Sch. Dist. Springfield, R-12 v. City Sprin.

Decision Date08 September 2005
Docket NumberNo. 26453.,26453.
Citation174 S.W.3d 653
PartiesBOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SPRINGFIELD, R-12 and Greene County, Missouri, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Missouri, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Neil R. Shortlidge, Stephen P. Chinn, and Paul A. Campo, Stinson, Morrison, Hecker, L.L.P., Overland Park, Kansas and Paul F. Sherman, Mann, Walter, Bishop & Sherman, P.C., Springfield, MO, for Appellant City of Springfield.

Ransom A. Ellis III and Laura J. Johnson, Ellis, Ellis, Hammons & Johnson, Springfield, MO, for Respondent Board of Education of the School District of Springfield, R-12.

Theodore L. Johnson III and John W. Housley, Office of Greene County Counselor, Springfield, MO, for Respondent Greene County, Missouri.

JAMES K. PREWITT, Judge.

City of Springfield, Missouri ("City") appeals from summary judgment in favor of the Board of Education of the School District of Springfield, R-12 ("School Board") and Greene County, Missouri ("County") regarding the application of § 89.380, RSMo 2000, to public facilities of School Board and County.

Background

In March of 2001, County purchased five parcels of real property in the 1200 block of North Robberson, in the city of Springfield, for the purpose of relocating and constructing a residential treatment center for juveniles under the authority of the Greene County Juvenile Court, pursuant to § 211.161(3), RSMo. Thereafter, property at 1200 North Boonville Avenue was also acquired by County. Although County voluntarily initiated contact with neighboring residents in order to address their concerns and obtain input regarding the proposed treatment center, there was opposition to its relocation, and neighboring residents expressed their opposition to members of Springfield City Council ("Council").

On March 22, 2001, City's Planning and Zoning Commission ("Commission") adopted an "updated Mid-Town Neighborhood Plan as an element of the Master Plan for the development of the City[.]" City had adopted a comprehensive Master Plan in December of 1996. The Master Plan, a planning and zoning ordinance, is administered by City's Planning and Development Department and the Commission. In addition to provisions for historic preservation, center-city development, public improvements, and parks and recreational areas, the Master Plan also included a "Shared-Use Principle." This element of the Master Plan provided for cooperation between City, County and other political jurisdictions in issues involving growth management and land use, including "recommendations concerning the location, extent and character of public `facilities' within the city." City contends that County approved the Master Plan on March 17, 1997 and that both Respondents contributed to and participated in the development of the plan.

By passage of Resolution No. 8834 on April 2, 2001, Council adopted the updated Mid-Town plan, designed to "[p]rotect and improve the single-family character of the neighborhood[,]... [m]anage the expansion of institutional uses without negatively affecting the ... residential portions of the neighborhood[,]" [and] "[c]oordinate public improvements and encourage private re-development[.]" The North Robberson property purchased by County is situated within the geographical borders of the Mid-Town Neighborhood, although County purchased the property prior to the adoption of Resolution No. 8834.

On July 9, 2001, Council adopted Resolution No. 8873, "[u]rging all governmental agencies within the City of Springfield to coordinate the planning of public facilities by submitting plans for public facilities which are within the scope and recommendation of the City's Master Plan to the Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Springfield, as required by section 89.380 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri."

Early in 2002, School Board began negotiations for the purchase of real property located at 1110 North Jefferson for the expansion of a parking lot serving Central High School and the school district's administrative offices. In April of 2002, School Board initiated a review of existing educational facilities and was considering the possibility of closing and/or relocating certain public school facilities within the city.

