Saunders v. Tri-State Block Corp.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 26853.,26853.
• Citation: 207 W.Va. 616,535 S.E.2d 215
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: David C. SAUNDERS, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. TRI-STATE BLOCK CORPORATION, a West Virginia Corporation, and Glenn Straub, Individually, Defendants Below, Appellants.

535 S.E.2d 215

207 W.Va. 616

David C. SAUNDERS, Plaintiff Below, Appellee, v. TRI-STATE BLOCK CORPORATION, a West Virginia Corporation, and Glenn Straub, Individually, Defendants Below, Appellants.

No. 26853.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted April 11, 2000.

Decided July 12, 2000.

Vincent S. Gurrera, Esquire, Daniel P. Taylor, Esquire, Dean G. Makricostas, Esquire, Gurrera, Taylor & Makricostas, Weirton, West Virginia, Attorneys for Appellee.

Elgine Heceta McArdle, Esquire, Musser & McArdle, Wheeling, West Virginia, Attorney for Appellants.

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal by Tri-State Block Corporation and Glenn Straub from an order of the Circuit Court of Ohio County granting the appellee, David C. Saunders, summary judgment on a claim asserted by Mr. Saunders under the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va.Code 21-5-1, et seq. The circuit court ordered the appellants to pay Mr. Saunders wages in the amount of $11,023.21, liquidated damages in the amount of $4,093.50, attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $10,347.94, and prejudgment interest in the amount of $2,801.11. On appeal, the appellants claim that the circuit court erred in awarding Mr. Saunders summary judgment since, they claim, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Mr. Saunders was an employee within the meaning of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act. They also claim that, even if he was an employee, a material question of fact existed as to the amount of damages to which he was entitled. Lastly, they assert that the circuit court erred in awarding David C. Saunders attorney fees without affording them an opportunity to challenge the fee statement which he had submitted.

I. FACTS

The individual appellant, Glenn Straub, is the President of Tri-State Block Corporation, the corporate appellant in this case.

The record developed in this case shows that prior to March 1996, Tri-State Block Corporation used a company known as U-MET of Pennsylvania as an independent sales representative to sell its metallurgical block product. At the time, the appellee, David C. Saunders, was employed by U-MET Corporation and handled the Tri-State Block Corporation account.

In March 1996, Tri-State Block Corporation discontinued its relationship with U-MET Corporation. What happened next is not precisely clear. The appellants, Tri-State Block Corporation and Glenn Straub, in their brief, claim that Tri-State Block Corporation began using an operation by the name of LEMET or Lehigh Metallurgical Services as one of its outside sales representatives and that LEMET was an operation of David C. Saunders. David C. Saunders, on the other hand, in his response to the appellant's brief, states that: "In or around the month of February 1996, Appellee [David C. Saunders] was contacted and recruited by the Appellant, Tri-State Block Corporation, to become its employee and to provide services on its behalf."

Various letters in the record, written on the letterhead of "LEMET—Lehigh Metallurgical Services" show that after March 1996, David C. Saunders did correspond with various companies and provide information and quotes to those companies on Tri-State Block Corporation's products.

Less than a year after March 1996, Tri-State Block Corporation wrote directly to David C. Saunders on January 3, 1997, and stated: "We have reviewed our sales operations and have determined that your services are no longer required." In the letter, Tri-State Block Corporation indicated that Mr. Saunders would be paid for all orders received as of January 1997, and referred to him as an "employee at-will." Following termination of the relationship, Mr. Saunders instituted the present civil action. In his complaint, he alleged that he had been an employee of Tri-State Block Corporation, and that Tri-State Block Corporation, in bad faith, and in violation of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va.Code 21-5-1, et seq., had failed to pay him the full wages due him.

