. Weber of Steel, Hector & Davis, Tallahassee, Amicus Curiae for Florida Home Builders Association.

Larry E. Levy of the Law Offices of Larry E. Levy, Tallahassee, Amici Curiae for Quinton Dryden, George Alford, and Leon Nettles.

Toby Buel of Three Rivers Legal Services, Inc., Lake City, Amicus Curiae for Wiley Dorman Foxx.

OVERTON, Justice.

We have for review Sarasota County v. Sarasota Church of Christ, Inc., 641 So.2d 900 (Fla.2d DCA 1994), in which the district court invalidated the special assessment at issue in this case. We have jurisdiction based on express and direct conflict with South Trail Fire Control District v. State, 273 So.2d 380 (Fla.1973), and Madison County v. Foxx, 636 So.2d 39 (Fla.1st DCA 1994). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. In summary, we conclude that the special assessment for stormwater services at issue in this case is a valid special assessment that is expressly authorized by the legislature because: (1) the assessment applies to the two classes of developed real property that contribute most of the stormwater runoff requiring treatment; (2) the assessment does not apply to undeveloped real property given that the undeveloped real property actually contributes to the absorption of stormwater runoff; (3) the properties assessed receive a special benefit from the funded stormwater services through the treatment of polluted stormwater contributed by those properties; and (4) the cost of those services has been properly apportioned. To require that the stormwater utility services be funded through a general ad valorem tax, as requested by the religious organizations who filed this action, would shift part of the cost of managing the stormwater drainage problems, which are created by developed real property, to undeveloped property owners who neither significantly contributed to nor caused the stormwater drainage problems. We quash the district court's decision.

The facts of this case are as follows. In 1989, Sarasota County (the County) adopted Ordinance No. 89-117, which created a stormwater environmental utility and imposed special assessments to fund the stormwater improvements and services. The ordinance was enacted in accordance with the policy directives of the Federal Clean Water Act ¹ and the Florida Air and Water Pollution Control Act ² (chapter 403, Florida Statutes (1987)). This stormwater ordinance imposed special assessments on all developed property but not on undeveloped property or property without physical improvements. After the County levied the assessment, a class action suit was filed against the County seeking to have the assessment declared to be an invalid tax. ³ The class consisted of religious organizations or entities owning developed real property in Sarasota County (the Churches) that are exempt from ad valorem taxes ⁴ but not from special assessments.

After a non-jury trial, the trial judge determined that stormwater services benefitted the community as a whole and that no evidence had been presented to show the services provided any direct or special benefit to the Churches. The trial judge then indicated that stormwater services should be funded through a tax rather than an assessment. Because the Churches are exempt from taxation, the trial judge found that the assessment could not be applied to them. As such, the trial judge invalidated the assessment as to the Churches and ordered a refund.

In making this ruling, the trial judge quoted from the circuit court opinion in Foxx v. Madison County, No. 90-161-CA, at 12 (3d Jud.Cir.Ct.1990), for the proposition that stormwater charges "provide only a general benefit to the community and property throughout the county as a matter of law as opposed to a special benefit to any particular property and accordingly the charges are not special assessments or assessments for special benefits as that term is used in the [Florida] Constitution." The circuit court's decision in Foxx was subsequently reversed by the First District Court of Appeal in Madison County v. Foxx, 636 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). In essence, the trial court found that the costs of stormwater utility services should never be paid for through a special assessment.

The County appealed the trial court's ruling, and the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed by simply adopting the trial court's order, with minor modifications, as its own. ⁵ As previously indicated, we accepted jurisdiction based on conflict with South Trail Fire Control District v. State, 273 So.2d 380 (Fla.1973), and Madison County v. Foxx, 636 So.2d 39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN A SPECIAL ASSESSMENT AND A TAX

To properly evaluate the validity of the special assessment imposed by the County, we first address the differences between a special assessment and a tax. In City of Boca Raton v. State, 595 So.2d 25 (Fla.1992), Chief Justice Grimes explained that, although special assessments and taxes are both mandatory, a special assessment is distinct from a tax. Taxes are levied throughout a particular taxing unit for the general benefit of residents and property and are imposed under the theory that contributions must be made by the community at large to support the various functions of the government. Consequently, many citizens may pay a tax to support a particular government function from which they receive no direct benefit. Conversely, special assessments must confer a specific benefit on the land burdened by the assessment and are imposed under the theory that the portion of the community that bears the cost of the assessment will receive a special benefit from the improvement or service for which the assessment is levied. Id. at 29.

Although a special assessment is typically imposed for a specific purpose designed to benefit a specific area or class of property owners, this does not mean that the costs of services can never be levied throughout a community as a whole. Rather, the validity of a special assessment turns on the benefits received by the recipients of the services and the appropriate apportionment of the cost thereof. This is true regardless of whether the recipients of the benefits are spread throughout an entire community or are merely located in a limited, specified area within the community. See, e.g., South Trail (special assessment for fire services found to benefit all properties within the district).

THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW

From the above analysis, we know that a valid special assessment must meet two requirements: (1) the property assessed must derive a special benefit from the service provided; and (2) the assessment must be fairly and reasonably apportioned according to the benefits received. City of Boca Raton, 595 So.2d at 30. These two prongs both constitute questions of fact for a legislative body rather than the judiciary. Id. at 30 (apportionment of benefits is a legislative function); South Trail, 273 So.2d at 383 (determination of special benefit is one of fact for legislative body; apportionment of the assessments is a legislative function). See also Meyer v. City of Oakland Park, 219 So.2d 417 (Fla.1969). We recognize, however, that cases addressing these issues sometimes blur the standard that is to be applied in determining whether the legislative conclusions regarding benefits and apportionment should be sustained. For instance, in South Trail, this Court stated that a legislative determination as to the existence of a special benefit should be upheld unless the determination is "palpably arbitrary or grossly unequal and confiscatory." 273 So.2d at 383 (quoting 48 Am.Jur. Special or Local Assessments § 29 at 588-89 (1943)). In City of Boca Raton and South Trail, we stated that a determination regarding the apportionment of benefits should be sustained "if reasonable people may differ" on the issue. To eliminate any confusion regarding what standard is to be applied, we hold that the standard is the same for both prongs; that is, the legislative determination as to the existence of special benefits and as to the apportionment of the costs of those benefits should be upheld unless the determination is arbitrary.

THE INSTANT SPECIAL ASSESSMENT

The County argues that the trial court substituted its judgment for that of the state and local legislative entities in determining that the stormwater utility services do not provide...