Shatz v. Phillips

Decision Date04 October 1971
Citation471 S.W.2d 944,50 A.L.R.3d 828,3 Pack 519,225 Tenn. 519
Parties, 225 Tenn. 519, 50 A.L.R.3d 828 Sylvain SHATZ et al. v. Robert L. PHILLIPS et al.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Elam, Glasgow & Tanner, Union City, for petitioners.

Heathcock & Cloys, Union City, for respondents.

OPINION

McCANLESS, Justice.

Sylvain and Elaine Shatz by their petition for the common law writ of certiorari sought to have declared invalid the action of the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Union City upholding the action of the municipal building inspector who, under the authority of Section 11--2003(b) of the Municipal Code, had denied the petitioners the right to use the property of which they were in possession for the assembling, processing, and storage of certain used and waste materials.

The Chancellor filed an opinion in which he found all the facts pertinent to the issues and on which he based his decree dismissing the petition. The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals who affirmed the Chancellor. We have granted certiorari.

The facts are not in dispute. The plaintiffs developed some of them by the testimony of witnesses and the parties stipulated the rest.

For the reasons we shall explain we reverse the Court of Appeals.

The petitioners are husband and wife and are partners under the trade name Union City Iron & Metal Company in a salvage business in Union City. They buy, process, and re-sell scrap metal of various kinds. At a location on a lot lying west of the railroad, east of Depot Street, and south of Grove Street, they operate an out of doors junk yard where large piles of scrap iron are processed and stored. Directly across Depot Street and west of it they occupy a building that they lease from a family owned corporation and inside which they assemble, process, and pack for sale different kinds of non-ferrous scrap, such as aluminum, copper, and brass. There they also store previous to selling them old automobile batteries and radiators. This activity, on the west side of Depot Street, conducted inside the building, is the activity which the building inspector and the Board of Zoning Appeals have forbidden.

The Chancellor, in his memorandum opinion, found:

'The complainant's building is modern, attractive, and other than the sign thereon, a casual passer would not know what business was being carried on in said building. Further, the complainant's operations in said building are free from noise, odor, fumes, and other objectionable features. There is no machinery in said building; there have been no complaints by the neighbors; they create no traffic problem and no fire hazard, * * *'

and

'The present and past use of the property, so far as the Court can see, is no more objectionable than many other permitted uses * * *.'

The Court of Appeals in their opinion said:

'All the storing, sorting, grading and packaging of the non-useable metal is done within the building on the property in question. The building is an ordinary masonry building and when viewed from the outside there is no indication what type operation is being carried on within the building. There is no smoke, fumes, noise or other objectionable feature to the operation carried on by the complainants.'

The Chancellor and the Court of Appeals, therefore, have concurred in their finding that nothing objectionable results from the conduct in the building of the activities which the building inspector and the board have forbidden.

The applicable sections of the Union City zoning ordinance adopted under the authority of Title 13, Chapter 7 of Tennessee Code Annotated, are Sections 11--2001 to 11--2006, inclusive of the Municipal Code, as follows:

'11--2001. General. Within all areas designated M--1, M--2 on the Zoning Map of the City of Union City, Tennessee, the regulations set out in this Chapter shall apply.

'11--2002. Intent and purpose. (a) The M--1 and M--2 Districts are designated to provide areas for uses of land and buildings for administration, research, manufacturing, processing, fabrication, assembly, freight handling, storage, and similar operations.

'(b) The regulations governing M--1 and M--2 Districts are designed to: promote stability of industrial development; protect industrial development from uses incompatible and detrimental to industry; protect non-industrial uses in areas adjacent to industrial districts; and to encourage industrial development in order to improve the basic economy of Union City and thus promote the health, safety, convenience, prosperity, and welfare.

'11--2003. Principal uses and structures permitted. (a) Any industrial use that will comply with the standards of this Chapter is by virtue of such compliance a permitted use, provided, that the expense of any tests, engineering reports, etc., required to assure compliance with these standards shall be borne by the person, persons, firm or corporation applying for a building permit and further, that the recipient of the building permit understands that these standards, like all other provisions of this ordinance, are continuing obligations, and that all new industrial uses will be expected to operate in compliance with these standards.

'(b) The storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used material not pertinent to a manufacturing or fabrication use on the premises is permitted only in the M--2 Districts (Heavy Industry) and such storage or salvage operations shall be enclosed by a wall, tight fence, or compact evergreen hedge not less than six (6) feet in height.

'11--2004. Permitted accessory uses and structures. Accessory buildings or uses incidental to and customarily associated with any permitted industrial use.