Tri-State Block Corporation filed an answer to Mr. Saunders' complaint and denied that he had been its employee. Following the filing of the answer, discovery was conducted, and on January 21, 1999, David C. Saunders moved for summary judgment. The appellants resisted the motion for summary judgment and various additional documents were filed by the parties. For instance, the letter terminating Tri-State Block Corporation's relationship with Mr. Saunders was introduced, and in that letter Tri-State Block Corporation specifically stated that Mr. Saunders was an at-will employee. Tri-State Block Corporation submitted an affidavit prepared by Joe Belot, an outside consultant, who was aware of the nature of the relationship between Tri-State Block Corporation and its various sales representatives. In the affidavit, Mr. Belot stated that: "These outside representatives were independent contractors and were not employees of Tri-State Block Corp." In that affidavit, Mr. Belot also stated that as part of his duties for Tri-State Block Corporation he was responsible for the manufacture and sale of Tri-State Block Corporation's product and that while Mr. Saunders performed services for Tri-State Block Corporation, between March 26, 1996 and January 3, 1997 "he had no control over Saunders nor did he supervise the work that Saunders did." Additionally, Tri-State Block Corporation submitted an affidavit prepared by A1 Lander, its office manager. In that affidavit, Mr. Lander stated: "That Saunders acted independently, that Tri-State Block Corp. had no control over his work nor did I supervise Saunders."

Ultimately, the circuit court after considering the record developed, on March 22, 1999, ruled on the summary judgment motion and found that David C. Saunders was an employee of Tri-State Block Corporation within the meaning of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va.Code 21-5-1, et seq., and that he was entitled to specific sums as damages, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest. The court's order specifically stated:

3. The Plaintiff [David C. Saunders] was an employee of Defendant, Tri-State Block Corporation within the meaning of the West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va.Code Section 21-5-1 et seq.

4. The Plaintiff was terminated from his employment with Defendant, Tri-State Block Corporation effective January 3, 1997.

5. The Plaintiff was not paid wages owed to him within seventy-two (72) hours after he was terminated from his employment.

6. The West Virginia Wage Payment and Collection Act, W. Va.Code Section 21-5-1 et seq., applies to the case at bar.

7. The Defendant, Tri-State Block Corporation, did not pay the Plaintiff wages owed to him in the amount of Eleven Thousand and Twenty-Three Dollars and Twenty One Cents ($11,023.21).

8. That pursuant to the aforesaid Wage Payment Collection Act as liquidated damages, the Plaintiff is entitled to thirty (30) days pay in the amount of Four Thousand Ninety Three Dollars and Fifty Cents ($4,093.50) based on his yearly income in the amount of $40,935.00, as reflected by the copy of the Plaintiff's 1996 1099 Form from the Defendant, Tri-State Block Corporation, attached hereto and incorporated herein, divided by the number of months, ten (10), Plaintiff was employed with said Defendant.

9. Pursuant to the aforesaid Wage Payment and Collection Act, as liquidated damages Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees and costs which are currently in the amount of Ten Thousand Three Hundred and Forty Seven Dollars and Ninety Four Cents ($10,347.94). (Please see Billing Statement attached hereto and incorporated herein). The court has reviewed the Billing Statement of the Plaintiff's counsel and finds that the attorney fees are declared to be reasonable pursuant to AETNA Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pitrolo and are hereby approved.

10. Pursuant to the aforesaid Wage Payment and Collection Act the Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest, at the legal rate, effective from January 7, 1999, in the amount of Two Thousand Eight Hundred and One Dollars and Eleven Cents ($2,801.11).

In the present proceeding, the appellants, Tri-State Block Corporation and Glenn Straub, its President, claim that questions of material fact remained in the case at the time the circuit court entered summary judgment, and that under the circumstances, summary judgment was inappropriate. Specifically, they claim that the status of Mr. Saunders as an independent contractor or as an employee for the purposes of West Virginia's Wage Payment and Collection Act was in doubt and dispute. They also assert that the amount of commissions owed to Mr. Saunders was in dispute. Finally, they argue that the trial court erred in awarding Mr. Saunders $10,347.94 in attorneys fees without conducting a hearing to afford them the opportunity to challenge the reasonableness of the fees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has indicated that "a circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." Syllabus Point 1, Davis v. Foley, 193 W.Va. 595, 457 S.E.2d 532 (1995); Syllabus Point 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). The Court has further indicated in Syllabus Point 3 of Aetna Casualty and Surety Company v. Federal Insurance Company of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963) that: "A motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law."

III. DISCUSSION

As has been previously stated, Mr. Saunders in his complaint in the present action, asserted that he was an at-will employee of Tri-State Block Corporation at the time of the termination of his relationship with that organization. Tri-State Block Corporation, in its answer, denied that assertion. A principal issue raised by the pleadings was, therefore, whether or not Mr. Saunders was an "...