Schuler v. Schuler

• Decision Date: 15 May 1956
• Docket Number: No. 29460,29460
• Citation: 290 S.W.2d 192
• Parties: Vivian I. SCHULER (Plaintiff), Appellant, v. Frederick L. SCHULER, non compos mentis, and Robert C. Reis, Guardian of the Person and Estate of Frederick L. Schuler, non compos mentis (Defendants), Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 192

290 S.W.2d 192

Vivian I. SCHULER (Plaintiff), Appellant, v. Frederick L. SCHULER, non compos mentis, and Robert C. Reis Guardian of the Person and Estate of Frederick L Schuler, non compos mentis (Defendants) Respondents.

No. 29460.

St. Louis Court of Appeals, Missouri.

May 15, 1956.

Boggiano & Hessel, Stephen A. Boggiano, St. Louis, for appellant.

Robert C. Reis, St. Louis, for respondents.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

On January 25, 1955 Vivian I. Schuler filed a petition for divorce against her husband, Frederick L. Schuler, non compos mentis, joining the guardian of his person and estate (an attorney) as a party defendant. The petition, inter alia, alleged the marriage on October 25, 1919, brief periods of separation during the intervening years, final separation in June, 1938, sanity from 1919 to June 1938, adjudication of Frederick as a person of unsound mind on September 16, 1938, his confinement since that date in a state hospital, the guardian's appointment and numerous indignities afforded to plaintiff during the period of cohabitation including a quarrelsome nature, violent temper, gambling, repeated requests for a divorce, refusal to pay for necessary operations, association with other women and numerous physical assaults upon plaintiff. The guardian's answer admitted the marriage and other formal allegations, denied the indignities and affirmatively pleaded Frederick's incapacity and unsoundness of mind 'for a number of years prior to September 16, 1938,' the date of the adjudication. At the close of all the evidence the court took the matter under advisement, later dismissed plaintiff's petition and denied her a decree of divorce. Following an unavailing motion for new trial plaintiff appealed.

A careful review of the evidence reveals that plaintiff is entitled to a decree of divorce if under the evidence Frederick was not of unsound mind but was legally accountable for his acts to and through June, 1938, provided Frederick's right as an incompetent under guardianship have been properly protected. A detailed narrative of Frederick's marital offenses is not necessary because neither the sufficiency of the various indignities to render plaintiff's condition intolerable nor the proof of plaintiff's innocence is challenged.

The parties are not in agreement as to the burden of proof. Plaintiff contends that defendants had the burden of proof of insanity, while defendants contend that plaintiff had the burden of proof of sanity.

