Schields v. Hickey

• Decision Date: 17 May 1887
• Parties: ABRAHAM SCHIELDS, Respondent, v. DANIEL HICKEY, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

26 Mo.App. 194

ABRAHAM SCHIELDS, Respondent, v. DANIEL HICKEY, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of Missouri, St. Louis.

May 17, 1887

APPEAL from the St. Louis Circuit Court, GEORGE W. LUBKE, Judge.

Affirmed.

JAMES L. BLAIR, for the appellant: The notes and deed of trust were void on the ground of incapacity on the part of the appellant and his wife. 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sects. 948, 944, note 1. And on the ground of gross inadequacy of consideration alone; also, because the respondent fraudulently represented the deed and notes to be papers necessary to secure to the appellant a lease of the premises. Nelson v. Betts, 21 Mo.App. 220; Pom. Eq. Jur., sects. 927, 928; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 161, 468, 470; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. [10 Ed.] sects. 246, 248, 249, 324, 331; Cooley on Torts, 476, and cases cited; Griffith v. Townley, 69 Mo. 13, 22, and cases cited; Hopkins v. Williams, 58 Mo. 201; Tracy v. Sacket, 1 Ohio St. 54, 60; Scoville v Barney, 4 Oreg. 288; Cruise v. Christopher, 5 Dana 181; Dailey v. Jessup, 72 Mo. 144; Buffalow v. Buffalow, 2 Dev. & Bat. Ch. R. 241; 3 Wh. &amp Tud. Leading Cas. in Eq. 136; Whithorne v. Hines, 1 Munford, 555; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 23; Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 118; Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. 155; Wambaugh v. Bimer, 25 Ind. 368; Seymour v. Delaney, 6 Johns. Ch. 222, 226; Fain v. Brown, 2 Ves. 304; Hamet v Dundass, 4 Barr. 178; Thompson v. Harcomb, 2 Bro. P. C. 415. The parties should have been put back into their original position. Alexander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 520, 521, and cases cited; Parker v. Marquis, 64 Mo. 38; Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sect. 327; Holland v. Anderson, 38 Mo. 55, 58.

A. A. PAXSON, for the respondent, cited Jackson v. Wood (88 Mo. 76).

OPINION

ROMBAUER J.

This was a suit at law upon a promissory note for three hundred and fifty dollars, alleged by the respondent to have been executed by the appellant, dated March 31, 1884, payable one year after date. The petition states that the note is unpaid, with the exception of the sum of sixty-seven dollars, paid thereon May 20, 1885, and prays judgment for the amount still due, to-wit: two hundred and eighty-three dollars, with interest at ten per cent. from maturity.

The answer first denies the execution of the note, and then sets up that its execution was brought about by the fraud and deceit of the plaintiff, together with the execution of another note, of the same date, tenor, and amount, payable two years after date; that the defendant, in March, 1884, intended to lease a lot from the plaintiff for a long time, and, on account thereof, his wife, without the defendant's knowledge, paid to the plaintiff the sum of one hundred dollars; that the plaintiff fraudulently represented to the defendant that, in order to complete this supposed leasing transaction, it would be necessary to execute certain papers, and, by that pretense, caused the defendant to execute the two notes, and a deed of trust on the property securing them, such property being the one which the defendant intended to lease, but which, in fact, the plaintiff sold to him; that the plaintiff delivered to him a warranty deed therefor, which, the defendant thought, was the lease thus bargained for.

The answer prays for a cancellation and surrender of the notes, a cancellation of the deed of trust, and a money judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of ninety dollars, being the difference between the rental value of the lot for one year, while the defendant was in possession thereof, and the one hundred dollars, which the defendant's wife paid to the plaintiff on account of the supposed leasing transaction.

The case was tried by the court. The court rendered judgment for the plaintiff on the note sued on, but decreed a cancellation, and surrender, of the other note. From the judgment and decree thus rendered, the defendant, alone, appeals.

We have carefully examined and analyzed the testimony in the record, and can see no ground upon which we can legally vacate the judgment thus rendered. It is needless to decide whether the review of the judgment should be governed, in this court, by rules applicable to legal, or equitable proceedings, as, in either view, the defendant's complaint that the judgment is erroneous, so far as he is concerned, must fail.

That the defendant is an ignorant man, that the lot in controversy was sold to him at an exorbitant value, and that the bargain was an unconscionable one, may be readily conceded. All these facts entitle him to no relief, of themselves, either legal or equitable. His claim is, not to have the transaction vacated on any of these grounds, but, to have it vacated on the ground that he intended to sign a lease, and was, by the fraud of the plaintiff, made to sign, instead, some notes, and a deed of trust securing them.

As to what preceded the execution of any papers is stated by the defendant's wife as follows:

" I met Mr. Schields one day, and says to him, ‘ it will be an accommodation if you will give me the privilege of putting carts on that lot there.’ He says, ‘ yes.’ And I says, ‘ well’ sir, I didn't know that you were going to charge

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