Sellars v. Collins

• Decision Date: 02 February 1948
• Docket Number: 16037.
• Parties: SELLARS v. COLLINS et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

46 S.E.2d 176

212 S.C. 26

SELLARS v. COLLINS et al.

No. 16037.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

February 2, 1948

Whiteside & Taylor, of Spartanburg, for appellant.

Lyles & Lyles, of Spartanburg, for respondent.

OXNER, Justice.

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff on June 28, 1946, as result of a collision between a motorcycle which he was riding and an automobile driven by defendant. Plaintiff alleged that his injuries were due to the negligence and wilfulness of the defendant in the operation of said automobile. Defendant denied the material allegations of the complaint and set up a plea of contributory negligence and wilfulness. The case was tried in April, 1947, and resulted in a verdict for the defendant. On motion of the plaintiff, the trial judge set aside the verdict and granted a new trial and from this order the defendant has appealed.

The first question for determination is whether an appeal will lie from the order granting a new trial. It is well settled in this State that an order granting or refusing a new trial when based solely on an error of law is subject to review by this Court, but when the order is based upon questions of fact, or upon both questions of law and fact, it is not appealable. Daughty v. Northwestern R. Co., 92 S.C 361, 75 S.E. 553; Ingram v. Hines, Director General, 126 S.C. 509, 120 S.E. 493; Snipes v. Davis, Director General, et al., 131 S.C. 298, 127 S.E. 447; Walker et al., v. Quinn, et al., 134 S.C. 510, 133 S.E. 444; King v. Western Union Tel. Co., et al., 167 S.C 500, 166 S.E. 629; O'Barr v. Pioneer Life Ins Co., 172 S.C. 72, 172 S.E. 769; Marsh v Poineer-Pyramid Life Ins. Co., 174 S.C. 59, 176 S.E. 878; Morrison v. South Carolina State Highway Department, 181 S.C. 258, 187 S.E. 344. In Marshall v. Charleston & S. Ry. Co., 57 S.C. 138, 35 S.E. 497, the Court said: 'The well-settled rule is that this court cannot review an order refusing or granting a new trial except for error of law, as the court is without jurisdiction to review the judgment of the circuit court on question of fact.' The following from Massey v. Adams, 3 S.C. 254, has been frequently quoted with approval: 'The only question proper for our consideration, is whether there was error of law in the order granting the new trial. If it was founded, either wholly or in part, on a conclusion from the fact contrary to that of the jury, then, according to the well-established principles governing the Court in regard to appeals, in which propositions of law do not arise, we cannot interfere.' In dismissing an appeal from an order granting a new trial, the Court in Bowman v. Harby, 109 S.C. 396, 96 S.E. 144, said: 'It is too plain for discussion that, under our decisions, the order is not appealable, because the new trial was not granted solely upon a question of law, but involved a consideration of the facts and the conduct of the trial.'

We shall now consider the order appealed from with a view of determining whether it was based solely on an error of law. The motion for a new trial was upon the grounds (1) that the conduct of one L. C. Gossett, who was on the jury panel during the week in which the action was tried, was highly prejudicial to plaintiff; (2) that one of the defendant's witnesses, Mrs. Marsingale, denied on cross examination that she was related to the defendant, when in fact she was so related; and (3) that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence. When the case was called for trial the Court inquired if any of the jurors were related to either of the parties. One member of the panel stated that he was related to the plaintiff and was excused by the Court. The juror Gossett remained silent and his name was among the twenty drawn from the jury box. From this list of twenty names the twelve jurors to serve on the case were to be selected. Plaintiff's counsel used one of his peremptory challenges in striking Gossett's name. The jury was duty selected and the trial proceeded. Gossett was called as the last witness for the defense. He testified that he operated a store which was located on the highway about five hundred feet from the scene of the accident and that the plaintiff was traveling at a rapid rate of speed when the motorcycle passed his store. He admitted on cross examination that he was a fourth or fifth cousin of the defendant, but stated that he did not disclose this fact when inquiry was made by the Court because he thought that it was too far off to 'amount to much.' After the testimony was completed and in the absence of the jury, Gossett was examined by the Court as to his failure to disclose this relationship before the trial commenced. He then admitted that he was a third or fourth cousin of the defendant. The Court reprimanded him and requested that he report the next morning, at which time the Court directed that his name be withdrawn from the jury panel, adjudged him in contempt, and...