Sebastian v. State of NY
Citation | 698 N.Y.S.2d 601,93 N.Y.2d 790,720 N.E.2d 878 |
Parties | ANTHONY SEBASTIAN et al., Appellants, v. STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent. |
Decision Date | 21 October 1999 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Collins, Collins, Kantor & Maxwell, P.C., Buffalo (Shawn W. Carey of counsel), for appellants.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Michael S. Buskus, Preeta D. Bansal and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for respondent.
The issue on this appeal is whether the State may be held liable in negligence for injuries inflicted by a juvenile delinquent who escaped from a Division for Youth (DFY) facility. To resolve the question, this Court must consider whether the State's alleged negligence arose out of the performance of a governmental, rather than a proprietary, function. We affirm the order that upheld the ruling in favor of the State.
Daniel Chadderdon was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent in July 1992. He was ordered by a Family Court Judge to be placed in the custody of the DFY, pursuant to Family Court Act §§ 352.2 and 353.2. Chadderdon was initially confined in a secure DFY facility, "which is characterized by physically restricting construction, hardware and procedures" (Executive Law § 504-a). In 1994, as the first step towards transition into the community, Chadderdon was transferred to a limited secure facility in Rochester; next, he was sent to a non-secure facility in Binghamton in July 1995. He escaped from the latter placement, and the State immediately issued a warrant for his apprehension. Approximately one month after the escape, Chadderdon robbed and assaulted a taxicab driver, claimant Sebastian. Chadderdon was arrested for this crime in August 1995. Following his conviction for attempted murder in the second degree and other serious felonies, he was sentenced as an adult criminal to 71/3 to 22 years' imprisonment.
In February 1997, after recovering from severe injuries and reviewing the District Attorney's file containing material on Chadderdon's background, claimant and his wife initiated a lawsuit against the State. They asserted liability, essentially claiming that the State knew of Chadderdon's vicious propensities. The proposed claim alleged that Sebastian's injuries resulted from the State's negligence in moving Chadderdon to, or supervising him at, the non-secure DFY facility, failing to prevent his escape, failing to notify appropriate authorities about the escape, and failing to take reasonable measures to recapture him. The Court of Claims rejected the claim, concluding that no "meritorious" basis was presented (Court of Claims Act § 10 [6]). The Appellate Division affirmed (250 AD2d 260). It reasoned that the claim arose out of the State's performance of a governmental function upon which tort liability could not be fixed absent a special relationship between the injured party and the State. Claimants have conceded that they did not allege such a relationship. Their appeal, as of right to this Court, is based on a two-Justice dissent at the Appellate Division (CPLR 5601 [a]).
On the opposite periphery lie proprietary functions in which governmental activities essentially substitute for or supplement "traditionally private enterprises" (Riss v City of New York, 22 NY2d 579, 581; Miller v State of New York, supra, at 512-513). Activities catalogued in the proprietary ledger generally subject the State "to the same duty of care as private individuals and institutions engaging in the same activit[ies]" (Schrempf v State of New York, 66 NY2d, at 294, supra).
The metaphorical continuum begins at one end with the purest proprietary matters and "extends gradually out to more complex measures of safety and security for a greater area and populace, whereupon the actions increasingly, and at a certain point only, involve governmental functions" (Miller v State of New York, supra, at 512). The varying nature of civic activities engaged in by the State may sometimes partake of both proprietary and governmental aspects.
affd for reasons stated by App Div
supra; Dunn v State of New York, 29 NY2d 313) should apply with parallel cogency in this juvenile delinquent supervision and escape setting.
DFY operates and maintains "secure, limited secure and non-secure facilities for the care, custody, treatment, housing, education, rehabilitation and guidance of youth placed with * * * the division" (Executive Law § 504 [1]). The placement of juvenile delinquents in such public institutions is effected by court order upon a finding that the juvenile "committed an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult" and that the juvenile "requires supervision, treatment or confinement" (Family Ct Act § 301.2 [1]; § 352.1 [1]). When a court orders such placement, it must consider not only the best interests of the youth, but also the need to protect the community as a whole (Family Ct Act §§ 301.1, 352.2).
The protection of the community aspect was added to the Family Court Act (L 1976, ch 878, § 2) in response' to the "increase in the quantity and seriousness of juvenile crime" (Mem of Assembly Member Gottfried in Support, Bill Jacket, L 1976, ch 878; see also, Mem of Standing Committee on Child Care in Support, id.). Thus, while the rehabilitative goal of the Family Court Act retains its pre-eminence, that objective is not exclusive. Statutorily, the protection of the community must be factored into the analysis, as it also bears relevantly on the proper classification of the State's activities as governmental in this case.
The removal of juveniles from the community by court order and their placement in public confinement—at least in part for the protection of the society as a whole—denotes a quintessentially governmental activity. Indeed, the State's acts and omissions with respect to...
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