Schutzenhofer v. Granite City Steel Co.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 56000,56000
• Parties: , 66 Ill.Dec. 637 John SCHUTZENHOFER, Appellee, v. GRANITE CITY STEEL COMPANY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 563

443 N.E.2d 563

93 Ill.2d 208, 66 Ill.Dec. 637

John SCHUTZENHOFER, Appellee, v. GRANITE CITY STEEL COMPANY, Appellant.

No. 56000.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 17, 1982.

Allan Goodloe, Jr., James R. Parham, Robert Broderick, Pope & Driemeyer, Belleville, for appellant Granite City Steel Co.

William W. Schooley, William S. Beatty, Law Offices of William W. Schooley, Granite City, for appellee.

UNDERWOOD, Justice:

Plaintiff, John Schutzenhofer, obtained a $75,000 judgment in a Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) action against defendant, Granite City Steel Company, following a jury trial in the circuit court of Madison County for injuries resulting from a work-related accident. Defendant argued upon appeal that a pretrial summary judgment declaring defendant to be a common carrier by rail engaged in interstate commerce constituted error. The appellate court, in a split decision, affirmed on the grounds that defendant had not preserved that issue for review. (101 Ill.App.3d 683, 57 Ill.Dec. 105, 428 N.E.2d 655.) We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

Plaintiff, a switchman, was injured in September of 1976 while working on defendant's wholly owned railroad and brought an action for damages under the Federal Safety Appliance Act and the FELA. At the time of his injury, plaintiff was one of 251 trainmen employed by defendant. As part of its steel-producing operation, defendant maintained about 55 miles of track within its industrial complex and over 500 railway cars; this railway system was used principally to transport both raw material and partially processed iron within the complex. Prior to 1975, defendant also acted as an agent for several commercial railroad companies. In that capacity, defendant performed switching operations at the junction of its tracks and those of the other railroads and delivered, by rail, materials destined for several other industrial concerns which had spur lines connected only to defendant's tracks. In 1975, defendant terminated its agency contracts but continued to provide railway services for three other companies. Two of these concerns were located on property leased from defendant, and the third had its plant immediately adjacent to defendant's complex.

Prior to trial, plaintiff successfully moved for a partial summary judgment that defendant was a common carrier by rail engaged in interstate commerce. Although defendant did not move for a summary judgment in its favor on that issue, it repeatedly denied its interstate status, arguing that the FELA was inapplicable and that plaintiff's sole remedy lay under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. Defendant presented this assertion in its answer, in a pretrial motion to dismiss, in a motion to dismiss following the presentation of plaintiff's evidence at trial, and in a motion for a directed verdict. After the trial judge denied all of these motions, defendant unsuccessfully moved for a reconsideration of the summary judgment and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

Although defendant complains only that the result of the summary judgment was incorrect, and not that summary judgment was itself inappropriate, the scope of our review is not confined merely to the issues preserved for appeal. (See Inolex Corp. v. Rosewell (1978), 72 Ill.2d 198, 201, 20 Ill.Dec. 566, 380 N.E.2d 775. See also People ex rel. Peoria Civic Center Authority v. Vonachen (1975), 62 Ill.2d 179, 340 N.E.2d 1.) This court has interpreted our own Rule 341(e)(7) (73 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(7)), which expresses the waiver doctrine, as "an admonition to the parties, not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the reviewing court." (Hux v. Raben (1967), 38 Ill.2d 223, 224, 230 N.E.2d 831.) Moreover, Rule 366, which has been held analogous to the plain error doctrine in criminal review (38 Ill.2d 223, 224, 230 N.E.2d 831), provides: "(a) Powers. In all appeals the reviewing court may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just * * * (5) give any judgment and make any order * * * and further orders and grant any relief * * * that the case may require" (73 Ill.2d R. 366.) While this court has recognized that this power of review is limited by the need to ensure an adequate opportunity for litigants to present argument (38 Ill.2d 223, 225, 230 N.E.2d 223), the matter which we address involves only a question of law which presents no evidentiary problem.

We find that the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the sole issue of defendant's status as a common carrier by rail in interstate commerce was erroneous under the Illinois statute governing summary judgments. The relevant portion of section 57 of the Civil Practice Act provides:

"Summary judgments.

(1) For plaintiff. Any time after the opposite party has appeared or after the time within which he is required to appear has expired, a plaintiff may move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor for all or any part of the relief sought.

(2) For defendant. A defendant may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part of the relief sought against him." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 57.)

This court has consistently held that examining the statutory language provides the best means of ascertaining the legislature's intent and that this language must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. (Town of the City of Peoria v. O'Connor (1981), 85 Ill.2d 195, 52 Ill.Dec. 49, 421 N.E.2d 912; Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin (1978), 72 Ill.2d 189, 21 Ill.Dec. 144, 381 N.E.2d 222; Western National Bank v. Village of Kildeer (1960), 19 Ill.2d 342, 167 N.E.2d 169.) The language of section 57 clearly lacks any provision for summary judgments which would serve only to resolve issues of fact without granting or denying part or all of the relief sought.

Our conclusion that it is improper to issue summary judgments which fail to grant or deny relief is consistent with both the joint committee comment and the historical and practice notes to section 57; this court has often found that commentary helpful when ascertaining the legislative intent. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Cohn, 93 Ill.2d 190, 198-203, 66 Ill.Dec. 615, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982); People v. Holt (1981), 91 Ill.2d 480, 488-90, 64 Ill.Dec. 550, 440 N.E.2d 102; People ex rel. Scott v. College Hills Corp. (1982), 91 Ill.2d 138, 150, 61 Ill.Dec. 766, 435 N.E.2d 463; Knox College v. Celotex Corp. (1981), 88 Ill.2d 407, 426; In re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill.2d 518, 529, 56 Ill.Dec. 693, 427 N.E.2d 1239; People v. Fritz (1981), 84 Ill.2d 72, 77, 48 Ill.Dec. 880, 417 N.E.2d 612; People v. Manning (1979), 76 Ill.2d 235, 240, 28 Ill.Dec. 544, 390 N.E.2d 903; People ex rel. Morrison v. Sielaff (1974), 58 Ill.2d 91, 93, 316 N.E.2d 769; People ex rel. Suddeth v. Rednour (1965), 33 Ill.2d 278, 283, 211 N.E.2d 281.) The joint committee comment states that "unlike subparagraph (d) of Federal Rule 56, revised section 57 does not provide for the finding by the court of uncontroverted facts in the event that a judgment under this section is not rendered upon the whole case or for all of the relief asked." (Emphasis added.) (Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 110, par. 57, Joint Committee Comments, at 60 (Smith-Hurd 1968).) According to the historical and practice notes, a provision in an early draft of the 1955 revision of section 57 permitting trial judges to enter judgment on uncontroverted facts without decreeing relief was eliminated because the joint committee believed that such a rule would "invite encroachment upon the right to trial...