School Dist. No. 46, Sarpy County, Neb. v. City of Bellevue
| Decision Date | 23 January 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-639,85-639 |
| Parties | , 37 Ed. Law Rep. 660 SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 46, SARPY COUNTY, NEBRASKA, and David K. Kentsmith, Appellants, v. CITY OF BELLEVUE and Bellevue School District, Sarpy County, Nebraska, Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Schools and School Districts: Actions: Boundaries: Standing. Notwithstanding that the statute provides that a school district is a body corporate, possesses the usual powers of a corporation for public purposes, and may sue and be sued, it is the law of this state that a school district may not maintain an action involving a change in the boundaries of a school district.
2. Statutes: Constitutional Law: Appeal and Error. If the statute involves economic or social legislation not implicating a fundamental right or suspect class, courts will ask only whether a rational relationship exists between a legitimate state interest and the statutory means selected by the legislature to accomplish that end.
3. Legislature: Statutes: Constitutional Law. If the legislature has made a reasonable classification, one that is not a mere cloak or cover for an arbitrary exemption of certain persons or a certain class of persons, but a natural and proper selection of those who, upon a reasonable view of the mischiefs to be met, should be subject to the regulations prescribed, and the law is made to operate generally and uniformly upon all of the class so constituted, the constitutional provision in question is not violated.
4. Schools and School Districts: Boundaries: Legislature. The fixing of boundaries of school districts is exclusively a legislative function, and it may be properly delegated to a subordinate agency, providing the Legislature prescribes the manner and the standards under which the power of the designated board may be exercised. The Legislature may delegate this authority provided it states the purpose for doing so and sets up reasonable standards to guide the agency which is to administer it.
L. Bruce Wright and Kathleen A. Jaudzemis, of Cline, Williams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, Lincoln, for appellants.
John E. Rice, Bellevue City Atty., for appellee City of Bellevue.
Dixon G. Adams, Bellevue, for appellee Bellevue School Dist.
The question presented by this appeal is whether the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 79-801(4) (Cum.Supp.1984) are unconstitutional for any of the various reasons alleged by the appellants, school district No. 46 of Sarpy County and David K. Kentsmith. The district court for Sarpy County, Nebraska, found, in effect, that § 79-801(4) did not violate either the U.S. Constitution or the Constitution of the State of Nebraska by sustaining demurrers filed by the appellees, the Bellevue School District and the City of Bellevue. For reasons more particularly set out hereinafter, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Section 79-801(4) provides as follows:
Whenever an application for approval of a final plat or replat is filed for territory which lies within the zoning jurisdiction of a city of the first or second class and does not lie within the boundaries of a Class IV or V school district, the affected school board of the city district or its representative and the affected school board or boards serving the territory subject to the final plat or replat or their representative shall meet within thirty days of such application and negotiate in good faith as to which district shall serve the platted or replatted territory and the effective date of any transfer based upon the criteria prescribed in subsection (2) of this section.
If no agreement has been reached prior to the approval of the final plat or replat, the territory shall transfer to the school district of the city of the first or second class upon the filing of the final plat unless an affected district petitions the district court within ten days of approval of the final plat or replat and obtains an order enjoining the transfer and requiring the affected school boards to continue negotiation. The court shall issue the order upon a finding that the affected board or boards have not negotiated in good faith based on one or more of the criteria listed in subsection (2) of this section. The district court shall require no bond or other surety as a condition for any preliminary injunctive relief. If no agreement is reached after such order by the district court and additional negotiations, the platted or replatted territory shall become a part of the school district of the city of the first or second class.
Section 79-801(2) provides in part:
During the process of negotiation, the affected school boards shall consider the following criteria:
(a) The educational needs of the students in the affected school districts (b) The economic impact upon the affected school districts;
(c) Any common interests between the annexed or platted area and the affected school districts and the community which has zoning jurisdiction over the area; and
(d) Community educational planning.
The undisputed evidence is that school district No. 46 and the Bellevue School District are both Class III school districts located in Sarpy County, Nebraska, and share a common boundary line. The City of Bellevue is a city of the first class, and the zoning jurisdiction of the City of Bellevue extends for a distance of 2 miles beyond the city limits and into the territory served by school district No. 46. Similarly, by definition as a Class III school district, school district No. 46 also must have a city or village in it which has extraterritorial zoning powers. See § 79-801(1).
On April 11, 1985, an application for final plat was filed, seeking to replat a number of lots in Normandy Hills subdivision, which is located in school district No. 46, south of the Bellevue School District's southernmost boundary. While the subdivision lies wholly outside the boundaries of the City of Bellevue and also outside the boundaries of the Bellevue School District, the subdivision does lie within the zoning jurisdiction of the City of Bellevue. This application triggered the transfer of the property out of school district No. 46 and into the Bellevue School District pursuant to the provisions of § 79-801(4). A request was made by the Bellevue School District to school district No. 46 to negotiate, as provided by § 79-801(4). District No. 46, however, chose not to negotiate and, instead, filed an action in the district court for Sarpy County, Nebraska, seeking an injunction and a declaration that § 79-801(4) is unconstitutional. This is not the same injunction which might have been obtained if good faith negotiations had not been conducted as provided by § 79-801(4). The district court determined that the act was not unconstitutional. It is from that order that this appeal is now taken.
Before proceeding to address the constitutional issue, we are required to first address the question of whether school district No. 46 is a proper party to this action. We believe it is not. In the case of Board of Education v. Winne, 177 Neb. 431, 434-35, 129 N.W.2d 255, 257-58 (1964), quoting from Halstead v. Rozmiarek, 167 Neb. 652, 94 N.W.2d 37 (1959), we said:
It therefore follows that if a school district may not question a change in boundary, it also may not attack the law which prescribes how and in what manner those boundaries shall be changed. School district No. 46 has no legal interest in the question presented by the case and, therefore, no standing to raise the constitutional issues set out in its petition.
The situation in regard to the additional appellant, Kentsmith, is, however, another matter. By his petition he first alleges that he is a resident, property owner, and taxpayer of school district No. 46. He then alleges in his first cause of action that the transfer of the land will "cause great damage ... to Kentsmith from loss of tax support and student population...." He further alleges in his third cause of action that "[a]s a property owner whose property is taxed to support School District No. 46, Kentsmith's financial burden would be increased if the replatted territory is transferred from School District No. 46 to School District of Bellevue." He further alleges that he "received no notice from and has been afforded no hearing by the City or by the School District of Bellevue regarding the transfer...." These are all allegations made on his own behalf and not on behalf of school district No. 46. To this petition the City of Bellevue and the Bellevue School District demurre...
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