Schuman v. Westbrook

• Decision Date: 26 June 1944
• Docket Number: 4-7394
• Citation: 181 S.W.2d 470,207 Ark. 495
• Parties: Schuman v. Westbrook
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

181 S.W.2d 470

207 Ark. 495

Schuman v. Westbrook

No. 4-7394

Supreme Court of Arkansas

June 26, 1944

Appeal from Sebastian Chancery Court, Fort Smith District; C. M Wofford, Chancellor.

Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part.

Hugh M. Bland, for appellant.

L E. Lister, for appellee.

OPINION

McFaddin Justice.

This is a suit by an alleged insane person to redeem her property sold for delinquent taxes; and the redemption is resisted on (1) the denial of insanity, (2) the plea of limitations, and (3) the plea of innocent purchaser. Also there is the question of the time when the redemptor becomes entitled to the rents.

Anna Laurie Westbrook was the owner by will of the property here involved, consisting of two lots and a house thereon in Fort Smith. In 1932, the property was forfeited to the State for the delinquent taxes of 1931. The State received the deed in 1934; and in October, 1937, appellant, Manie Schuman, received a deed from the State upon payment of $ 80.12. In February, 1940, Schuman conveyed the property to Maurice Kaplan by quitclaim deed. From July, 1938, until after the filing of this suit, either Schuman or Kaplan was at all times in actual possession by a tenant.

On September 15, 1941, this suit was filed by Anna Laurie Westbrook, an insane person, acting by her next friend, Lucille Westbrook; and there was: (1) an allegation of the insanity of Anna Laurie Westbrook at all times involved, (2) an allegation of the tender of taxes, and (3) a prayer for redemption and also for an accounting of rents. Both of the appellants (1) denied the insanity of Anna Laurie Westbrook, (2) pleaded adverse possession under § 8925 of Pope's Digest, (3) pleaded three years' adverse possession, and (4) denied plaintiff's right to any rents. In addition, Kaplan pleaded that he was an innocent purchaser of the property for value and without any notice or knowledge of any defect in the title.

The chancery court rendered a decree of redemption in favor of the plaintiff, and found that Schuman had received rents totaling $ 553 and had expended for taxes and improvements a total of $ 451.37. Therefore, in addition to ordering redemption, the chancery court rendered judgment against Schuman for $ 101.63. From that decree comes this appeal, presenting the questions which we now list and discuss:

I. Was Anna Laurie Westbrook Insane?

At the time of the trial in the chancery court, Anna Laurie Westbrook was a woman thirty-two years of age. There had never been any previous inquisition into her mental status. She had never been declared insane and therefore had no guardian. (See § 7543 et seq. of Pope's Digest.) But such an order, if made, would only have been prima facie evidence in a suit like the one here (Eagle v. Petterson, 136 Ark. 72, 206 S.W. 55, 7 A. L. R. 553; Barkheimer v. Lockhart, 139 Ark. 223, 213 S.W. 381). The chancery court had authority to determine mental status in this case irrespective of any previous adjudication by the probate court.

In some jurisdictions there are three types of mental status, being: sanity, incompetency, and insanity (see 28 Am. J. 656 et seq.); but in this State we have only two types of mental status recognized by law, being: sanity and insanity. The question here is whether the plaintiff was sane or insane. Many authorities agree that it is difficult to define insanity, and that it is a social or legal term rather than a medical term. In 32 C. J. 593 it is said: "'Insanity' differs so much in kind and degree that no precise definition can be given applicable to the varying circumstances of every case. . . . Upon questions of insanity the law attempts to ascertain whether a party is or is not possessed of such soundness of mind as renders him competent to do, or relieves him from the responsibility for doing, certain acts. In a legal sense, mental soundness is sanity; mental unsoundness is insanity. In this sense insanity is defined as such unsoundness of mental condition as, with regard to any matter under action, modifies or does away with individual legal responsibility or capacity."

