Seasons Realty Corp. v. City of Yonkers

• Decision Date: 24 January 1975
• Parties: SEASONS REALTY CORP. et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF YONKERS, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 738

363 N.Y.S.2d 738

80 Misc.2d 601

SEASONS REALTY CORP. et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF YONKERS, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Westchester County.

Jan. 24, 1975.

Stuart R. Shamberg, P.C., Mt. Kisco, for plaintiffs.

Eugene J. Fox, Corp. Counsel, Yonkers, for defendant by Richard G. Fontana, Yonkers, of counsel.

GEORGE BEISHEIM, Jr., Justice.

The plaintiff landlords have instituted this action against the City of Yonkers for a declaratory judgment that the Declaration of Housing Emergency passed by the City Council of the City of Yonkers on June 28, 1974, is invalid, illegal and unconstitutional. The city takes the position that its resolution of June 28, 1974, was a valid exercise of the power delegated to it under the Emergency Tenant Protection Act (hereinafter designated ETPA) passed by the New York State Legislature, effective as of May 29, 1974 (L.1974, ch. 576).

Plaintiffs maintain that the declaration or resolution of the city was invalid by reason of the fact that it was not based on any findings of fact by the City Council allegedly required under Section 8623, subd. a, of the ETPA, and also because the City Council conducted no survey of housing accommodations within the city and had no other reasonable basis upon which to make a finding that the vacancy of all classes of rental housing in Yonkers as required by the ETPA was 5% Or less.

Plaintiffs contend further and affirmatively offered a survey at the trial to prove that the Declaration of Emergency was invalid by reason of the fact that at the time of its passage there was more than 5% Vacancy rate in all classes of housing within the City of Yonkers which were not exempt from the ETPA.

Plaintiffs also argue that the city in its use of whatever survey or other source of information it relied upon in reaching its determination that the vacancy rate was 5% Or less included exempt rental classifications in its calculations which plaintiffs claim was in contravention of the provisions of Sections 8623 and 8625 of the ETPA.

It is plaintiffs' position that by reason of the foregoing, they and all other apartment building owners in the City of Yonkers who are subject to the ETPA and the city's resolution have been deprived of their property without due process of law as required by Article I, Section 65, of the Constitution of the State of New York.

At the trial of this action there was introduced into evidence (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2) the minutes of the public hearing before the City Council on June 28, 1974, which consisted only of resolution 270--1974 which was previously adopted by the City Council at a meeting held June 11, 1974, by a vote of 11 to 1 with one absentee and the following brief notation:

'No written protests.

Speakers: For--Harry Rosenblum, representing the Senior Council of Senior Citizens; Mrs. Gertrude Yarock, reading a statement from Mr. Moe Gancher; Estelle Semel, 31 Nassau Rd., Yonkers; Sol Slifkin, 3 Sadore Lane, Yonkers; Mrs. Gertrude Yarock, 45 Amberson Ave., Yonkers

Against--Stephen J. Lehrman

Motion by Vice Mayor Hanney to close Public Hearing.

Motion adopted by a vote of 12 to 0; Councilman Freddolino absent.'

No stenographic minutes of the hearing were made.

Plaintiffs also introduced into evidence (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) Resolution 286--1974 which was passed by the City Council on June 28, 1974, after the public hearing had been closed. Resolution 286--1974 (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1) is an identical resolution to Resolution 270--1974 passed on June 11, 1974, and incorporated in Plaintiffs' Exhibit 2.

Plaintiffs introduced testimony at the trial, which was not contradicted, that at the public hearing of June 28, 1974, the city introduced no evidence whatsoever, and that the persons who spoke in favor of the resolution produced no documents or presented any facts pertaining to the criteria set forth in Section 8623 of the ETPA, to wit:

'(1) the basis of the supply of housing accommodations within such city, town or village;

(2) the condition of such accommodations;

(3) and the need for such residential rents within such city, town or village.'

Testimony at trial also desclosed that at the hearing before the City Council no evidence was presented relevant to the vacancy rate of rental housing in the City of Yonkers except for a survey filed by Stephen J. Lehrman on behalf of the Builders Institute and Apartment Owners' Advisory Council. This survey with minor alterations was introduced into evidence at the trial as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 3.

