Savini v. University of Hawaii

• Decision Date: 19 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 26747.,26747.
• Citation: 153 P.3d 1144
• Parties: Sosaiete L. SAVINI and Bette Savini, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI`I, Defendant-Appellant, and John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, Doe Non-Profit Entities 1-10, and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

153 P.3d 1144

Sosaiete L. SAVINI and Bette Savini, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI`I, Defendant-Appellant, and John Does 1-10, Jane Does 1-10, Doe Partnerships 1-10, Doe Corporations 1-10, Doe Non-Profit Entities 1-10, and Doe Governmental Entities 1-10, Defendants.

No. 26747.

Supreme Court of Hawaii.

March 19, 2007.

Francis T. O'Brien, on the briefs, for the plaintiffs-appellees Sosaiete L. Savini and Bette Savini.

Robert A. Mash, of the Office of the General Counsel of the University of Hawai`i, on the briefs, for the defendant-appellant University of Hawai`i.

Deirdre Marie-Iha, Deputy Attorney General, on the briefs, for the amicus curiae State of Hawai`i.

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, and DUFFY, JJ.

Opinion of the Court by LEVINSON, J.

The defendant-appellant University of Hawaii (UH) appeals from the first circuit court's July 12, 2004 order, the Honorable Gary W.B. Chang presiding, denying UH's April 7, 2004 motion (citing Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 662-4 (1993) and Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 12(b)¹), to dismiss the June 5, 2001 first amended complaint of the plaintiffs-appellees Sosaiete L. and Bette Savini [hereinafter, "the Savinis"].

On appeal, UH asserts that the Savinis' claim for relief is barred by HRS § 662-4 inasmuch as more than two years elapsed between the onset of the Savinis' injuries—which, UH asserts, triggered the "accrual" of their claim—and the Savinis' initiation of their lawsuit more than three years later.

As we hold infra in section III.B.5, the Savinis' claim did not accrue until the quantum of the medical care they actually received exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit set forth in HRS § 431:10C-306(b)(2) (1993).² It follows that the circuit court correctly denied UH's motion to dismiss and, accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's July 12, 2004 order.

I. BACKGROUND

The Savinis allege that, on November 13, 1997, UH professor Thomas T. Bopp, while driving a vehicle owned by the State of Hawai`i [hereinafter, "the State"] at Honolulu International Airport, struck and physically injured Sosaiete and, hence, inflicted emotional distress on Bette. These facts [hereinafter, "the accident"]³ were alleged both in the Savinis' April 3, 2001 complaint for damages against the State and Bopp and in their June 5, 2001 first amended complaint, which was materially identical except that it changed the named defendants by substituting UH for Bopp and the State.

On April 7, 2004, UH moved to dismiss the Savinis' action pursuant to the State Tort Liability Act (STLA), HRS ch. 662, in particular HRS § 662-4, and HRCP Rule 12(b), see supra note 1. In particular, UH argued that the Savinis "were required to file their claim within two years of the date of the accident." (Citing Waugh v. Univ. of Hawai`i, 63 Haw. 117, 128, 621 P.2d 957, 966 (1981); Bissen v. Fujii, 51 Haw. 636, 638, 466 P.2d 429, 431 (1970); Rumball v. State, Civ No. 04-1-0038K (Haw.3d Cir. May 4, 2004); Brub v. Bedish, Civ. No. 03-1-0500-03 (Haw. 1st Cir. Oct. 22, 2003); Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544, 547 (8th Cir.1980); Mendiola v. United States, 401 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Webb Trucking Co., 141 F.Supp. 573, 575 (D.Del.1956).) In their memorandum in opposition, the Savinis urged (1) that "accrue" and "occur" are distinct terms and concepts, as construed by this court and by the Mississippi Supreme Court, (2) that, regardless of the date of the accident, their "claim" did not "accrue," within the meaning of HRS § 662-4, until the medical-rehabilitative limit set forth in HRS § 431:10C-306(b)(2), see supra note 2, was exceeded, and (3) that the medical-rehabilitative limit constitutes a threshold quantum of resultant medical expenses beneath which motor vehicle accidents are generally<sup>4</sup> characterized as "no-fault" such that, as a matter of law, tort liability does not attach to personal injuries. (Quoting Teller v. Teller, 99 Hawai`i 101, 110, 53 P.3d 240, 249 (2002) (quoting In re Akana, 42 Haw. 415, 444 (1958) (Stainback, J., dissenting) ("The dictionary gives the following definition for the word `accrue': `To come into existence as an enforceable claim; to vest as a right; as, a cause of action has accrued when the right to sue has become vested.'")); Stubbs v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 825 So.2d 8, 15 (Miss.2002) ("`Occur' and `accrue' are not synonymous, legally or otherwise . . .").) The Savinis noted that HRS § 431:10C-315⁵ provides that the limitation period "runs from the date of the accident or . . . of the last no-fault payment,⁶ whichever is later." Further to the foregoing, the Savinis asserted that, as of April 3, 1999, two years prior to the filing of their original complaint, Sosaiete's workers' compensation carrier had expended only $1244.06 on his behalf, i.e., less than the monetary threshold, which was $13,900.00 at the time of the accident, see Hawai`i Administrative Rules § 16-23-10(c) (1999). The Savinis attached an "Exhibit A," which appears to be a statement of workers' compensation benefits paid on Sosaiete's behalf, and a declaration of the Savinis' counsel purporting to authenticate the exhibit. In its reply, UH added that, inasmuch as the legislature, in 1976, amended HRS § 662-4 expressly to protract the STLA's limitation period to six years in medical malpractice cases involving a plaintiff's late discovery of the injury, see supra note 1, but did not create "any exception for . . . automobile accidents," the legislature did not contemplate extending the limitation period beyond two years after the occurrence of the accident itself.

