Seegars v. WIS-TV (Broadcasting Co. of The South), WIS-TV

• Decision Date: 11 May 1960
• Docket Number: No. 17656,WIS-TV,17656
• Citation: 236 S.C. 355,114 S.E.2d 502
• Parties: Neal SEEGARS, Appellant, v.(BROADCASTING COMPANY OF THE SOUTH), and Esso Standard Oil Company, Respondents.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 502

114 S.E.2d 502

236 S.C. 355

Neal SEEGARS, Appellant, v. WIS-TV (BROADCASTING COMPANY OF THE SOUTH), and Esso

Standard Oil Company, Respondents.

No. 17656.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 11, 1960.

J. Clator Arrants, Camden, Arthur L. Jones, Kershaw, for appellant.

Cooper & Gary, Boyd, Bruton & Lumpkin, Columbia, for respondents.

OXNER, Justice.

This action was brought against the Broadcasting Company of the South and the Esso Standard Oil Company to recover damages for alleged defamation by television occurring during a news broadcast sponsored by Esso over the facilities of Station WIS-TV. This station is located in Columbia, South Carolina, and is operated by the Broadcasting Company.

The plaintiff, along with five other persons, was taken into custody by South Carolina law enforcement officers and officers of Kershaw County on or about January 2, 1957, in connection with the investigation of the beating of a Camden school bandmaster. A news report of the arrest was made by the television station, and a photograph of the plaintiff shown on the news program. Plaintiff and the others concerned were thereafter released, and this action brought alleging defamation.

There has been some difference of opinion as to whether a defamation is libel or slander when televised. Virginia Law Review, Volume 42, page 63, January, 1956. However, we need not pursue the question here because this action is characterized in the agreed statement as one to recover damages for libel.

The case is here on appeal by plaintiff from that portion of an order of the Circuit Court (1) requiring him to make his complaint more definite and certain, (2) striking certain allegations of the complaint, (3) denying his motion to strike certain defenses in the answers, and (4) changing the venue from Kershaw County to Richland County. The exception charging error in refusing plaintiff's motion to strike certain portions of each answer was not argued either orally or in the brief and, therefore, will be considered as abandoned.

We shall first discuss whether the Court erred in requiring plaintiff to make his complaint more definite and certain. It is alleged in the complaint that there was published and broadcast on January 3, 1957 over the facilities of WIS-TV that plaintiff 'had been arrested and was charged with being a party to the crime of flaying, flogging, and beating of one, Guy Hutchins or words to that effect', and in conjunction therewith there was exhibited and shown 'a picture of the plaintiff with a number hanged around plaintiff's neck, thereby intentionally conveying to thousands of South Carolinians, that plaintiff was a criminal.' It was further alleged that said broadcast 'was false, wanton, defamatory, and malicious.'

Defendants made a motion to require plaintiff to make his complaint more definite and certain by stating with particularity the words, statements or pictures in the broadcast which were false and defamatory. The Court held that the allegation with respect to the picture was sufficient but 'the plaintiff should be required to set forth in more detail substantially the words claimed to have been used by the defendants in making the oral broadcast of which the plaintiff complains and to relate such words to the picture claimed to have been broadcast.' The Court further held that the complaint should be made more definite and certain by alleging 'which part or parts of the broadcast plaintiff claims were false.'

The Circuit Judge has a wide discretion in passing on a motion under Section 10-606 of the 1952 Code to make more definite and certain. Anderson v. Singleton, 164 S.C. 94, 161 S.E. 873; Ridgeland Box Mfg. Co. v. Sinclair Refining Co., 216 S.C. 20, 56 S.E.2d 585; Ellen v. King, 227 S.C. 481 88 S.E.2d 598. In Epstin v. Berman, 78 S.C. 327, 58 S.E. 1013, 1014, the Court said:

'An order to make pleadings definite and certain by amendment is appealable when it deprives the appellant of some substantial right. * * * The Code, however, invests the circuit court with power to order such amendment when the allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise nature of the charge is not apparent, and large discretion must necessarily be allowed the circuit court, and the court's action will not be disturbed except in a case where it clearly appears that the appellant has been prejudiced.'

Presumably the Broadcasting Company has a record of the broadcast complained of and plaintiff should not be required to give a detailed review of it. Spurlin v. Colprovia Products Co., 185 S.C. 449, 194 S.E. 332. And we do not construe the order of the Circuit Judge as exacting such a requirement. Plaintiff is only asked to give the substance of the statements claimed to be defamatory, together with their relation to the picture, and to state the part or parts thereof claimed to be false. We find no abuse of discretion in requiring the complaint to be made more definite and certain in these particulars, nor does it appear that plaintiff would be prejudiced in doing so.

There is some suggestion that by answering defendants waived the right to require the complaint to be made more definite and certain but all rights under the motions were reserved in the answers. Moreover, the question of waiver was not presented in the Court below. The exception relating to this phase of the case is overruled.

In the complaint it is alleged that each defendant is a 'large, powerful and wealthy corporation.' Defendants moved to strike these allegations. The Court struck the words 'large' and 'powerful' but refused to strike 'wealthy'. We find no prejudicial error. Under the allegation that defendants are wealthy corporations, plaintiff, on the issue of punitive damages, can show the financial status of each defendant and its ability to pay.

There remains the question of whether the Court erred in changing the venue from Kershaw County, where the action was brought, to Richland County. The motion to change the venue was made upon the grounds that (1) neither of the defendants had an office or agent or transacted any business in Kershaw County, and (2) that Esso was not a material party to the controversy and was joined as a defendant solely for the purpose of prejudicing the right of the Broadcasting Company to have the venue changed.

In support of the first ground there was presented an affidavit by the executive vicepresident of the Broadcasting Company in which he stated that its corporate offices were in the City of Greenville but its principal office...