Schwartz v. Mills

• Decision Date: 13 February 1985
• Docket Number: No. 48536,48536
• Citation: 685 S.W.2d 956
• Parties: Carl and Anita SCHWARTZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mrs. Ray G. MILLS and Mrs. Clark Hungerford, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 956

685 S.W.2d 956

Carl and Anita SCHWARTZ, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Mrs. Ray G. MILLS and Mrs. Clark Hungerford, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 48536.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division One.

Feb. 13, 1985.

Gray Carroll Stribling, St. Louis, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Daniel E. Wilke, Clayton, for Mrs. Ray G. Mills.

Gary Edward Snodgrass, Richmond Heights, for Mrs. Clark Hungerford.

KAROHL, Judge.

Plaintiffs appeal summary judgment for defendants granted on the ground that the relief plaintiffs seek is barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

The plaintiffs, property owners, brought suit against defendant Mills, abutting property owner west of plaintiffs, and defendant Hungerford, adjacent property owner, west of Mills, for actual and punitive damages and injunctive relief. In Count I plaintiffs allege that defendants "negligently and carelessly maintained their residential property in that, inter alia, they have caused or permitted a manhole and 'homemade' drainage pipe (containing several holes thereon) to be situated on and beneath their residential property and through which large quantities of water have been and are currently being discharged onto Plaintiffs' residential property." Count II alleges that defendants have used their residential property in an unreasonable manner causing an accumulation and collection of water to be discharged upon plaintiffs' property. Count III alleges that the acts of defendants as alleged in Counts I and II were willful, malicious, knowing and intentional. Count IV alleges that the acts referred to in Count II are continuing, recurring, willful, knowing, malicious and intentional and that defendants have refused to take measures to cure. Plaintiffs pray for damages in Counts I and II, punitive damages in Count III and an injunction in Count IV. The facts pleaded by the plaintiffs suggest several theories of liability for the damages plaintiffs claim to have suffered: (1) an action based on negligence; (2) an action based upon temporary private nuisance; and, (3) an action based upon continuing trespass.

Defendants' motions for summary judgment were based upon the legal defense that plaintiffs' claims are barred by the statute of limitations. § 516.120 RSMo 1978. The motions were supported by affidavits, depositions and admissions. The court sustained the motions citing Lato v. Concord Homes, Inc., 659 S.W.2d 593 (Mo.App.1983), and plaintiffs appeal that judgment.

Our review of a summary judgment is equivalent to review of a court-tried proceeding to determine whether defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rue v. Helmkampf, 657 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Mo.App.1983). On review of a grant of a motion for summary judgment upon the ground that plaintiffs' action is barred by the statute of limitations the party against whom judgment was entered must be accorded every favorable intendment of the record. Thompson v. Parker, 608 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Mo. banc 1980).

Plaintiffs contend that summary judgment is inappropriate since its claim is for continuing trespass and temporary nuisance which is not barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs contend that Lato is not applicable because in that case property owners brought suit against a contractor for breach of express warranty of workmanship, negligent design, breach of implied warranty of availability and violation of plaintiff's right to peaceful enjoyment. The court applied § 516.120 RSMo 1978, a five-year statute of limitations after finding "there was but single wrongful act--the delivery of the property with a defective sewer line." Lato, 659 S.W.2d at 595. Plaintiffs' position here is that they have alleged a cause of action for continuous and repeated wrongful acts consisting of the negligent and careless maintenance and unreasonable use of defendants' properties.

It is defendants' position that the petition alleges a cause of action for wrongful acts which occurred during or prior to 1964 and that defendants had done nothing thereafter to change or alter the condition. They conclude that there is no dispute as to these facts, that § 516.120 RSMo 1978, a five-year statute of limitations is applicable and that plaintiffs' causes of action are barred.

The true dispute between the parties is one of the nature and character of plaintiffs' cause of action. The question raised is whether as a matter of law the record supports a finding of a permanent or a temporary private nuisance, a trespass resulting from a permanent structure which by its nature necessarily causes ongoing damage or present acts (or failure to act) causing recurring damage and the effect of the statute of limitations as to each.

We review relevant legal principles. "The rule is well settled in Missouri that the character of a cause of action is determined from the facts stated in the petition and not by the prayer or name given the action by the pleader." State v. Consolidated School District No. 4 of Iron County, 417 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Mo. banc 1967). Where the allegations are doubtful as between the pleaded cause of action for a permanent nuisance or a temporary nuisance a court would favor the right to successive actions for injury anew and treat the nuisance as temporary. Otherwise, the effect would be to give the defendant, because of his wrongful act, the right to continue the wrong; a right equivalent to an easement. Shelley v. Ozark Pipeline Corporation, 327 Mo. 238, 37 S.W.2d 518, 521 (1931). The question as to what constitutes a nuisance is one of law. Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 55 S.W.2d 485, 489 (1932).

The period of limitation which bars a personal action depends upon when the cause accrues, § 516.100, and the nature of the action, §§ 516.120-516.370. An action for private nuisance rests on tort liability and is based upon an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Nuisance derives from the early rule of tort liability and so describes an effect rather than a cause. White v. Smith, 440 S.W.2d 497, 502-503 (Mo.App.1969). Liability in an action for nuisance may be based upon either negligent or intentional invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land. Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage District of Holt City, 602 S.W.2d 787 (Mo.App.1980).

Applying these principles we find that plaintiffs alleged, among alternative causes, an action for a temporary private nuisance, separable as to each accrued injury, for which the plaintiff has redress within the period of limitation for each accrual. Rebel, 602 S.W.2d at 794; Hayes v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co., 177 Mo.App. 201, 162 S.W. 266, 268 (1914).

The Rebel case is particularly helpful. There the landowners sued a city drainage district for damages and injunctive relief. The petition alleged negligent failure to maintain a ditch levee which permitted water to flood and erode the land of the plaintiff. The trial court concluded that the petition alleged a cause of action for permanent nuisance and was barred by a five-year statute of limitations. "That judgment necessarily rejected the pleading as a cause of action for temporary nuisance, abatable and separately accrued by each new incursion." Rebel, 602 S.W.2d at 789. The Western District reversed and remanded for trial. It distinguished Powers v. St. Louis I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 158 Mo. 87, 57 S.W. 1090 (1900) and found that the petition pled injury from neglect by defendant and continuous failure to maintain defendant's levee. Id. at 794. In Powers plaintiff's damages were from the inherent character of a structure in usual operation due to negligent design and construction. The Rebel petition was found to plead a construction made harmful by the neglect of the...