Segura v. State

• Decision Date: 13 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. 15-0203,15-0203
• Citation: 889 N.W.2d 215
• Parties: Paula SEGURA and Ricardo Segura, Appellants, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

889 N.W.2d 215

Paula SEGURA and Ricardo Segura, Appellants,

v.STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 15-0203

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed January 13, 2017

Daniel D. Bernstein of Law Office of Daniel D. Bernstein, Iowa City, for appellants.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Anne Updegraff, Assistant Attorney General, and Jessica Tucker Glick and Richard M. Tucker of Phelan, Tucker, Mullen, Walker, Tucker & Gelman, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellee.

CADY, Chief Justice.

In this case, we consider whether a person can properly present a claim against the State without complying with a state appeals board (board) regulation that requires the claimant to personally sign the form. The district court dismissed the claims filed by the plaintiffs in this case because their attorney signed the forms on their behalf. On further review from a decision of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the district court, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and remand for further proceedings.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings.

Paula Segura alleges the State of Iowa was negligent in diagnosing and treating her acute medical condition, leading to a permanent loss of function in her lower extremities. Ricardo Segura, her spouse, alleges loss of consortium. The alleged negligence occurred on May 12, 2009. The Seguras assert they learned of the injury and its cause on May 13, 2009. In April of 2010, the Seguras contacted Iowa City attorney Daniel D. Bernstein about their potential claims. Bernstein agreed to investigate the claim. The Seguras moved to Fort Worth, Texas, and Bernstein maintained "on and off communication." On May 12, 2011, Bernstein filed two board claim forms on the Seguras' behalf, signing their names and his own, and writing "per POA." Bernstein did not attach any document that would show he actually had power of attorney. The claim forms, together with attached appendices, identified the Seguras' causes of action and included a short summary of the relevant facts.¹ The claim forms also contained personal information, including the Seguras' and Bernstein's contact information and social security numbers.

On February 6, 2012 (approximately nine months after filing the claims), the board rejected the Seguras' claims by letter addressed to Bernstein, stating, "The State Appeal Board, after considering the facts and circumstances forming the basis of your client's claim and the applicable law, has made a final determination to deny payment of this claim." On August 3, 2012 (approximately six months after receiving the State's letter), the Seguras filed their claim in district court.

The State moved to dismiss the Seguras' petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the Seguras' failure to sign the claim forms and Bernstein's failure to provide evidence of power of attorney constituted noncompliance with Iowa Administrative Code rule 543—1.3(3), rendering the filings ineffectual and thus depriving the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Seguras resisted, arguing Bernstein was acting as their attorney and should be entitled to file documents on their behalf, and furthermore that strict compliance with administrative rules should not be a prerequisite to jurisdiction. The district court denied the motion, finding it would be more appropriately brought as a motion for summary judgment.

The parties then engaged in a discovery dispute regarding, primarily, expert reports. The Seguras had delayed in obtaining expert witnesses, citing high cost and the potential their claim could be dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. The Seguras then moved for declaratory judgment and/or partial summary judgment on the jurisdiction issue, reiterating their arguments from the earlier resistance to the State's motion to dismiss. This time, the district court agreed with the State and concluded, "[I]t is necessary for a claims form filed under the [Iowa Tort Claims Act] to include evidence of a person's authority to represent the claimant, if the claims form is not, in fact, signed by the claimant." Finding Bernstein could not "show[ ] that the claims forms were completed according to the administrative rules," the district court dismissed the petition.

The Seguras appealed. They reiterated the arguments presented to the district court, but included additional legal authority and recast the issue from "whether [the Seguras'] attorney's signature on their behalf was a harmless error in the administrative process" to whether "the State Appeal Board claim forms presented by claimants Paula and Ricardo Segura provided adequate notice of their claim to the State in order for the State to commence its own investigation." The State claimed that the Seguras were attempting to argue a new, "substantive" issue that was not preserved, that the only issue on appeal should be whether the Seguras complied with the "procedural" requirements of the Iowa Tort Claims Act (ITCA), and that the Seguras failed to do so by failing to personally sign the forms. The court of appeals agreed with the State on both error preservation and the merits and adopted the district court's ruling without further opinion. We granted further review.

