Sharp v. Learned

• Decision Date: 20 June 1938
• Docket Number: 33208
• Citation: 182 Miss. 333,181 So. 142
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: SHARP et al. v. LEARNED

181 So. 142

182 Miss. 333

SHARP et al. v. LEARNED

No. 33208

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 20, 1938

(Division B.)

1 STATES.

The boundary line of a navigable river between two states is the thread of the stream and continues with gradual changes in the thread, but, if the thread is changed by avulsion, the line remains where it was.

2 PLEADING.

A pleading must be construed most strongly against the pleader.

3 INJUNCTION.

In suit to enjoin defendants from prosecuting suit in Louisiana courts against complainant for cutting timber, bill alleging that because of changes in course of Mississippi river the land was situated to westerly side of the navigable stream of Mississippi river and was joined in most part to the Louisiana shore meant that the land was situated in Louisiana and was so situated when the alleged trespass took place, in absence of allegation that the change of the thread of the stream was by avulsion.

4 INJUNCTION.

Ordinarily a court of equity will not restrain the prosecution of a suit in another state unless a clear equity is made out requiring the interposition of the court to prevent manifest wrong or injustice.

5 INJUNCTION.

The comparative convenience or inconvenience of the parties as the result of granting or withholding an injunction restraining the prosecution of a suit in another state should be considered, and injunction should not be granted if it would operate oppressively or inequitably or contrary to the real justice of the case.

6. VENUE.

An action for trespass on land is not a "transitory action" (Code 1930, sec. 495.

7. INJUNCTION.

Where plaintiff claimed title to land under laws of Mississippi, and defendants claimed title to land under laws of Louisiana and alleged change in thread of Mississippi river had transferred land from Mississippi to Louisiana side of river, Mississippi court would not enjoin defendant from prosecuting suit in Louisiana courts against plaintiff for cutting timber from land, since, by the venue statute, the Legislature recognized that it would be to the best interest of pirties concerned that actions for trespass on land be brought where trespass was committed (Code 1930, sec. 495).

ON SUGGESTION OF ERROR.

(Division B. June 20, 1938.)

[182 So. 122. No. 33208.]

Division B

May 16, 1938

APPEAL from the chancery court of Adams county, HON. R. W. CUTRER, Chancellor.

Suit by A. B. Learned against R. B. Sharp and another to enjoin defendants from prosecuting any suit in the courts of Louisiana against plaintiff for cutting timber. From an order overruling demurrers to the bill, the defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

On suggestion of error. Suggestion of error overruled.

Reversed and remanded.

Jones & Stockett, of Woodville, Engle & Laub, of Natchez, and Sholars & Gunby, of Monroe, La., for appellants.

It is apparent from the bill that a question of title to land is the main one, the appellee claiming it as Mississippi soil and appellants as being Louisiana soil. The bill is not one to remove clouds, or to quiet title; complainant does not come into the court showing any valid or legal claim or title to the lands for which he asserts some vague and indefinite ownership. The bill was not filed in the county where the land is claimed to be, but in Adams County, and is based solely on a prayer to enjoin these appellants from entering any court which they believe and contend has the sole jurisdiction of the cause and of the res. We submit that the demurrers interposed herein, both geneal and special, should have been sustained and this bill dismissed. We insist that the Chancery Court of Adams County had no jurisdiction hereof and as fully appears from the bill itself.

Before proceeding in any case the court has the primary duty to see that it has jurisdiction both of the subject matter and of the parties.

Broom v. Board of Supervisors, 171 Miss. 586, 158 So. 344; Brotherhood, etc., v. Agnew, 170 Miss. 604, 155 So. 205; Cocke v. Breve, 68 Miss. 775.

True it is that in the case at bar personal service was had upon these appellants, but the thing, the res, the subject matter, according to the bill of complaint is in Louisiana. We say this advisedly; we say it because the verbiage of the bill so clearly indicates it. The allegation contained in paragraph 5 is, in effect, that due to the changes in the course of the Mississippi River, the land is now in Louisiana, and is joined to the Louisiana shore. The court knows judicially that changes in a river caused by the process and progress of accretions carries with those changes the boundaries of the lands affected. The bill contains no fact, nor even suspicion of fact, which changes, alters or modifies this established law.

