State v. Mullin

• Decision Date: 22 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 57428,57428
• Citation: 225 N.W.2d 305
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patrick E. MULLIN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 305

225 N.W.2d 305

75 A.L.R.3d 1072

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Patrick E. MULLIN, Appellant.

No. 57428.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 22, 1975.

James F. Fowler, of Wilson & Goodhue, Indianola, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., David E. Linquist, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Gottschald, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and MASON, REES, UHLENHOPP and REYNOLDSON, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

Defendant bank customer was charged with falsely uttering his own check at his own bank on an overdrawn account. Following his conviction for violating § 713.3, The Code, he appeals from judgment sentencing him to seven years imprisonment. We reverse.

The 21-year-old defendant had a seventh grade education. On July 28, 1973 he opened his first checking account in Peoples Trust and Savings Bank (of Indianola) with a $10 deposit. Thereafter he made several small deposits and wrote a number of small checks. The largest balance in defendant's account at any time was $10. Mr. T. J Nicholls, the bank's cashier, became aware the account was overdrawn on September 14, 1973. After that date the bank continued to honor defendant's no-fund checks, several of which were counter checks payable to defendant. Defendant's account was overdrawn $108.64 on September 28, 1973, after which no more checks were posted against it.

October 5, 1973, defendant, in the bank's Milo branch office, drew and presented for payment a $45 counter check stamped payable to 'Myself Only at the Counter.' Mrs. Dorothy Uttley, manager of the Milo office, asked defendant if he had an account in the bank and if he was working in the locality. After he answered both questions in the affirmative, she accepted the check and gave him $45 in cash.

Mr. Nicholls testified he supervised the bank's bookkeeping system (located at Indianola), authorized payment of checks, and determined whether checks written on overdrawn accounts would be honored. He conceded the bank had a lenient policy concerning overdrafts, and frequently would, in effect, extend credit by honoring checks drawn on accounts with insufficient funds. When a customer's overdraft exceeded $20 his name would be added to a list promulgated to bank personnel. In the ordinary course of procedure defendant's name would have been on a list available to Mrs. Uttley, but she did not refer to the list when she cashed defendant's check.

The $45 counter check from the Milo office arrived in Indianola October 6, 1973. Mr. Nicholls testified, 'On October 6 there was not sufficient funds in the account to pay the check. So, the normal course of business, bookkeepers do not post it and I make a decision the following day as to whether it would be paid, creating or increasing an overdraft, or whether I'd return it marked insufficient funds. On October 7, 1973 I made the decision we would mark it insufficient funds and not pay it.' Of course, the check had already been paid at Milo. Mr. Nicholls merely decided not to post it to defendant's account.

October 24, 1973, Mr. Nicholls discussed this and other checks (which had been posted to the overdrawn account) with defendant, who denied signing the other checks. Mr. Nicholls requested him to return the next day to sign an affidavit the signatures were not his. When defendant did not appear on October 25, Mr. Nicholls turned the $45 check over to the county attorney.

Defendant testified in his own behalf. He knew he had no funds in his account to pay the $45 check. He claimed at the time he wrote it he intended to deposit a check for wages he was to receive in a few days. He had made no specific arrangement with the bank to pay overdrafts. Defendant never offered to, and did not, repay the bank.

We are persuaded this appeal may be resolved by consideration of only one of several grounds defendant urges for reversal.

I. The crux of this controversy is whether our law requires that a person who parts with money in exchange for a no-fund check be deceived in the transaction, and if so, whether a payor bank whose responsible employees know a customer has an overdrawn account may be legally deceived when it pays the customer's counter check presented without extrinsic misrepresentations. The State does not deny these issues were properly preserved below by appropriate motions for directed verdict and for new trial.

Defendant was charged under § 713.3, The Code:

'Any person who with fraudulent intent shall make, utter, draw, deliver, or give any check, draft, or written order upon any bank, person, or corporation and who secures money, credit, or thing of value therefor, and who knowingly shall not have an arrangement, understanding, or funds with such bank, person, or corporation sufficient to meet or pay the same * * *' (shall be guilty of a felony or misdemeanor depending upon the amount).

The county attorney's information alleged the check was made, uttered and delivered to Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, willfully and with intent to defraud said bank.