There is a legal presumption, applicable in divorce cases, Willis v. Willis, Mo.App., 274 S.W.2d 621, and Dunn v. Dunn, 240 Mo.App. 87, 216 S.W.2d 141, that every person is sane. Fendler v. Roy, 331 Mo. 1083, 58 S.W.2d 459; Reynolds v. Maryland Casualty Co., 274 Mo. 83, 201 S.W. 1128; State ex rel. Bevan v. Williams, 316 Mo. 665, 291 S.W. 481; 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 147, p. 826; 28 Am.Jur., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons, Sec. 121, p. 751; Jones on Evidence, Fourth Edition, Vol. 1,Sec. 59. This presumption obtains until it takes flight in the light of contrary evidence, Willis v. Willis, supra; Edwards v. Business Men's Assur. Co. of America, 350 Mo. 666, 168 S.W.2d 82; State ex rel. Bevan v. Williams, supra, but the allegation and suggestion by a plaintiff of the insanity of defendant and that defendant was previously adjudicated to be a person of unsound mind does not destroy the presumption that defendant was sane prior to the date of adjudication. While such adjudication and the appointment of a guardian gives rise to a presumption of continued mental incapacity (unless accidental or temporary in nature), State ex rel. Bartlett v. Littrell, 325 Mo. 35, 26 S.W.2d 768; Kiehne v. Wessell, 53 Mo.App. 667; Richardson v. Smart, 65 Mo.App. 14; First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, 194 Or. 68, 241 P.2d 135; Schindler v. Parzoo, 52 Or. 452, 97 P. 755, that presumption is prospective in its operation from the date of the adjudication, Shupp v. Farrar, 85 Ohio App. 366, 88 N.E.2d 924; First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, supra, and not retrospective. Rath's Committee v. Smith, 180 Ky. 326, 202 S.W. 501; Shupp v. Farrar, supra, 88 N.E.2d loc. cit. 926: 'Contestants contend also that from the adjudication of insanity on November 24, 1947, it is presumed that the witness was insane on August 8, 1947. The general rule is that presumptions are prospective and not retrospective. * * *' An adjudication of insanity does not determine the insanity of a person at a prior time. In Rhoades v. Fuller, 139 Mo. 179, 40 S.W. 760, a suit to rescind a contract for the exchange of real property on the ground of the insanity of the grantor at the time of the trade, the trial court was convicted of reversible error in admitting in evidence the record of the insanity inquest (at which the grantor was adjudged to be of unsound mind and incapable of managing his affairs) on the issue of the sanity of the grantor at the time of the execution of the deed some twenty days previously. Referring to the record the Supreme Court of Missouri said, 139 Mo. loc. cit. 187, 40 S.W. loc. cit. 761: 'It raised no presumption as against him of Rhoades' insanity at the time of the trade, which was consummated something over 20 days before the date of the inquest. It is no uncommon occurrence for persons who have never manifested any evidences of insanity to become violently insane within a very short space of time.' In Kliewer v. Bodenheimer, 199 Okl. 107, 184 P.2d 456, loc. cit. 458, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma said: 'Plaintiff also stresses the fact that Moody was declared incompetent three months after the sale of his farm. But this does not establish his incompetency at a prior date.' In Longbotham v. Longbotham, 119 Minn. 139, 137 N.W. 387, loc. cit. 389, the Supreme Court of Minnesota said: 'The fact that the defendant had been adjudged insane and committed to the hospital for treatment does not necessarily establish that he was insane, within the rule stated, when the several acts of cruelty were committed.' See also First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, supra; Schindler v. Parzoo, supra; 44 C.J.S., Insane Persons, Sec. 32(2), p. 90. In Larsson v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, 97 Cal.App.2d 704, 218 P.2d 604, loc. cit. 606, the California Court of Appeals said: 'The adjudication of incompetency on June 24, 1941, did not raise a presumption that plaintiff had been incompetent prior to that time.' Other cases indicating that an adjudication of insanity raises no presumption of insanity at an earlier date include Avery v. Avery, 42 Cal.App. 100, 183 P. 453; Kliewer v. Bodenheimer, supra; Andrews v. Andrews' Committee, 120 Ky. 718, 87 S.W. 1080, 90 S.W. 581; Shirley v. Taylor, 1844, 5 B.Mon. 99, 44 Ky. 99; Wathen v. Skaggs, 161 Ky. 600, 171 S.W. 193; Hentz v. Wallace's Adm'r, 153 Va. 437, 150 S.E. 389; McGregor v. Keun, 330 Ill. 106, 161 N.E. 99; Black v. Boyer, Tex.Civ.App., 21 S.W.2d 1094. Otherwise stated, 'inferences of fact and presumptions usually do not run backward.' Thus in Forbis v. Forbis, Mo.App., 274 S.W.2d 800, the Springfield Court of Appeals held that evidence that a party was of unsound mind on January 4, 1952 and was so adjudicated on July 3, 1953, standing alone, was not presumptive evidence that the same condition existed on February 12, 1951. And see Glover v. Bruce, Mo.Sup., 265 S.W.2d 346; Nash v. Normandy State Bank, Mo.Sup., 201 S.W.2d 299; Snowwhite v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 705, 127 S.W.2d 718; Conduitt v. Trenton Gas & Electric Co., 326 Mo. 133, 31 S.W.2d 21, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 140, p. 789, for further statement of the rule that mere proof of the existence of a present condition, or a condition at a given time, does not raise any presumption that the same condition existed at a prior time.

Indeed, in the instant situation, the opposite presumption obtains. Thus in Hill-Dodge Banking Co. v. Loomis, 140 Mo.App. 62, loc. cit. 70, 119 S.W. 967, loc. cit. 969, Judge Goode, speaking for this court, said: 'But prior to an inquest sanity is presumed, and the burden of proving insanity rests upon him who relies on that state of mind.' In First Christian Church in Salem v. McReynolds, supra, 241 P.2d loc. cit. 138, the Supreme Court of Oregon said: 'The first rule to which we now refer presumes the existence of mental competency prior to an adjudication to the contrary.' And see 28 Am.Jur., Insane and Other Incompetent Persons, Sec. 121, p. 751, and Schindler v. Parzoo, supra.

Since sanity is presumed prior to adjudication of insanity, or until evidence of insanity is introduced, it follows that the burden of proof of the fact of insanity prior to adjudication is upon the party who asserts the insanity of himself or another as the basis of a claim or defense. This rule, almost universal, ¹ has been applied in suits to set aside deeds, Edinger v. Kratzer, Mo.Sup., 175 S.W.2d 807; Chadwell v. Reed, 198 Mo. 359, 95 S.W. 227; annulment actions, Forbis v. Forbis, supra; suits on ordinary contracts, Boydston v. Bank of Camden Point, Mo.App., 141 S.W.2d 86; Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Hardman, 62 Mo.App. 153; suits on promissory notes, Hill-Dodge Banking Co. v. Loomis, supra; suits on insurance policies, Fendler v. Roy, supra; and prosecutions for crime. State v. Hardy, 359 Mo. 1169, 225 S.W.2d 693. In Chadwell v. Reed, supra, 198 Mo. loc. cit. 379, 95 S.W. loc. cit. 233, the Supreme Court of Missouri said: 'The presumption is that all men are sane, and it devolves upon those who assert the contrary to prove it by a preponderance of, or the weight of, the testimony, * * *. A party claiming under a deed is not bound to prove the sanity of the person making it, but the burden of proving the unsoundness of mind and incapacity of the grantor, at the time of its execution, rests with the party seeking ot impeach it. * * *' And in Wathen v. Skaggs, supra, 171 S.W. loc. cit. 195, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky said: 'The fact of the...