Seivert v. Alli
| Decision Date | 21 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. S-20-209.,S-20-209. |
| Citation | 959 N.W.2d 777,309 Neb. 246 |
| Parties | Patricia A. SEIVERT, appellee and cross-appellant, v. Tyron A. ALLI, appellant and cross-appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Kelly T. Shattuck, of Vacanti Shattuck, Omaha, for appellant.
Benjamin M. Belmont and Wm. Oliver Jenkins, of Brodkey, Cuddigan, Peebles, Belmont & Line, L.L.P., Omaha, for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
Papik, J. Tyron A. Alli appeals and Patricia A. Seivert cross-appeals the district court's decree dissolving the parties’ marriage and dividing the marital estate. Both parties assign multiple errors. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
In December 2013, Seivert filed a complaint against Alli in the district court for Douglas County seeking a dissolution of their marriage. At the time the complaint was filed, the parties had four minor children, born in 1998, 2000, 2003, and 2004. Earlier in 2013, Alli had moved out of the home in which he, Seivert, and the children had lived.
The parties attempted to resolve disputed issues over the next several years. The matter eventually went to trial in July 2019. The disputed issues included the following: if and when the parties were married; if the parties were not married, whether they should be treated as putatively married under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-378 (Reissue 2016) ; the date on which the marital estate should be identified and valued; the valuation of Alli's business interests; and whether Alli should be obligated to pay alimony. Evidence presented at trial relevant to the parties’ assignments of error is detailed later in this opinion.
On January 13, 2020, the district court entered a decree dissolving the marriage. The district court found that the parties were married on January 26, 2012, rejecting both Seivert's arguments that the parties were either validly or putatively married in 1996, as well as Alli's argument that the parties were never married.
The decree adopted the parties’ existing parenting plan, which awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor children to Seivert subject to Alli's parenting time. By the time of the decree, only two of the parties’ children were minors.
The decree ordered Alli to pay Seivert $8,390 per month in child support, $5,000 per month for 60 months in alimony, and $50,000 for attorney fees. The decree further ordered Alli to continue to pay tuition and educational expenses for the minor children to attend the private high school in which they were enrolled. It also provided, "The children's 529 accounts or other accounts held for the benefit of the children shall be held by [Seivert] as a constructive trustee and/or custodian for the benefit of the minor children and their educational expenses." In dividing the marital estate, the district court awarded to Alli a bank account containing $304,130 that the parties used to pay the minor children's private school tuition.
Using January 26, 2012, as the date of the marriage, the district court divided the marital assets between the parties. The court utilized the date of trial as the valuation date for the division of the assets. Accordingly, the district court included in the marital estate an investment account and equity in a home that Alli purchased in 2014, both of which were funded by Alli with postcomplaint and postseparation earnings.
In valuing Alli's business interests, the district court found that "the valuation of [Alli's] business interests are most accurately determined by relying on [Alli's] existing business and buy/sell agreement terms." The district court awarded the marital portion of Alli's business interests to Alli.
The district court ordered Alli to make an equalization payment to Seivert of over $1.2 million. It also directed Alli to assign to Seivert over $800,000 in his retirement accounts to equalize the division of assets.
After the district court overruled Alli's motion for new trial and Seivert's motion to alter or amend, Alli appealed and Seivert cross-appealed.
Alli assigns that the district court erred (1) by including in the marital estate property that he obtained after the parties separated and the complaint for dissolution was filed, (2) by ordering him to pay alimony, (3) by ordering him to pay attorney fees, and (4) by dividing an account intended for the minor children's school tuition while also ordering him to be responsible for those costs.
In her cross-appeal, Seivert assigns that the district court erred (1) in its determination of the value of Alli's business interests and (2) in its failure to find that the parties were putatively married in June 1996.
In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. This standard of review applies to the trial court's determinations regarding custody, child support, division of property, alimony, and attorney fees. Higgins v. Currier , 307 Neb. 748, 950 N.W.2d 631 (2020).
In a review de novo on the record, an appellate court is required to make independent factual determinations based upon the record, and the court reaches its own independent conclusions with respect to the matters at issue. Id. However, when evidence is in conflict, the appellate court considers and may give weight to the fact that the trial court heard and observed the witnesses and accepted one version of the facts rather than another. Dooling v. Dooling , 303 Neb. 494, 930 N.W.2d 481 (2019).
A judicial abuse of discretion exists if the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. Id.
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law that an appellate court resolves independently of the trial court. Connolly v. Connolly , 299 Neb. 103, 907 N.W.2d 693 (2018).
We begin with Seivert's argument that the district court erred when it declined to treat the parties as putatively married in 1996 under § 42-378. Although Seivert provides little in the way of specifics, she generally contends that if the district court had found the parties were putatively married in 1996, the marital estate would have been larger and she would have been entitled to a larger equalization payment. Because the resolution of this issue could possibly impact the resolution of other assigned errors, we address it first.
During the course of the proceedings, both parties took multiple positions as to whether and when they were married. In her initial complaint, Seivert alleged that the parties were married in Omaha, Douglas County, Nebraska, on June 16, 1996. In Alli's answer to the initial complaint, he denied that the parties were married in Douglas County in 1996 and alleged that the parties were married in Douglas County on January 26, 2012.
In an amended complaint, Seivert changed her allegations regarding the date of the marriage. She alleged that "[o]n or about" June 18, 1996, she "in good faith participated in a marriage ceremony and accordingly was married to [Alli] in Kauai, Hawaii." She alleged that the parties renewed their vows on January 26, 2012, in Douglas County. Alli then changed his allegations regarding the date of the marriage in his answer to the amended complaint. He denied Seivert's allegations and alleged that no marriage ceremony took place in either 1996 or 2012. He asked that the district court declare that the parties were never married and dismiss Seivert's complaint.
Whether and when the parties married remained a disputed issue at trial, and both parties testified regarding the subject. Seivert testified that she and Alli met in 1994 and became engaged to be married in 1995. According to Seivert, she and Alli planned a trip to Hawaii in June 1996, where they intended to get married and have a honeymoon. Shortly before leaving for Hawaii, they obtained a marriage license application from the Douglas County clerk's office. They partially completed the application, but did not sign or file it, and they did not participate in a marriage ceremony in Nebraska at that time. Seivert testified that in Hawaii, she and Alli signed some papers and participated in a marriage ceremony on the beach by their hotel. She recalled being given some type of certificate, but did not recall what she or Alli did with it.
Alli agreed that the parties were engaged prior to June 1996 and that they traveled to Hawaii in that month, but he testified that they went there solely for a vacation. He denied that they participated in any ceremony in Hawaii and denied that they applied for or obtained a Hawaii marriage license. Alli acknowledged that after returning from Hawaii, the parties consistently represented themselves as husband and wife. According to Alli, he believed the parties were married at the time as a result of their obtaining a license in Douglas County prior to leaving for Hawaii.
Approximately 16 years later, Seivert was asked to provide documentation of her marital status as part of an insurance audit. She testified that she was unable to find the marriage certificate and that she was told by "Hawaii" that any records had been "purged." Because she was unable to locate documentation and did not have time to search further, Seivert testified that she and Alli agreed to obtain a marriage license in Douglas County and have a ceremony performed. In a handwritten, signed, and dated statement on the marriage license application, Seivert and Alli both acknowledged that they were married in a ceremony in June 1996, but that the marriage certificate paperwork was misplaced and never received by the Douglas County clerk's office. Alli testified he signed the acknowledgment of a prior ceremony because Seivert asked him to, but...
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