Our recent decisions have identified the elements in a § 713.3 offense thus: 1) an intent to defraud, 2) securing money, credit or other thing of value by means of a check, draft or written order, and 3) knowingly not having any arrangement, understanding, or funds with the bank, person or corporation upon which the check or other instrument is drawn sufficient to meet or pay the same. See State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa 1972); State v. Johnson, 196 N.W.2d 563, 565 (Iowa 1972); State v. Kimball, 176 N.W.2d 864, 865 (Iowa 1970).

While the element of another being defrauded or deceived has not been separately isolated in our decisions since State v. McCutchan, 219 Iowa 1029, 1031, 259 N.W. 23, 24 (1935), it is clearly subsumed under the language of the second element above set out. It is plain one could not secure money 'by means of' a worthless check if the person or entity cashing the check knew it was of no value.

And in practice, by separate instruction the jury ordinarily is so told, as it was in this case, that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt the person parting with the money for the check 'was deceived thereby.' See The Iowa State Bar Association Uniform Criminal Instruction 510.5. On appeal, the State now asserts the comparable instruction submitted to the jury below is incorrect 'in that the knowledge of the victim cannot affect the intent of the defendant.' The State made no such objection at trial and fails to respond to the rationale that if the victim is not deceived it logically cannot be maintained the maker of a worthless check received anything 'therefor,' to use the term employed in § 713.3. The statutory concept of a Quid pro quo exchange cannot be so easily ignored.

Our recent examination of the above requirement is found in State v. Johnson, supra. Trial court there sustained State's objections to prior no-found checks given the payee by defendant and paid by defendant's father. Reversing, we said at 196 N.W.2d 571,

'(E)vidence of provious transactions involving checks given by defendant to Garrett was admissible to aid the jury in determining whether Garrett, at the time he accepted the check and parted with things of value, was deceived thereby.'

We now hold a defendant cannot be convicted of a § 713.3 offense unless he has deceived or defrauded a victim.

II. So concluding, we must confront the second facet of this issue: whether a payor bank whose responsible employees know a customer has an overdrawn account may be legally deceived when it pays the customer's counter check presented without extrinsic misrepresentations.

There is no factual dispute. State's brief at page 4 concedes, 'Evidence presented at trial shows that the victim (bank) knew the appellant did not have sufficient funds in his account at the time he cashed the check at one of their branch offices.'

Instead of making the necessary law conclusion, trial court submitted the issue to the jury in instruction 13, patterned after Uniform Instruction 510.5 referred to above. The jury was told the bank must have been defrauded, that if it accepted the check with knowledge defendant had no funds or credit the bank could not have been deceived, and that the knowledge of the bank's agents T. J. Nicholls and Dorothy Uttley was the bank's knowledge.

Defendant's brief drolly observes, 'How the jury was able to find Defendant guilty in view of such instruction * * * and Instruction No. 11, astounding though it may be, is testament to the ability of the jury system to rise to every occasion.'

The State does not deny the knowledge of Mr. Nicholls, the cashier, is legally imputable to the bank. In State v. McCutchan supra, 219 Iowa at 1038, 259 N.W. at 27--28, this court impliedly accepted the concept an employee's knowledge was imputable to the bank under a statute almost identical to § 713.3. The principle was not invoked there because the employee was an aider and abettor in the fraud. See also Mechanicsville T. & S. Bank v. Hawkeye-Security I. Co., 158 N.W.2d 89, 91 (Iowa 1968). But here the long-accepted rule that the knowledge of an officer is the knowledge of the corporation is applicable. See White v. Gutshall, 213 Iowa 401, 405, 238 N.W. 909, 911 (1931); Watt v. German Sav. Bank, 183 Iowa 346, 366, 165 N.W. 897, 902 (1917); Walker v. State, 89 Ga.App. 101, 104, 78 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1953); 3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency § 273, pp. 635--637.

Recourse to that principle in these circumstances leads inexorably to a legal conclusion and not to a fact question for the jury. The bank was not deceived or defrauded. Defendant's motions should have been granted.

III. Our above conclusion is reinforced by failure of the State and this court, after extensive research, to find a single appellate decision affirming a defendant's conviction under a similar statute for writing a counter check against an overdrawn account.

On the other hand, defendant's position is supported both by reason and...