Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Commission

• Decision Date: 06 June 1961
• Citation: 175 N.E.2d 244,342 Mass. 694
• Parties: BAY STATE HARNESS HORSE RACING AND BREEDING ASSOCIATION, INC. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 244

175 N.E.2d 244

342 Mass. 694

BAY STATE HARNESS HORSE RACING AND BREEDING ASSOCIATION, INC. v. STATE RACING COMMISSION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued May 4, 1961.

Decided June 6, 1961.

Claude B. Cross, Boston (John M. Reed and Charles M. Goldman, Boston, with him), for petitioner.

Edward O. Proctor, Boston (Theodore R. Stanley and Austin Broadhurst, Boston, with him), for respondents.

Before WILKINS, C. J., and SPALDING, WILLIAMS, CUTTER and KIRK, JJ.

CUTTER, Justice.

This is a petition for review under the State Administrative Procedure Act, G.L. c. 30A, § 14, ¹ of two decisions of the State racing commission, dated January 30, 1961, one granting a license to the petitioner (Bay State) to conduct pari-mutuel harness racing for fifty-seven days in 1961 and one granting a license to Eastern Racing Association, Inc. (Eastern), to conduct thirty-three days of such 1961 racing. The commission (see G.L. c. 6, § 48, as amended through St.1955, c. 730, § 2) considers applications (see G.L. c. 128A, § 2, as amended through St.1959, c. 295, § 1) for licenses to conduct racing meetings and, 'after * * * a public hearing in the * * * town wherein the license is to be exercised, may issue a license to the applicant.' G.L. c. 128A, § 3, as amended through St.1959, c. 295, § 2. General Laws c. 128A, § 3(j), as amended by St.1946, c. 575, § 4, ² provides that no 'licenses shall be issued for more than an aggregate of ninety racing days in any one year at the harness horse racing meetings combined.' ³

Bay State in its petition alleges the granting of 1961 licenses as outlined above; that the commission refused 'to grant or renew' Bay State's 'license for a greater number of days as applied for'; and that under G.L. c. 30A, § 14, such action constitutes a final decision of the commission in an adjudicatory proceeding. To show that Bay State is aggrieved, Bay State in its petition relies upon the circumstance that the commission refused Bay State's request for a license to conduct harness racing for more than fifty-seven days and that the 'granting of a license to Eastern for thirty-three racing days precluded * * * [the commission] from granting * * * [Bay State] a license for more than fifty-seven racing days.' It is alleged also that 'the granting of the license to Eastern has worked and will continue to work economic injury to * * * [Bay State] as a competitor of Eastern in the same narrow market by decreasing the attendance of patrons and making unavailable many standard bred harness horses.'

The petition also alleged the following facts. Bay State introduced harness racing in Massachusetts in 1947 and thereafter has conducted such racing each year. It has built in Foxborough expensive facilities which 'are usable only for such purpose.' In the initial years Bay State 'suffered operating losses due to the unfamiliarity of the racing public * * * with night harness * * * racing.' Bay State persistently tried to improve the quality of its meetings and reinvested earnings in improving its facilities. 'As a result of its efforts * * * alone * * * [Bay State] has succeeded in popularizing the sport * * * and has succeeded in making * * * its track profitable. In 1959 * * * [Bay State] conducted a * * * meeting under a license * * * lasting sixty-seven days.' In 1960, the commission cut Bay State's license to fifty-seven days and then 'made no findings * * * to justify depriving * * * [Bay State] of the ten days which it lost in that year. Its decision in 1961,' the petition avers, 'continues its [1960] decision * * * and * * * is based upon an error of law, unsupported by substantial evidence, and unwarranted by the facts on the record, as well as being arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion.' Bay State contends that in 'refusing to renew licenses for harness * * * meetings, * * * [the commission] is required,' under G.L. c. 30A, §§ 11(8) and 13, 'to make appropriate findings to justify the refusal, and refusal to grant a license * * * for a period * * * equal to the period of the previous year's license constitutes such a refusal.'

'In 1958 Eastern, which had theretofore been conducting running * * * racing * * * at its track [Suffolk Downs] * * * applied * * * for a license to hold a harness * * * meeting of twenty-three days.' This application was denied in 1958, but was granted in 1959 on substantially the same evidence. The 1959 decision, it is averred, was unsupported by substantial evidence, arbitrary, and capricious, and the 1961 decision 'continues the 1959 decision and is * * * defective upon the same grounds.'