II. Standard of Review.

"A ‘court has inherent power to determine whether it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the proceedings before it.’ " Klinge v. Bentien , 725 N.W.2d 13, 15 (Iowa 2006) (quoting Tigges v. City of Ames , 356 N.W.2d 503, 512 (Iowa 1984) ). Our review is for correction of errors at law. Schaefer v. Putnam , 841 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Iowa 2013) ; see also Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.

III. Analysis.

"It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on appeal." Meier v. Senecaut , 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). "[O]ne purpose of our error preservation rules is to ensure that the opposing party and the district court are alerted to an issue at a time when corrective action can be taken or another alternative pursued." Top of Iowa Coop. v. Sime Farms, Inc. , 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000) ; see also Office of Consumer Advocate v. Iowa State Commerce Comm'n , 465 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Iowa 1991). "Error preservation does not turn, however, on the thoroughness of counsel's research and briefing so long as the nature of the error has been timely brought to the attention of the district court." Summy v. City of Des Moines , 708 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Iowa 2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int'l, Inc ., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 n.3 (Iowa 2016). Similarly, error preservation does not turn on "hypertechnical" challenges. Ezzone v. Riccardi , 525 N.W.2d 388, 403 (Iowa 1994).

In their motion for declaratory judgment, the Seguras characterized the issue as "whether the fact that Claimant[ ]s, themselves, failed to sign the State Appeal Board Claim Forms denies the District Court for the State of Iowa the jurisdiction to hear the lawsuit." In their brief in support of the motion, they posed the question, "To what extent must a claimant comply with the promulgated state tort claim form in order to properly submit a claim?" They pointed out that the board was able to investigate their claims despite their failure to sign the form. They argued to distinguish our cases holding claims must be brought by individuals authorized to bring them. In short, the argument the Seguras presented should have been more than enough to alert the court of the claimed error. See Ezzone , 525 N.W.2d at 403 (finding error preserved when challenge was hypertechnical); Office of Consumer Advocate , 465 N.W.2d at 283–84 (finding error preserved when a party alleged a violation of "procedural fairness" despite that party's failure to identify the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause as the source of the right); see also Bartlett Grain Co., LP v. Sheeder , 829 N.W.2d 18, 24 n.4 (Iowa 2013) (finding error preserved, even though parties did not cite to specific UCC provision because appellant alerted the court of its "essential claim"). The district court's ruling, which not only noted the Seguras had argued "that the act of retaining their counsel is, in and of itself, sufficient to permit their counsel to sign the claim forms on their behalf," but found federal precedent persuasive and stated it "consider[ed] the reasoning in Kanar[ v. United States , 118 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1997) ] as [it] consider[ed] whether Plaintiffs' claims in the present case must be dismissed," shows it considered and decided the arguments to the contrary. See Lamasters v. State , 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012) ("If the court's ruling indicates that the court considered the issue and necessarily ruled on it, even if the court's reasoning is ‘incomplete or sparse,’ the issue has been preserved."); see also Kanar , 118 F.3d at 530–31 (discussing what is required under the Federal Tort Claims Act to present a claim).

Error was preserved in this matter. We therefore reach the underlying issue. Doing so, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing the Seguras' claims and hold a claim is properly presented to the board when it identifies sufficient information for the board to investigate the claim and discloses the amount of damages claimed. Finding the Seguras did so, we reverse and remand for further proceedings to address the merits of their claims.

A. Background. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is judicial, not constitutional or statutory in origin. See Boyer v. Iowa High Sch. Athletic Ass'n , 256 Iowa 337, 347, 127 N.W.2d 606, 612 (1964). We have consistently held it is a jurisdictional bar. See Montandon v. Hargrave Constr. Co. , 256 Iowa 1297, 1299, 130 N.W.2d 659, 660 (Iowa 1964) ("[The state] is immune from suit except where immunity is waived by statute and ... there is no statutory waiver or consent to jurisdiction in tort actions."). Leading up to the enactment of the ITCA, this...