Shatz v. Phillips
Decision Date | 04 October 1971 |
Citation | 471 S.W.2d 944,50 A.L.R.3d 828,3 Pack 519,225 Tenn. 519 |
Parties | , 225 Tenn. 519, 50 A.L.R.3d 828 Sylvain SHATZ et al. v. Robert L. PHILLIPS et al. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Elam, Glasgow & Tanner, Union City, for petitioners.
Heathcock & Cloys, Union City, for respondents.
Sylvain and Elaine Shatz by their petition for the common law writ of certiorari sought to have declared invalid the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Union City upholding the action of the municipal building inspector who, under the authority of Section 11--2003(b) of the Municipal Code, had denied the petitioners the right to use the property of which they were in possession for the assembling, processing, and storage of certain used and waste materials.
The Chancellor filed an opinion in which he found all the facts pertinent to the issues and on which he based his decree dismissing the petition. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the Chancellor. We have granted certiorari.
The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiffs developed some of them by the testimony of witnesses and the parties stipulated the rest.
For the reasons we shall explain we reverse the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are husband and wife and are partners under the trade name Union City Iron & Metal Company in a salvage business in Union City. They buy, process, and re-sell scrap metal of various kinds. At a location on a lot lying west of the railroad, east of Depot Street, and south of Grove Street, they operate an out of doors junk yard where large piles of scrap iron are processed and stored. Directly across Depot Street and west of it they occupy a building that they lease from a family owned corporation and inside which they assemble, process, and pack for sale different kinds of non-ferrous scrap, such as aluminum, copper, and brass. There they also store previous to selling them old automobile batteries and radiators. This activity, on the west side of Depot Street, conducted inside the building, is the activity which the building inspector and the Board of Zoning Appeals have forbidden.
The Chancellor, in his memorandum opinion, found:
and
'The present and past use of the property, so far as the Court can see, is no more objectionable than many other permitted uses * * *.'
The Court of Appeals in their opinion said:
The Chancellor and the Court of Appeals, therefore, have concurred in their finding that nothing objectionable results from the conduct in the building of the activities which the building inspector and the board have forbidden.
The applicable sections of the Union City zoning ordinance adopted under the authority of Title 13, Chapter 7 of Tennessee Code Annotated, are Sections 11--2001 to 11--2006, inclusive of the Municipal Code, as follows:
'(b) The regulations governing M--1 and M--2 Districts are designed to: promote stability of industrial development; protect industrial development from uses incompatible and detrimental to industry; protect non-industrial uses in areas adjacent to industrial districts; and to encourage industrial development in order to improve the basic economy of Union City and thus promote the health, safety, convenience, prosperity, and welfare.
'(b) The storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used material not pertinent to a manufacturing or fabrication use on the premises is permitted only in the M--2 Districts (Heavy Industry) and such storage or salvage operations shall be enclosed by a wall, tight fence, or compact evergreen hedge not less than six (6) feet in height.
'After public notice and hearing, and appropriate conditions and safeguards, the Board of Zoning Appeals may permit the following uses or similar and no more objectionable uses:
'Any retail use or service permissible in the B--3 District (General Business), provided such use serves, or is directly auxiliary to, the needs of industrial uses or employees thereof.
'(b) Any other uses and structures not specifically permitted or permissible on appeal or any other use which in the opinion of the Board of Zoning Appeals would be detrimental to the industrial districts and adjacent districts.'
The lot which is the subject of this suit, on the west side of Depot Street, is in a district designated on the zoning map as an M--1 (Light Industry) District. According to the terms of the sections of the Municipal Code, copied above any lawful industry may be carried on in an M--2 District (Heavy Industry). With a single exception any lawful industry may be carried on in an M--1 District (Light Industry). The exception is that 'The storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used material not pertinent to a manufacturing or fabrication use on the premises' is allowed only in an M--2 District (Heavy Industry).
The ordinance does not define the designations, 'M--1 District (Light Industry)' and 'M--2 District (Heavy Industry)' and under its language the only difference in what is allowed in them is that no matter how conducted, 'the storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used material' is not allowed in an M--1 District (Light Industry). The operation in an M--1 District (Light Industry) of a wood working plant, a foundry or a slaughter house would meet the restrictions of the ordinance.
The question for our determination is: Does Section 11--2003(b) of the Municipal Code of Union City have the effect of being arbitrary and of working an unreasonable discrimination on the use of the petitioners' lot on the west side of Depot Street? We must answer this question in the affirmative making it necessary that we declare the section void insofar as it applies to the uses of the property described in the record.
Our Court through Mr. Justice Tomlinson has said:
'In whatever form presented, ultimately the question for judicial determination is the same, to wit: Does the zoning ordinance in question have any reasonable connection or relation with the protection of public safety, health, morals and natural wellbeing of the people?' Meador v. City of Nashville, 188 Tenn. 441, 220 S.W.2d 876 (1948).
Then the Court, again through Mr. Justice Tomlinson, said:
Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 250 S.W.2d 70 (1952).
Under the facts before us there is discrimination: that is, the petitioners are forbidden to do with their property in an M--1 District (Light Industry) what those with real estate located in an M--2 District (Heavy Industry) are allowed to do. This discrimination would not of itself be sufficient to justify the Court in deciding that the discrimination is such as to render the application of the ordinance invalid; but nowhere in the record does it appear that the discrimination is a reasonable one--quite the contrary--it clearly appears that the petitioners' use of the property would not be such as to cause any result justifying the exercise of...
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Board of Com'Rs of Roane County v. Parker
...the County to rezone parcels 29.01, 12 & 16 was "an unreasonable discrimination against their property," relying on Shatz v. Phillips, 225 Tenn. 519, 471 S.W.2d 944 (1971). In Shatz, a municipal building inspector denied Plaintiffs' right to use their property for assembly, processing and s......
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Bd. of Comm. of Roane Cnty. V. Parker et al.
...of the County to rezone parcels 29.01, 12 & 16 was "an unreasonable discrimination against their property," relying on Shatz v. Phillips, 471 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. 1971). In Shatz, a municipal building inspector denied Plaintiffs' right to use their property for assembly, processing and storage......
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Covitch v Wilson County Bd. of Zoning, 99-02334
...power so long as it is reasonably related to the protection of the public safety, health, morals, or welfare. Shatz v. Phillips, 225 Tenn. 519, 471 S.W.2d 944, 947-48 (1971). However, the ability to use these police powers to legislate, and thus enact or amend zoning laws, is not vested in ......