'11--2005. Special exceptions. The judgment of the Board of Zoning Appeals shall be guided by a desire to encourage industrial development in order to improve the basic economy of Union City. Such interest will include the promotion of orderly industrial districts containing industries and other uses compatible with each other. Judged against this interest will be considerations of the effect of the industry, or other use, on the environs and the general character of the entire community.

'After public notice and hearing, and appropriate conditions and safeguards, the Board of Zoning Appeals may permit the following uses or similar and no more objectionable uses:

'Any retail use or service permissible in the B--3 District (General Business), provided such use serves, or is directly auxiliary to, the needs of industrial uses or employees thereof.

'11--2006. Prohibited uses and structures. (a) Dwelling units, other than those provided in a hotel, motel, or tourist court permitted as a special exception.

'(b) Any other uses and structures not specifically permitted or permissible on appeal or any other use which in the opinion of the Board of Zoning Appeals would be detrimental to the industrial districts and adjacent districts.'

The lot which is the subject of this suit, on the west side of Depot Street, is in a district designated on the zoning map as an M--1 (Light Industry) District. According to the terms of the sections of the Municipal Code, copied above any lawful industry may be carried on in an M--2 District (Heavy Industry). With a single exception any lawful industry may be carried on in an M--1 District (Light Industry). The exception is that 'The storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used material not pertinent to a manufacturing or fabrication use on the premises' is allowed only in an M--2 District (Heavy Industry).

The ordinance does not define the designations, 'M--1 District (Light Industry)' and 'M--2 District (Heavy Industry)' and under its language the only difference in what is allowed in them is that no matter how conducted, 'the storage and/or salvaging of junk and other used material' is not allowed in an M--1 District (Light Industry). The operation in an M--1 District (Light Industry) of a wood working plant, a foundry or a slaughter house would meet the restrictions of the ordinance.

The question for our determination is: Does Section 11--2003(b) of the Municipal Code of Union City have the effect of being arbitrary and of working an unreasonable discrimination on the use of the petitioners' lot on the west side of Depot Street? We must answer this question in the affirmative making it necessary that we declare the section void insofar as it applies to the uses of the property described in the record.

Our Court through Mr. Justice Tomlinson has said:

'In whatever form presented, ultimately the question for judicial determination is the same, to wit: Does the zoning ordinance in question have any reasonable connection or relation with the protection of public safety, health, morals and natural wellbeing of the people?' Meador v. City of Nashville, 188 Tenn. 441, 220 S.W.2d 876 (1948).

Then the Court, again through Mr. Justice Tomlinson, said:

'Equally as well settled is the fact that a zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to such statute is valid, except where that ordinance may be in some respect unreasonable or arbitrary. If there be a discrimination between properties in zoning, such discrimination will not be disturbed if it may be rested upon some reasonable basis, and is not forbidden by the Charter.' Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 250 S.W.2d 70 (1952).

Under the facts before us there is discrimination: that is, the petitioners are forbidden to do with their property in an M--1 District (Light Industry) what those with real estate located in an M--2 District (Heavy Industry) are allowed to do. This discrimination would not of itself be sufficient to justify the Court in deciding that the discrimination is such as to render the application of the ordinance invalid; but nowhere in the record does it appear that the discrimination is a reasonable one--quite the contrary--it clearly appears that the petitioners' use of the property would not be such as to cause any result justifying the exercise of...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Clark v. Truck Ins. Exchange
    • United States
    • Nevada Supreme Court
    • 16 Agosto 1979
  • Board of Com'Rs of Roane County v. Parker
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 13 Febrero 2002
    ...the County to rezone parcels 29.01, 12 & 16 was "an unreasonable discrimination against their property," relying on Shatz v. Phillips, 225 Tenn. 519, 471 S.W.2d 944 (1971). In Shatz, a municipal building inspector denied Plaintiffs' right to use their property for assembly, processing and s......
  • Bd. of Comm. of Roane Cnty. V. Parker et al.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 13 Febrero 2002
    ...of the County to rezone parcels 29.01, 12 & 16 was "an unreasonable discrimination against their property," relying on Shatz v. Phillips, 471 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn. 1971). In Shatz, a municipal building inspector denied Plaintiffs' right to use their property for assembly, processing and storage......
  • Covitch v Wilson County Bd. of Zoning, 99-02334
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • 6 Noviembre 2000
    ...power so long as it is reasonably related to the protection of the public safety, health, morals, or welfare. Shatz v. Phillips, 225 Tenn. 519, 471 S.W.2d 944, 947-48 (1971). However, the ability to use these police powers to legislate, and thus enact or amend zoning laws, is not vested in ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT