Sch. Comm. of Gloucester v. City of Gloucester

• Decision Date: 08 April 1949
• Citation: 324 Mass. 209,85 N.E.2d 429
• Parties: SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF GLOUCESTER v. CITY OF GLOUCESTER et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

324 Mass. 209

85 N.E.2d 429

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF GLOUCESTER

v.CITY OF GLOUCESTER et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

April 8, 1949.

Report from Superior Court, Essex County; Baker, Judge.

Suit in equity by the School Committee of Gloucester against the City of Gloucester and others for a declaration of rights and duties of the plaintiff and of the defendants under city ordinance establishing a purchasing department. The trial judge ruled that the ordinance was valid and reported the case to the Supreme Judicial Court.

Final decree entered adjudging ordinance valid.

Before QUA, C. J., and LUMMUS, RONAN, WILKINS and WILLIAMS, JJ.

A. K. Carey, of Boston, for petitioners.

C. W. Wonson, City Sol., of Gloucester, for respondents.

WILKINS, Justice.

This bill in equity, brought by the school committee of Gloucester against the city, its mayor, and its purchasing agent, seeks ‘a binding declaration of the rights and duties of the plaintiffs, acting as a school committee under G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 71, and of the defendants' under an ordinance enacted by the city council establishing a purchasing department. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 231 A, inserted by St.1945, c. 582, § 1. The case was heard upon the pleadings and certain exhibits introduced in evidence, which were orally agreed to constitute a ‘statement of agreed facts.’ The judge ruled that the ordinance is valid and binding on the school committee, and reserved and reported to this court ‘all questions of law herein’ upon the pleadings, the ‘statement of agreed facts,’ and his ‘findings, rulings, and order for declaratory decree.’ G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 214, § 31.

The ordinance was enacted purportedly pursuant to G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 41, § 103, which reads: ‘A city which accepts this section in the manner provided in the following section * * * may establish a purchasing department, to consist of a purchasing agent and such assistants as the city council * * * may determine. * * * The purchasing agent shall purchase all supplies for the city * * * and for every department thereof except in case of emergency. All purchases or contracts for purchases exceeding one hundred dollars in amount shall be based upon competition. A record shall be kept by the department of the prices paid for the supplies, and shall be open to the inspection of any citizen.’ Section 104 provides that § 103 may be submitted for acceptance to the voters of a city on the ballot at any annual city election, and shall take effect if a majority of the voters voting thereon shall vote in the affirmative. On December 2, 1947, at a city election the voters of the city of Gloucester accepted § 103.

The ordinance (c. 163 of the ordinances of the city of Gloucester) entitled ‘An Ordinance establishing a purchasing department for the city of Gloucester,’ was enacted April 2, 1948, and provides in part: ‘Section 5. The city purchasing agent shall purchase all supplies, material and equipment required for the city of Gloucester and for every department thereof, except in case of emergency. The school committee shall determine and send a requisition to the city purchasing agent to purchase textbooks, library books and items used for technical instruction. All purchases or contracts for purchases exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100) in amount shall be based upon competition. Section 6. The city purchasing agent when purchasing materials, equipment and supplies for the city and for any department thereof shall, when quality, price and delivery are equal, give preference to merchants doing business in the city of Gloucester. Quality of the article to be furnished shall be deemed first in importance and after making his comparison of the bids received, the purchasing agent shall procure the article he considers best in quality, all other things being equal.’

The school committee¹ contends that the ordinance is invalid, (1) as exceeding the authority conferred by § 103, and (2) as illegally attempting to deprive the committee of its power and obligation under G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71, § 48.

We shall consider the second point first. Section 48 of c. 71 reads: ‘The [school] committee shall, at the expense of the town, purchase textbooks and other school supplies, and, under such regulations as to their care and custody as it may prescribe, shall loan them to the pupils free of charge. If instruction is given in the manual and domestic arts, it may so purchase and loan the necessary tools, implements and materials. It shall also, at like expense, procure such apparatus, reference books and other means of illustration, as may be needed.’

Section 48 of c. 71 had its origin in St.1826, c. 143, § 7, and St.1855, c. 436, and has been consecutively on our statute books in some form ever since. Rev.Sts. c. 23, § 19; Gen.Sts. c. 38, § 29; St.1873, c. 106; St.1878, c. 23; Pub.Sts. c. 44, § 40; St.1884, c. 103; St.1885, c. 161, § 2; St.1894, c. 320, § 2. In the compilation of the Revised Laws the substance and phraseology of these provisions were much the same as now. R.L. c. 42, §§ 35, 37. Sections 103 and 104 of c. 41 are of relatively recent origin. St.1916, c. 223; St.1920, c. 591, § 30.

