Shaw v. Piel

• Decision Date: 15 July 1942
• Citation: 27 A.2d 137
• Parties: SHAW v. PIEL.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

27 A.2d 137

SHAW

v. PIEL.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 15, 1942.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Somerset County.

Action by Eva M. Shaw, administratrix of the estate of Joseph Shaw, deceased, against Maria Piel to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's decedent caused by falling through a trap door on defendant's premises. On exceptions to the direction of the verdict for defendant and to the exclusion and admission of certain evidence.

Exception sustained.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, MANSER, WORSTER, and MURCHIE, JJ.

Locke, Campbell & Reid and James L. Reid, all of Augusta, for plaintiff.

L. D. Ryan, of Skowhegan, Berman & Berman, and Benjamin L. Berman, all of Lewiston, for defendant.

MANSER, Justice.

On April 28, 1939, Joseph Shaw received bodily injuries by falling through a trap door in a building on premises owned by the defendant. From these injuries he died six months later. This action is brought by the administratrix of the decedent's estate for resulting damages to him, recovery, if any, to be first for the benefit of the North Anson Reel Co., employer of decedent, in so far as it was entitled thereto under subrogation rights provided in the Workmen's Compensation Act, R.S., c. 55, § 24.

The case comes up on exceptions by the plaintiff to the direction of a verdict for the defendant by the presiding justice and to the exclusion and admission of certain evidence.

If the evidence in the case would have warranted the jury in returning a verdict for the plaintiff, the exceptions must be sustained. When fair-minded and unprejudiced persons may reasonably differ in the conclusions to be drawn from undisputed facts, the question is one of fact for the jury. Patten v. Field, 108 Me. 299, 81 A. 77.

The facts, which may be regarded as undisputed, are as follows Shaw and one Hinman were on a business trip for their employer, undertaking to procure orders for its products from such persons as might be interested therein and in need thereof. The merchandise handled by the employer included building supplies, materials and paints. The defendant owned a residential estate of considerable area with a main house, several other buildings and a greenhouse. The men drove upon the premises at about noontime, went to the house and inquired of the woman who came to the door as to the man in charge of the estate. They were informed that he was then absent but was expected to return soon. Waiting in their own car in the driveway, they saw another car enter the premises and proceed to the rear of the house. Upon renewed inquiry, they learned from the same woman that probably the arrival was the man for whom they were looking, and that he might be at the greenhouse, and they were informed as to its location. They went in that direction by a well defined path, and were again told by a workman outside the greenhouse that the man they wanted, a Mr. Lange, was inside. There was attached to the greenhouse a small wooden building, through the door of which Hinman entered, expecting that Shaw, who had stopped apparently temporarily, would follow him. Hinman proceeded down a pathway in the center of the wooden building and successfully passed a square opening or hole from which a trap door had been lifted, and which was unprotected by guard rails, although such safety appliances were there and presumably available for use. Hinman engaged in conversation with Lange concerning the products he had for sale, and was asked as to some special paints for the greenhouse. To this Hinman replied that Shaw had a booklet listing many such paints and could give the necessary technical data relating thereto. At that moment Shaw entered the building, stepped forward about six feet and fell through the hole. The injury did not at first appear serious, and before taking Shaw to his home, Hinman continued his negotiations with Lange and took an order for some paint, linseed oil and turpentine, which was later delivered and payment received.

The questions involved as to liability of the defendant for the damages resulting from the injury were:

Was Shaw a trespasser, a licensee or an invitee at the time of the accident?

Was there violation of any legal duty owed to Shaw by the defendant?

Was Shaw himself guilty of contributory negligence?

Should a verdict have been directed for the defendant upon the ground that no liability existed as a matter of law?

As to the status of Shaw at the time of the accident, the general legal principles have been definitively applied by our court in a succession of decisions that, if a person goes upon property of another as a trespasser, he is there without right and is bound to accept the existing situation. If he is allowed to go there for his own interest or convenience, he is a mere licensee and the owner owes him no duty except not to wilfully cause him harm. If he is there by invitation of the owner, then it is the duty of the owner to maintain the place in a reasonably safe and suitable condition.

An invitation may be express or implied. When the owner in terms invites another to come upon his premises, the invitation is express. An invitation is implied in behalf of one who enters the premises of another in pursuance of an interest or advantage which is common or mutual to him and the owner. Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173, 31 Am.Rep. 262; Dixon v. Swift, 98 Me. 207, 56 A. 761; Russell v. Maine C. R. Co., 100 Me. 406, 61 A. 899; Stanwood v. Clancey, 106 Me. 72, 75 A. 293, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 1213; Patten v. Bartlett, 111 Me. 409, 89 A. 375, 49 L.R.A., N.S., 1120; Austin v. Baker, 112 Me. 267, 91 A. 1005, L.R.A. 1916F, 1130; Robinson v. Leighton, 122 Me. 309, 119 A. 809, 30 A.L.R. 1386; Foley v. H. F. Farnham Co. (Malloy v. H. F. Farnham Co.), 135 Me. 29, at page 34, 188 A. 708.

The opinion in Carleton v. Franconia Co., 99 Mass. 216, puts it thus: "The owner or occupant of land is liable in damages to those coming to it, using due care, at his invitation or inducement, express or implied, on any business to be transacted with or permitted by him, for an injury occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land or of the access to it, which is known to him and not to them, and which he has negligently suffered to exist and has given them no notice of."

This statement of principle is quoted with approval by our own court in Moore v. Stetson, 96 Me. 197, 52 A. 767.

In somewhat different...