Our own case of Pulaski County v. Hill, 97 Ark. 450, 134 S.W. 973, is one of our landmarks on this subject; and Mr. Justice Frauenthal's words, as there contained, remain, even after the lapse of years, still the clearest expression on the subject, and directly in point in the case at bar. We quote at length:

"It is earnestly contended by counsel for defendants that the finding of the chancellor that John Hill was an insane person at the time of the tax sale or at any time thereafter is contrary to the weight of the testimony adduced upon the trial of this case. It is difficult to define with accuracy the limits of that mental incapacity which under the law renders one insane. An insane person is one who is of unsound mind, and our statute provides that a 'person of unsound mind includes every person who is a lunatic idiot or deranged.' Kirby's Digest, § 7812.

"But at last the law furnishes no definite enumeration of the mental powers and no exact measure by which to determine the degree of their exercise in order to decide whether or not an individual is of sound or unsound mind. There are numerous civil proceedings where insanity or mental incapacity may be shown, and the rule for establishing the degree of the insanity necessarily depends upon the purpose for which the insanity is to be proved. It may be that the object of proving insanity is to annul a contract, or to defeat the execution of a will or to appoint a guardian to take charge of the estate of the insane person. The rule for establishing the degree of insanity in these various cases varies with the case. But the question in all such cases where incapacity arising from defect of the mind is alleged is, not whether the mind is itself diseased or the person is afflicted with any particular form of insanity, but rather whether the powers of the mind have become so affected, by whatever cause, as to render him incapable of transacting business like the one in question. As a general rule, it may be stated that, in order to have that measure of capacity required by law to be of sound mind, a person must have capacity enough to comprehend and understand the nature and effect of the business he is doing; and where it is clearly made to appear that the mental incapacity and imbecility is of such a degree as to render the person unable to conduct the ordinary affairs of life and leaves him in a condition to be the victim of his infirmity, then such person is in contemplation of law not of sound mind. Weakness of understanding is not alone sufficient to show mental unsoundness if capacity remains to see things in their true relations and where the individual has a moderate comprehension of his immediate duties and of the value and use of his property. But, as is said by Marshall, J., in the case of Prather v. Naylor's Adm'r, 1 B. Monroe 244, the criterion in determining whether or not the individual is of sound mind 'rests upon the question whether the individual is mentally competent of rational government of himself and his affairs.' 1 Clevenger on Med. Jur. of Insanity, § 244; Young v. Stevens, 48 N.H. 133, 2 Am. Rep. 202, 97 Am. Dig. 592; In re Storick, 64 Mich. 685, 31 N.W. 582; Hamrick v. Hamrick, 134 Ind. 324, 34 N.E. 3; King v. Cummins, 60 Vt. 502, 11 A. 727; Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60, 31 N.E. 303; Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555; Beller v. Jones, 22 Ark. 92. And the opinions of witnesses not expert are competent to prove mental capacity or incapacity when the facts or circumstances are disclosed upon which they found their opinions. Beller v. Jones, supra; King v. Cummins, supra; Kilgore v. Cross, 1 F. 578.

"In the case at bar the matter involved related to the payment of taxes upon property. That was one of the matters attending the transaction of ordinary business. The object and purpose of proving insanity in this case would be to show that John Hill did not have the mental capacity to understand and appreciate the fact that the taxes should be paid upon his property; in other words, the true and proper test of whether or not he was of sound mind under the testimony and nature of this case was whether or not he had the mental capacity to transact ordinary business and to take care of and manage his property. If he was mentally incapable of understanding and acting rationally in the ordinary affairs of life and in the management of his property, then he was not of sound mind within the meaning of the statute granting him time until such disability should be removed in which to redeem his land from tax forfeiture.

"We do not deem it desirable to set out in any detail the testimony relative to the mental condition of John Hill. The testimony discloses that almost from his infancy he was a mental imbecile, and on this account was the sport and plaything of his associates. He was not totally incapable of taking care of himself, but he was wholly incompetent on account of his mental unsoundness to rationally manage his affairs or to care for and protect his property in a rational manner. He did not understand the ordinary affairs of life in their true relations, and was unable to form correct conclusions as to them. He was mentally incapable of transacting business, or to comprehend the nature and effect of the business of paying or failure to pay taxes on his property. Upon an examination of all the evidence we feel a conviction that he did not have that mental capacity which is found in a sound mind, although he was not technically an idiot or lunatic. This was his mental condition at the time of said tax sale and continuously from that date to his death. He was therefore an insane person within the meaning...