School Committee of Hatfield v. Board of Ed.

• Decision Date: 06 May 1977
• Citation: 363 N.E.2d 237,372 Mass. 513
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 237

363 N.E.2d 237

372 Mass. 513

SCHOOL COMMITTEE OF HATFIELD et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued January 4, 1977.

Decided May 6, 1977.

Philip L. Goduti, Arlington, for the plaintiffs.

Francis X. Bellotti, Atty. Gen., and Andrew J. McElaney, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and QUIRICO, WILKINS and LIACOS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

This action was commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County seeking judicial review of the action of the State board of education (board) in denying an application by the town of Hatfield for school building assistance funds pursuant to St.1948, c. 645. All defendants moved to dismiss the action on the ground, inter alia, that the county court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. A single justice of this court dismissed the action, and the plaintiffs appealed to the full court. We conclude that the judgment of the single justice was correct. This court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter because the board's decision is not subject to judicial review.

1. The plaintiffs first contend that the board's decision is subject to judicial review under the State Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, § 14, as appearing in St.1973, c. 1114, § 3. That section provides for judicial review of 'a final decision of any agency in an adjudicatory proceeding'. General Laws c. 30A, § 1(1), as amended through St.1966, c. 497, defines adjudicatory proceeding as 'a proceeding before an agency in which the legal rights, duties or privileges of specifically named persons are required by constitutional right or by any provision of the General Laws to be determined after opportunity for an agency hearing.' The plaintiffs contend that the town was entitled to a hearing on its application under G.L. c. 30A. ¹

The plaintiffs concede that there is no statutory right to a hearing in this context under St.1948, c. 645, or under any other provision of the General Laws. Therefore, the town was entitled to a hearing before the board only if such a hearing is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Reid v. Acting Comm'r of the Dep't of Community Affairs, 362 Mass. 136, 144, 284 N.E.2d 245 (1972). The question thus becomes whether the town had a property interest in the school building assistance funds for which it had applied which would invoke the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and of art. 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. ² See, e.g., Lotto v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^a , 343 N.E.2d 855 (1976); Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, --- Mass ---, --- - --- ^b , 330 n.e.2D 180, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929, 96 S.Ct. 277, 46 L.Ed.2d 257 (1975);

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332--333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164--167, 94 S.Ct. 1633, 40 L.Ed.2d 15 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599--603, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972); Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570--571, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

Property interests 'are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state laws--rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits.' Haverhill Manor, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pub. Welfare, supra --- Mass. at ---, ^c 330 N.E.2d at 187, quoting from Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, supra, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701. The only possible source of a legitimate claim of entitlement to school building asistance funds is the controlling statute, St.1948, c. 645. Section 8 of that statute, as amended through St.1961, c. 471, § 2 (see also St.1965, c. 572, § 42), provides: 'Forthwith upon receipt of an application under the provisions of section seven, the . . . (board) shall examine such application and any facts, estimates or other information relative thereto, and shall determine whether the proposed construction is in the best interests of the city, town,

region or county, with respect to its site, type of construction, sufficiency of accommodations, and otherwise.' ³ The board rejected the town's application based on its conclusion that the proposed construction was not in the best interests of the town because (1) the Department of Education's enrollment projections for the town did not show an increasing school population for the town and, therefore, since at the time of the application, there were fewer than 320 pupils in grades seven through twelve in the Hatfield public schools, the proposed 400 pupil building was not justified, and (2) the application contravened published policies of the board with respect to school district organization and size. ⁴

Statute 1948, c. 645, provided no explicit standards for determining eligibility for school construction funds and left to the discretion of the board the determination whether the proposed construction would be in the best interests of the town. Such discretion negates any claim of entitlement which would mandate the protection of the due process clause. Cf. Lotto v. Commonwealth, supra. Furthermore, the 'best interests' determination of the board in this case is a matter of governmental policy, peculiarly within the expertise of the administrative agency. See, e.g., Natick Trust Co. v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 337 Mass. 615, 617, 151 N.E.2d 70 (1958); Hayeck v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 335 Mass. 372, 374--375, 140 N.E.2d 310 (1957). Since there is neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a hearing in the context of this case, the proceedings before the board were not adjudicatory proceedings within the meaning of G.L. c. 30A, § 1(1), and therefore, this court has no power to review the board's decision under G.L. c. 30A, § 14.

2. The plaintiffs also seek declaratory relief under G.L. c. 231A. The board's decision is not subject to judicial review under that chapter because of the discretionary nature of its decision. See, e.g., Pilgrim Co-op. Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, --- Mass. --- ^d , 339 N.E.2d 751 (1976) and cases cited therein. The conclusory allegations in the complaint do not bring his case within the exceptions collected in West Broadway Task Force, Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Community Affairs, 363 Mass. 745, 750--751, 297 N.E.2d 505 (1973).

3. The plaintiffs also seek judicial review under G.L. c. 15, § 1J. That statute is clearly inapposite to the case now before us, because it applies only to judicial review of racial imbalance plans.

4. Finally, the plaintiffs seek review under G.L. c. 249, § 4, through an action in the nature of certiorari. Such relief is available only to review judicial or quasi judicial proceedings, and is not available to review discretionary administrative action. See, e.g., Good v. School Comm. of Cambridge, 354 Mass. 759, 236 N.E.2d 87 (1968); South Shore Nat'l Bank v. Board of Bank Incorporation, 351 Mass. 363, 365, 220 N.E.2d 899 (1966); First Church of Christ,...