The defendant City of Yonkers at the trial presented the testimony of three witnesses, to wit, the Chief of the City of Yonkers Department of Planning, the City Planning Director, and the Assistant to the Mayor. The Chief of the Department of Planning presented a statistical analysis completed in December, 1974 (Defendant's Exhibit C) which purported to show that the vacancy rate as of June, 1974, was 4.1%. The Assistant to the Mayor testified that some of the information contained in Defendant's Exhibit C had been furnished to the Mayor and some of the City Councilmen on or before June 11, 1974, in connection with another resolution considered by those individuals. The city admitted that no actual survey of rental housing vacancies had been made by the city and that the analysis completed by the Chief of the Department of Planning in December, 1974, was based upon the United States census data of 1970 plus certain additional information and estimates made by this official affecting the period from 1970 to June, 1974.

The court shall consider first plaintiffs' contention that the determination by the City Council as to whether a 5% Or less vacancy rate existed in all housing accommodations in the City of Yonkers is purely an administrative act. Of course, if plaintiffs should be correct in this contention, there would have to be substantial evidence in the record of the hearing before the City Council on June 28, 1974, to support the validity of the resolution (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1). Collins v. Behan, 285 N.Y. 187, 33 N.E.2d 86; Ennis v. Crowley, 12 A.D.2d 999, 211 N.Y.S.2d 500.

Plaintiffs submit no cases to support their argument that the Council's resolution was an administrative rather than a legislative act and the court finds that, contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the Council in passing the resolution of June 28, 1974, acted in a legislative capacity. Meyers v. New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal, et al., 36 A.D.2d 166, 319 N.Y.S.2d 522.

Section 8623 of ETPA, subd. a, reads as follows:

'A declaration of emergency may be made as to any class of housing accommodations if the vacancy rate for the housing accommodations in such class within such municipality is not in excess of five percent and a declaration of emergency may be made as to all housing accommodations if the vacancy rate for the housing accommodations within such municipality is not in excess of five percent.'

Pursuant to the delegation of authority of the foregoing section, the Yonkers City Council passed a resolution or declaration of emergency after the public hearing on June 28, 1974. The resolution stated, Inter alia:

'WHEREAS, there exists in the City of Yonkers a housing emergency in regard to the plight of apartment dwellers, and

WHEREAS, the vacancy rate in the City of Yonkers is below five (5%) per cent, now, therefore,

BE IT RESOLVED, that the City Council of the City of Yonkers does hereby declare that a housing emergency exists in the City of Yonkers for all accommodations set forth in the Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 of New York State, * * *'

The Meyers case, supra, involved a situation where the Village of Rockville Centre adopted a resolution requesting the State Division of Housing and Community Renewal to decontrol housing accommodations within the village after a public hearing on notice and upon a finding set forth in the resolution that decontrol was warranted. Mr. Justice Hopkins clearly set forth the legal ground rules under which a local community was operating in such a situation. He stated at page 169, 319 N.Y.S.2d at page 525:

'* * * We think that the effectuation of the legislative policy by the delegation of power to the local unit of government is plainly constitutional (People ex rel. Wakeley v. McIntyre, 154 N.Y. 628, 632, 49 N.E. 70, 71; Stanton v. Board of Supervisors of County of Essex, 191 N.Y. 428, 84 N.E. 380; Cleveland v. City of Watertown, 222 N.Y. 159, 118 N.E. 500). As was stated in People ex rel. Unger v. Kennedy, 207 N.Y. 533, 545, 101 N.E. 442, 446: 'the Legislature may pass a statute which is a completed law affecting or conferring rights upon a restricted locality but to become operative only in the event of an affirmative vote by the people of such locality.' We see no essential difference between a statute conferring rights on the electors of the locality and a statute conferring rights on the representative body of the locality. Both lie within the scope of the power of the Legislature.' and continued at page 170, 319 N.Y.S.2d at page 526:

'The plaintiffs' emphasis on the existence of standards implies of necessity that standards must be fixed by the Legislature whenever it delegates power to municipalities. But that is not a valid premise. Where the grant of power is specially defined, the use of the power by the municipality has no other limitations than would circumscribe the Legislature itself. 'An ordinance adopted by such a corporation, pursuant to authority expressly delegated by the legislature, has the same force within the corporate limits as a statute passed by the legislature itself' (Village of Carthage v. Frederick, 122 N.Y. 268, 271, 25 N.E. 480; see, also, People ex rel. Doyle v. Atwell, 232 N.Y. 96, 133 N.E. 364). Here, the grant of power and the manner in which the power may be exerted are particularized in detail; and the contention that standards must accompany the delegation of power...