The petition prays that the 1961 license to Eastern 'be set aside' and that the commission 'be ordered to reconsider * * * [Bay State's] application * * * for ten [additional] days of * * * racing'; that the court declare that the commission in granting licenses for increased days of racing 'is required to give consideration to and make appropriate findings in respect to the adequacy of existing facilities for such meetings and the economic injury which existing licensees would sustain in connection with * * * increased licenses.'

The commission filed a demurrer on the grounds (1) that the petition 'does not set forth facts * * * sufficient to entitle * * * [Bay State] to [court] review'; (2) that Bay State 'is not a person entitled to review'; (3) that Bay State is not 'aggrieved' within G.L. c. 30A, § 14; and (4) that the petition is multifarious in seeking to review the action of the commission in granting two separate licenses. Its demurrer was also directed specially to certain specific allegations mentioned below.

The petitioner appeals from an interlocutory decree sustaining the demurrer and a final decree dismissing the petition.

1. General Laws v. 128A, § 3, permits the commission to grant a license after the required public hearing. Section 11 purports to give the commission 'full discretion to refuse to grant a license to any applicant for a license or to suspend or revoke the license of any licensee. If any license is suspended or revoked, the commission shall * * * record * * * its reasons * * *.' In Landers v. Eastern Racing Ass'n Inc., 327 Mass. 32, 45, 97 N.E.2d 385, 394, this court (prior to the enactment in 1954 of G.L. c. 30A) considered the bearing of § 11 upon the constitutional validity of G.L. c. 128A, and said 'that c. 128A does not constitute an improper delegation of legislative authority * * *. Without reciting in detail the directions to and the restrictions imposed upon the commission by the Legislature, it is enough to say that elaborate and detailed procedures are established for the guidance of the commission in granting licenses.' Cf. Mullholland v. State Racing Comm., 295 Mass. 286, 291-292, 3 N.E.2d 773 (where the constitutionality of c. 128A was not decided because the plaintiffs had no standing to assert by bill in equity that c. 128A was invalid).

We think that c. 128A contemplates that the commission, although given a broad discretion in granting licenses (see Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm., 340 Mass. 776, 166 N.E.2d 711 ^a), shall conform to general standards related to the public interest. A few of these, stated specifically in c. 128A, § 3, prescribe periods of the year and hours of the day during which particular types of racing may be licensed and impose restrictions designed to prevent improper persons from being licensed (see e. g. § 3[k] and [j]). From various provisions of the chapter may be implied a legislative requirement that licensees shall be financially responsible, be able to meet obligations to the Commonwealth, have suitable and safe facilities for the service of the patrons, and be persons likely to conduct racing in accordance with approved practices and in a manner consistent with the public safety, health, morals, and welfare. Examination of the chapter, however, furnishes few specific standards, either to guide the commission in granting and refusing licenses, or in framing rules and regulations under § 9 (as amended through St.1935, c. 454, § 5). Nevertheless, we are bound so to interpret the statute as to avoid serious doubts about its constitutional validity. See Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. ----, 168 N.E.2d 858, ^b and cases cited. The validity of the delegation of authority to approve or refuse licenses and to make regulations (see Opinion of the Justices, 341 Mass. ----, 167 N.E.2d 745 ^c) would be in doubt if the statute did not require the commission to apply general standards of public interest, convenience, and necessity, similar to those which have been sometimes implied in the regulation of public utilities. See e. g. Retail Stores Delivery, Inc. v. Department of Pub. Util., 339 Mass. 441, 448-451, 159 N.E.2d 646; City of Newton v. Department of Pub. Util., 339 Mass. 535, 546-547, 160 N.E.2d 108. See also Davis, Administrative Law (1958 ed.) §§ 2.01-2.16, esp. § 2.08; Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachusetts, 41 B.U.L.Rev. 157, 180-181; n. 136; note, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 302. Although a race track is hardly a public service company in the usual sense, various aspects of such an enterprise give rise to a substantial public concern about the manner in which, and by whom, it is conducted. Among these aspects are (1) the pari-mutuel gambling associated with racing, (2) the circumstance that the large groups of spectators require safe and convenient facilities, (3) the interest of members of the public in racing competition honestly managed and of good quality, and (4) the necessity of having and maintaining proper physical facilities for race meetings and, consequently, to ensure the continuance of such facilities in the future, the necessity of fair treatment of the economic interests (see Carroll Bdcst. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., 103 U.S.App.D.C. 346, 258 F.2d 440, 443-444) and...