In a letter dated February 19, 2002, City's Director of Planning and Development wrote to School District's Superintendent, Jack Ernst, advising that the purchase of land by School Board and its proposal to close school facilities triggered the application of § 89.380, RSMo 2004, and that School Board's purchase and planned closures required approval by the Commission. Separately, City Attorney Wright wrote Councilwoman Mary Collette, on February 19, 2002, stating that violation of § 89.380 provided City with the right to "commence a civil action" against any public entity. In regard to School Board's plans to close or relocate public school facilities, Wright stated that § 89.380 "requires the R-12 School District to submit the proposed use to the City Planning Commission." Likewise, County was advised through City's attorney that its plans for development or use of any public facility upon real property located within the city, particularly the development of the North Robberson property, would be subject to the requirements set forth in § 89.380.

On May 7, 2002, School Board filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment contending that, under §§ 89.380 and 89.491 and City's Resolution No. 8873, Commission has no authority "to require Plaintiff Board or District to submit any of Plaintiff Board's decisions for review, approval or disapproval of Defendant City's Commission." School Board also requested a declaration that City has no authority to file any enforcement action alleging a violation for failure to comply. In support of its position, School Board asserts that its right to acquire land is specifically granted to School Board by Article I, Section 26, and Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Missouri Constitution, and § 177.073, RSMo, which, according to School Board, vests it and the school district "with exclusive power to select, locate, procure and use sites for its public schools within Defendant City, without any restriction thereon by an ordinance of Defendant City."

On May 13, 2002, County filed a Motion to Intervene, which the trial court granted on June 13, 2002. County filed its Petition for Declaratory Judgment on July 1, 2002, contending that § 89.380 has no application to County's plans to develop the North Robberson property or any other property it owns or may acquire, in that §§ 49.270 and 49.300, RSMo "vest [County] with the exclusive power to select, locate, procure and use sites for its public facilities within Defendant City without any restriction thereon[.]"

City filed its Answer and Counterclaim for declaratory judgment in response to School Board's petition on June 14, 2003. On June 21, 2002, responding to County's petition, City filed its Answer and Counterclaim for declaratory judgment. City contended that both School Board and County are subject to the provisions of § 89.380. City also requested injunctive relief requiring School Board and County to comply with the statute.

Subsequently, all parties moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of School Board and County on June 9, 2004, finding that § 89.380 was not applicable to either Respondent, and City has no authority to seek any enforcement action against Respondents. City filed a motion to amend judgment pursuant to Rule 75.01 on July 8, 2004, which the trial court overruled on August 3, 2004. City filed Notice of Appeal on August 12, 2004.

Issue as to Timeliness of Notice of Appeal

School Board and County contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction because City failed to file a timely notice of appeal, in that City moved "for an Order pursuant to Rule 75.01 amending said judgment." Respondents contend a motion filed under Rule 75.01 does not act to extend the finality of the judgment. Both assert that the judgment became final thirty days after its entry on June 9, 2004, thus the notice of appeal filed on August 12, 2004 was untimely. This issue was taken with the case for determination when the appeal was submitted to this Court.

City's motion to amend judgment stated:

COMES NOW Defendant, the City of Springfield, Missouri ("City"), and within the thirty-day period after entry of judgment, which judgment was entered on the 9th day of June, 2004, moves the Court for an Order pursuant to Rule 75.01 amending said judgment. In support of this motion, the City refers the Court to the accompanying Suggestions in Support.

Within the Suggestions in Support of Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, City requests the trial court amend its judgment by striking or clarifying specified paragraphs. City also indicated therein that it was filing its motion in order to clarify issues for the appellate court and avoid further proceedings.

In response to this Court's order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed, City states that it "mistakenly referenced Rule 75.01 instead of Rule 78.04" in its motion to amend the judgment. "Generally, under Rule 75.01, a trial court retains jurisdiction for thirty days, during which it may vacate, reopen, correct, amend, or modify its judgment." Dangerfield v. City of Kansas City, 108 S.W.3d 769, 772 (Mo.App.2003).1

Rule 78.04 states, in part: "Any motion for new trial and any motion to amend the judgment or opinion shall be filed not later than thirty days after the entry of judgment." However, under Rule 81.05, the trial court's jurisdiction may be extended up to ninety days upon the filing of an authorized after-trial motion. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hart, 41...

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