Schuler v. Holmes, 47958
Decision Date | 13 November 1951 |
Docket Number | No. 47958,47958 |
Citation | 49 N.W.2d 818,242 Iowa 1303 |
Parties | SCHULER v. HOLMES. |
Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Uhlenhopp & Uhlenhopp, Leming & Hobson, all of Hampton, for claimant-appellant.
James E. Coonley, Hampton, Senneff & Bliss, Mason City, for defendant-appellee.
This appeal presents the single question: Is Claimant barred from the benefits of the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act, under Section 85.61, subd. 3(a), Code 1950, I.C.A.? The Industrial Commissioner and the District Court held that he was and Claimant has appealed.
Section 85.61 defines various terms used in the Act. Division 3 thereof provides: 'The following persons shall not be deemed 'workmen' or 'employees':
(Italics ours.) In construing this provision, we are definitely committed to the rule, that for one to be barred, the employment must be both casual and not for the purpose of the employer's trade or business. Oliphant v. Hawkinson, 192 Iowa 1259, 183 N.W. 805, 33 A.L.R. 1433; Gardner v. Trustees of M. E. Church, 217 Iowa 1390, 250 N.W. 740; Bates v. Nelson, 240 Iowa 926, 38 N.W.2d 631. In Porter v. Mapleton Electric Light Co., 191 Iowa 1031, 183 N.W. 803, 805, we said, in defining the word 'casual', as used in the Act: this is cited with approval in Bates v. Nelson, supra, 58 Am.Jur. Workmen's Compensation, Section 92, states: 'In the absence of statutory definition, definition is that given by lexicographers'. The terms 'Business' or 'Trade' are synonymous and defined in Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, as 'any particular occupation or employment habitually engaged in, * * *'. In construing a statute, it is also a well recognized rule that in endeavoring to ascertain the intent of the act which is passed it should be given such construction as will not result in injustice, unreasonableness or absurd consequences. Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869, 14 N.W.2d 717; citing Oliphant v. Hawkinson, supra.
Under Section 86.29, Code 1950, I.C.A., and many decisions of this Court, the findings of the Industrial Commissioner on a disputed fact question, have the force of a jury verdict and are conclusive upon this Court. However, if there is no substantial conflict therein, the question becomes one of law for the court and his findings may be reviewed. Tepesch v. Johnson, 230 Iowa 37, 296 N.W. 740; Arnold v. State, 233 Iowa 1, 6 N.W.2d 113; Brewer v. Central Const. Co., 241 Iowa 799, 43 N.W.2d 131.
The facts in the instant case are not in substantial conflict. Claimant is a day laborer, a sort of 'Jack-of-all-trades'. To take his own statement: . Defendant-employer is 63 years of age. Prior to 1946 he owned and operated a restaurant, which he leased in 1946. Two years later, the restaurant building was destroyed by an explosion and he lived in a trailer located on the premises thereof, which he owned. He had no other property. In May 1949, he obtained possession of the property in question, two lots on which stood the house, here involved, and a small shack, and which he had purchased in the fall of 1948. He immediately started to modernize the house for the purpose of living in part thereof and renting a part. About three weeks before the incident in question, he employed Claimant to make some repairs on the garage which was attached to the house. He also arranged with Claimant to do the work incidental to connecting the house with the main sewer. On July 13, 1949, one Baldwin, using a ditching machine, dug the ditch from the sewer main to the house, both Claimant and Defendant being about and assisting therewith. Claimant left, intending to return the next day to complete making the connections, but fearing rain and a possible cave-in of the ditch, returned that evening and commenced the work. While so engaged, the ditch caved and Claimant was injured. It appears without dispute, that Defendant had never looked after rental properties or engaged in construction work, other than above noted, and owned no other property at the time. Claimant was employed on an hourly basis, with no definite agreement as to the amount per hour. He also furnished the material needed to make the connections.
Claimant places considerable stress upon Gardner v. Trustees of M. E. Church, supra, as authority for the proposition that the Defendant's business or trade was the repair of the house. In the Gardner case, the trustees were supervising the erection of a church building and Gardner was employed to help with the...
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...and purpose thereof and give to it a meaning in accord therewith, avoiding ridiculous and absurd results where possible. Schuler v. Holmes, 242 Iowa 1303, 49 N.W.2d 818. In my opinion this statute is patently embiguous. As said in Hubbard v. Marsh, 241 Iowa 163, 40 N.W.2d 488, an ambiguity ......
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