Sutton v. Archer, 93 Miss. 603, 40 So. 705; 1 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 298; 4 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 1318; 3 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 17.

Where the suit is strictly local, the subject matter is specific property, and the relief when granted is such that it must act directly upon the subject matter, and not upon the person of the defendant, the jurisdiction must be exercised in the state where the subject matter is situated.

4 Pomeroy Eq. Jur. (3 Ed.) 1318; Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161.

A citizen of any state has the right, the privilege of having the courts of that state pass upon and adjudicate the question as to the validity of his title to land, and a citizen of a state other than the one in which the land is located has the same right, or privilege. The injunction here denies these appellants of their constitutional right.

Sturgis v. Jackson, 88 Miss. 508, 40 So. 547; Columbia, etc., v. Morton, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 114; Jones v. Hughes, 137 N.W. 1023, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 502.

It is the contention of the appellants that the establishment of title is a suit of a local nature and that the proper place for the trial of such a case is in the county or parish where the land lies. Therefore, the threatened suit was not of a transitory nature but one of local nature and, quite naturally, the appellants, proceeding to protect themselves in the matter of the cut timber, assumed that the parish in which the land lies was the proper place to establish their title in order that they might then proceed to sue for the damage done them by the cutting of the trees on said land.

There are no elements of equity and good conscience on behalf of the appellee in this case whereby the appellants should have been restrained from asserting their right to title to the land and trying same in the parish in which it is claimed that land lies.

Being in Madison Parish, Louisiana, we assert that court is the proper place to try title to the land. Title to the land in question is the basis upon which can be established damages for the cutting of the trees therefrom.

14 R. C. L. 358, par. 60.

If the lands in controversy are Louisiana lands it is but proper that in a local action the courts of the state where the lands lie should be the proper courts to adjudicate title. The force of a Mississippi decision as to the ownership of lands in another state would not necessarily be binding upon the courts of that state where the lands are situated.

Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316, 33 L.Ed. 918; 14 R. C. L. 417, par. 119.

A very clear case must be made out to authorize a court of equity to enjoin suits on the grounds that they are vexatious and oppressive.

32 C. J. 94, par. 88; Standard Roller Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 71 N.J.Eq. 61, 63 A. 456.

This injunction, if granted, would compel the appellants to litigate their Louisiana title in Adams County, Mississippi.

Section 495, Code of 1930; Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 33 L.Ed. 538.

Nothing in the bill here shows a contract between appellants and appellee; nothing in the bill shows fraud in the dealings between the parties; nothing in the bill shows a matter of trust between appellants and appellee, and, therefore, the subject matter being ownership of land, the Chancery Court of Adams County, Mississippi, had no jurisdiction whatsoever in this, a local matter establishing the title to land, to enjoin these appellants.

Platte Fisheries v. Wadford, 170 Miss. 617, 155 So. 161; Sutton v. Archer, 46 So, 705, 93 Miss. 603.

The boundaries of the two states need not to be established in order for the ownership of the land in controversy to be established in either appellants or appellee.

Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Washington Airport, Inc., 283 U.S. 348, 75 L.Ed. 1109.

The allowance of this injunction is an abridgement of the constitutional rights of appellants.

Cofrode v. Michigan, 7 L.R.A. 511; Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 427, 80 L.Ed. 299.

Brandon & Brandon, of Natchez, for appellee.

We submit that the recitals of the bill of complaint contain not only all necessary averments of fact necessary to afford the Chancery Court of Adams County, Mississippi, jurisdiction of this cause, but also fully sufficient averments to support the prayer for relief and the action of the court in issuing temporary writ of injunction.

Whereas it is a well recognized principle that the courts of one country can exercise no jurisdiction or control over courts of another, and the rule once prevailed that a Court could not restrain a citizen within its jurisdiction from prosecuting a suit in a court of a foreign nation: "Gradually, however, recognition was given to the distinction between endeavoring to control the action of a foreign court, by a mandate directed to it, and controlling the action of a resident, over whose person the court had undisputed jurisdiction, until, according to later decisions, unqualified approval is given to the doctrine that, in a proper...