At its June 1, 2004 hearing, the circuit court ruled in relevant part as follows:

[T]he cause of action does not accrue until . . . the plaintiff reaches the thresh[]old and this record does not indicate when the thresh[]old was met.

I think it indicates that [the Savinis] ha[ve] incurred at least $17,000 . . . of expenses, but it doesn't show when in time the tort thresh[]old amount of [$]13,[9]00 . . . was met. . . . I'm interpreting that word "accrued" to begin . . . upon that point in time when the plaintiff incurs or is paid the thresh[]old amount of no-fault [sic—presumably, "workers' compensation," see supra note 6,] benefits.

Accordingly, the circuit court's July 12, 2004 order denied UH's motion to dismiss, concluding that "[a] claim against [UH] arising out of a motor vehicle accident does not `accrue,'" and "the two-year statute of limitations . . . does not begin to run[,] . . . until medical/rehabilitative expenses incurred by the injured person exceed the applicable tort threshold." On August 5, 2004, the circuit court ordered that UH could pursue an interlocutory appeal from its July 12, 2004 order, see HRS § 641-1(b) (1993). On August 9, 2004, UH filed its timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Denial Of Summary Judgment⁷

We review the circuit court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo. Hawai`i C[m]ty[.] Fed[.] Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai`i 213, 221, 11 P.3d 1, 9 (2000). The standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is settled:

[S]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In other words, we must view all of the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Querubin v. Thronas, 107 Hawai`i 48, 56, 109 P.3d 689, 697 (2005) (quoting Durette v. Aloha Plastic Recycling, Inc., 105 Hawai`i 490, 501, 100 P.3d 60, 71 (2004) (quoting Simmons v. Puu, 105 Hawai`i 112, 117-18, 94 P.3d 667, 672-73 (2004) (quoting Kahale v. City & County of Honolulu, 104 Hawai`i 341, 344, 90 P.3d 233, 236 (2004) (quoting SCI Mgmt. Corp. v. Sims, 101 Hawaii 438, 445, 71 P.3d 389, 396 (2003) (quoting Coon v. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai`i 233, 244-45, 47 P.3d 348, 359-60 (2002)))))).

Willis v. Swain, 112 Hawai`i 184, 188-89, 145 P.3d 727, 731-32 (2006) (brackets in original).

B. Statutory Interpretation

"The standard of review for statutory construction is well-established. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo." Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Dennison, 108 Hawai`i 380, 384, 120 P.3d 1115, 1119 (2005) (quoting Labrador v. Liberty Mut. Group, 103 Hawai`i 206, 211, 81 P.3d 386, 391 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so doing, this court must adhere to the well-established rule of statutory construction that the "foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." Gray v. Admin. Dir. of [the] Court, 84 Hawai`i 138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, 590 (1997) (citations omitted).

Wright v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 111 Hawai`i 401, 407, 142 P.3d 265, 271 (2006).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Parties' Arguments

On appeal, UH begins with a disquisition on sovereign immunity, implying that to hold that the Savinis' claim did not accrue until they exceeded the medical-rehabilitative limit would exceed the scope of the State's (and, hence, UH's) consent to suit set forth in the STLA, HRS ch. 662:

. . . The language of the no-fault statutes at issue here do not purport to change the STLA's statute of limitations[, HRS § 662-4, see supra note 1] . . . .

. . . [T]he two-year statute of limitation [(UH presumably means "the Savinis' claim")] "accrue[d]" at the time of the motor vehicle...