It is to be presumed that the General Court in enacting the statute permitting the establishment of a purchasing department had in mind the earlier statute relating to the powers of the school committee. Devney's Case, 223 Mass. 270, 271, 111 N.E. 788.Johnson's Case, 318 Mass. 741, 745, 64 N.E.2d 94. ‘A statute is to be interpreted with reference to the pre-ëxisting law. * * * If reasonably practicable, it is to be explained in conjunction with other statutes to the end that there may be an harmonious and consistent body of law. * * * Statutes ‘alleged to be inconsistent with each other, in whole or in part, must be so construed as to give reasonable effect to all, unless there be some positive repugnancy between them.’ Brooks v. Fitchburg & Leominster Street Railway Co., 200 Mass. 8, 17, 86 N.E. 289, 292.' Walsh v. Commissioners of Civil Service, 300 Mass. 244, 246, 15 N.E.2d 218, 220;Eastern Racing Association, Inc., v. Assessors of Revere, 300 Mass. 578, 581, 16 N.E.2d 64;Assessors of Brookline v. Prudential Ins. Co., 310 Mass. 300, 307, 38 N.E.2d 145. ‘It is the duty of the court to construe the various statutory provisions touching upon a point in issue with due regard to all of them, ‘so as to give a rational and workable effect to the whole so far as practicable.’ Thacher v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 250 Mass. 188, 191, 145 N.E. 256, 257.' McCarthy v. Rogers, 295 Mass. 245, 249, 3 N.E.2d 787, 789;Hardman v. Collector of Taxes of North Adams, 317 Mass. 439, 442-443, 58 N.E.2d 845.

Section 103 of c. 41 prescribes in broad terms that the ‘purchasing agent shall purchase all supplies for the city * * * and for every department thereof except in case of emergency.’ It aims to afford a central authority charged with carrying out the details of acquiring all the city's supplies. An undoubted purpose is a saving in expenditure through enabling the purchase of many items in larger quantities than would be possible if each department should act on its own. There also might be an advantage to the city accruing from experience concentrated in the purchasing department. To uphold the school committee's contention would require the interpretation that within the meaning of § 103, not only is the school committee not a department of the city but also that purchases of its supplies are not purchases for the city. That school expenditures are a large part of the annual tax levy in our municipalities, and very often the largest single item, is common knowledge.

Recognizing, as any one must, that words would not have been difficult to find to express a legislative intention to except the school committee from the operation of the purchasing department statute, we consider the reasons advanced in argument for reading by implication such an exception into that statute. The school committee approaches the subject from the opposite direction of G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 71. Section 34 of that chapter, as appearing in St.1939, c. 294, provides: ‘Every city and town shall annually provide an amount of money sufficient for the support of the public schools as required by this chapter.’ The words of § 34 ‘convey a positive and inflexible legislative command,’ and place the school committee in many respects ‘upon a basis different from that of other municipal departments.’ Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 87-88, 146 N.E. 360, 362. The school committee cites numerous cases in which a school committee has been held not to be controlled by various statutes of general application to the municipal government. Among these cases, with the respective statutes held not to apply to a school committee, are Leonard v. School Committee of Springfield, 241 Mass. 325, 135 N.E. 459, and Decatur v. Auditor of Peabody, 251 Mass. 82, 146 N.E. 360, the budget law, G.L. c. 44, § 32, originally enacted as St. 1913, c. 719, entitled ‘An Act relative to municipal indebtedness'; Callahan v. Woburn, 306 Mass. 265, 270-273, 28 N.E.2d 9, the municipal finance act, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 44, § 31; Davis v. School Committee of Somerville, 307 Mass. 354, 30 N.E.2d 401, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 32, § 37C, paragraph (2), as appearing in St.1938, c. 439, § 2, relating to retirement systems; Ring v. Woburn, 311 Mass. 679, 43 N.E.2d 8, the municipal finance act, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 44, § 31; and Hayes v. Brockton, 313 Mass. 641, 48 N.E.2d 683, the budget law, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 44, § 31A, inserted by St.1941, c. 473, § 1. See O'Connor v. Brockton, 308 Mass. 34, 30 N.E.2d 842;O'Brien v. Pittsfield, 316 Mass. 283, 285, 55 N.E.2d 440;James v. Mayor of New Bedford, 319 Mass. 74, 75, 64 N.E.2d 638;Watt v. Chelmsford, 323 Mass. 697, 84 N.E.2d 28. The school committee argues that, as to all matters entrusted to it by c. 71, it is an independent board of public officers beyond the control of the...