Schwarz v. State
| Decision Date | 20 February 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 43455,43455 |
| Citation | 85 Wn.2d 171,531 P.2d 1280 |
| Parties | Philip B. SCHWARZ, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, King County, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Washington, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Kenneth C. Hawkins, Gary G. McGlothlen, Yakima, for appellant.
Slade Gorton, Atty. Gen., James K. Pharris, James M. Vache, Asst. Attys. Gen., Olympia, for respondents.
The court is asked in this case to interpret and inquire into the constitutionality of Laws of 1973, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 14, § 3, now codified as RCW 3.34.065. That section, passed as part of an act entitled 'Justices of the Peace--Number--Qualification,' provides that:
After the next respective judicial elections following July 16, 1973, in counties of the second class and larger counties all justices of the peace and district court judges are required to have been admitted to the practice of law in the state of Washington before they may exercise the functions of their office.
Prior to the enactment of RCW 3.34.065, the basic statute providing the qualifications for justices of the peace was Laws of 1961, ch. 299, § 15 (codified as RCW 3.34.060). That statute provides:
To be eligible to file a declaration of candidacy for and to serve as a justice of the peace, a person must:
(1) Be a registered voter of the justice court district; and
(2) Be either:
(a) A lawyer admitted to practice law in the state of Washington; or
(b) A person who has been elected and has served as a justice of the peace, municipal judge or police judge in Washington; or
(c) In those districts having a population of less than ten thousand persons, a person who has taken and passed such qualifying examination for the office of justice of the peace as shall be provided by rule of the supreme Court.
The appellant, who has not been admitted to the practice of law, was elected, in 1970, to the position of justice of the peace for the Vashon District Court for King County. He had been elected and had served the preceding term and was therefore qualified to file for the office under the so-called 'grandfather clause' of RCW 3.34.060.
In May 1974, the appellant brought this declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination that he was entitled to file for reelection in November 1974 and to serve as justice of the peace even though he was not admitted to the practice of law. The superior court rejected his contentions and granted summary judgment for the defendants. His appeal to the Court of Appeals, Division Two, was transferred to this court for determination.
The appellant applied for a writ of mandate to allow him to file and run for reelection while the case was pending in this court. In refusing the mandate, the Chief Justice recognized that the case could not be decided before the time for filing but indicated that the appellant could proceed with his appeal and obtain a determination of his right to file in a future election.
The appellant's assignments of error raise three questions. The first concerns the proper interpretation to be placed upon the statutory provisions which we have heretofore quoted. The appellant suggests that it was not the legislative intent in enacting RCW 3.34.065 to repeal any portion of RCW 3.34.060. It is his theory that since RCW 3.34.065 does not expressly prohibit a nonlawyer from filing for the office of justice of the peace or assuming the office, if elected, he is still entitled to file and run for the office. He does admit, however, that, under the new act, he would not be qualified to serve. Thus he claims that he is entitled to enjoy the emoluments of office if he is elected, but is not required or permitted to perform the functions of the office.
We find it difficult to conceive that the legislature intended to authorize such a state of affirs. On numerous occasions this court has indicated that a statute should be construed as a whole in order to ascertain the legislative purpose and thus to avoid unlikely, strained or absurd consequences which could result from a literal reading, and that the spirit or purpose of legislation should prevail over express but inept language used therein. Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray, 82 Wash.2d 295, 510 P.2d 243 (1973); Alderwood Water Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 62 Wash.2d 319, 382 P.2d 639 (1963).
The notion that the legislature intended to permit a person, who is not qualified to serve as justice of the peace, to nevertheless file for election and, if elected, to enjoy the emoluments of the office not only defies reason but is inconsistent with RCW 3.34.080, which provides that each justice of the peace shall, before entering upon the duties of his office, take an oath to perform those duties faithfully and impartially and to the best of his ability.
RCW 3.34.060 and RCW 3.34.065 can be harmonized. While the legislative intent could have been expressed with greater clarity, the only reasonable interpretation to be placed upon these two provisions read together, is that they require that candidates for the office of justice of the peace in...
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