Sheehan v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis

• Decision Date: 02 May 1939
• Docket Number: 34596
• Parties: Ethel Sheehan, as Administratrix of the Estate of William Sheehan, v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

127 S.W.2d 657

344 Mo. 586

Ethel Sheehan, as Administratrix of the Estate of William Sheehan, v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, a Corporation, Appellant

No. 34596

Supreme Court of Missouri

May 2, 1939

Appeal from Circuit Court of City of St. Louis; Hon. Eugene L Padberg, Judge;

Affirmed on remittitur of $ 10,352.10.

T M. Pierce, J. L. Howell and Walter N. Davis for appellant.

(1) The record is without positive and substantial evidence that the employees of the Frisco train in question failed to blow the whistle on the train as it backed in. The evidence in that regard is wholly negative. Crossno v. Term Railroad, 41 S.W.2d 796; Holmes v. Penn. Ry. Co., 74 N. J. L. 469, 66 A. 412, 12 Ann. Cas. 1031; Patterson v. Gaines, 6 How. 589; White v. So. Ry. Co., 151 Va. 302, 144 S.E. 424; Elias v. Collins, 237 Mich. 175, 211 N.W. 88, 52 A. L. R. 1118; Johnson v. Richmond, etc., Ry. Co., 160 Va. 766, 169 S.E. 603; M. & O. Railroad Co. v. Johnson, 157 Miss. 266, 126 So. 827; Hughes v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 8 P.2d 853; Gulf, etc., Railroad Co. v. Nail, 156 Okla. 294, 10 P.2d 668. (a) The evidence shows that Luna, plaintiff's only witness as to the accident, was paying no attention to the Frisco train as it backed in, until it reached a point twenty to twenty-five feet south of the elevator in question, and that there was other noise around. In the face of positive evidence to the contrary, the fact that he did not hear the whistle blow, an inference at most, became dissipated. Penn. Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 77 L.Ed. 503; So. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U.S. 190, 52 S.Ct. 58, 76 L.Ed. 239; George v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 213 Mo.App. 668, 251 S.W. 729. (b) Where the evidence is so overwhelming on one side as to leave no room to doubt what the fact is, the court should give a peremptory instruction to the jury. Penn. Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 233, 77 L.Ed. 503; Gunning v. Cooley, 281 U.S. 90, 50 S.Ct. 231, 74 L.Ed. 720; Patton v. Ry. Co., 179 U.S. 658, 21 S.Ct. 275, 45 L.Ed. 361; Small v. Lamborn & Co., 267 U.S. 248, 45 S.Ct. 300, 69 L.Ed. 597. (c) Under the evidence, the fact that Luna did not hear the whistle blow was nothing but surmise and conjecture. Gulf, etc., Railroad Co. v. Wells, 275 U.S. 455, 48 S.Ct. 151, 72 L.Ed. 370. (d) The fact that witnesses are in the employ of defendant does not impair their credibility. Penn. Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. 333, 77 Ed. 503; C. & O. Railroad Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 51 S.Ct. 453, 75 L.Ed. 983. (e) Insubstantial and insufficient testimony does not require the submission of an issue to the jury. So. Ry. Co. v. Walters, 284 U.S. 190, 52 S.Ct. 58, 76 L.Ed. 239; A.T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Toops, 281 U.S. 351. (f) Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the kind and amount of evidence required to establish negligence is not subject to the control of the states. C. & O. Railroad Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587, 49 S.Ct. 422, 73 L.Ed. 861; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Coogan, 271 U.S. 472, 46 S.Ct. 564, 70 L.Ed. 1041. (2) The opinion of the former appeal is the law of the case on subsequent appeals, unless the pleadings have been amended so as to introduce new issues; or, unless the evidence on the retrial is substantially different; or, unless the opinion of the former appeal was manifestly erroneous because of a mistake as to the law or the evidence; or, because an injustice has been done. Davidson v. Railroad, 301 Mo. 85, 256 S.W. 169; Mangold v. Bacon, 237 Mo. 525, 141 S.W. 650; Monroe v. Railroad, 297 Mo. 654, Bagnell v. Railroad, 242 Mo. 21, 249 S.W. 644, 257 S.W. 469; Seibert v. Harden, 319 Mo. 1112, 8 S.W.2d 905; Nothstine v. Feldman, 320 Mo. 512, 8 S.W.2d 912. (3) At the time of his injuries, plaintiff's decedent, William Sheehan, was engaged in oiling an elevator in the City of St. Louis Union Station. Said elevator operated from the station platform to the subway below. The oil of said elevator, a portion of said depot, even though it was used indiscriminately in carrying interstate and intrastate freight to and from the platform and subway, was not interstate transportation or work so closely related to it as to be a part of it. Stogsdill v. Railroad, 85 S.W.2d 447; Boles v. Hines, 226 S.W. 272; 1 Roberts, Federal Liabilities of Carriers (1 Ed.), sec. 483; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Manning, 62 F.2d 294; Industrial Acc. Comm. v. Davis, 259 U.S. 182, 66 L.Ed. 888, 42 S.Ct. 489; C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Chinn, 137 N.E. 885, certiorari denied, 263 U.S. 716, 68 L.Ed. 521, 44 S.Ct. 137; Minn. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Nash., 242 U.S. 619, 61 L.Ed. 539, 37 S.Ct. 239; reversing Nash v. M. & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 Minn. 166, 154 N.W. 957; Tepper v. Railroad, 238 N.Y. 423, 144 N.E. 668; Capps v. A. C. L. Ry. Co., 178 N.C. 558, 101 S.E. 216, certiorari denied, 252 U.S. 580, 64 L.Ed. 726, 40 S.Ct. 345; C. & E. I. Railroad Co. v. Industrial Comm., 284 U.S. 296, 76 L.Ed. 304, 52 S.Ct. 151, 77 A. L. R. 1367; C. & N. W. Railroad Co. v. Bolle, 284 U.S. 74, 76 L.Ed. 173, 52 S.Ct. 59; Sullivan v. Railroad, 105 Conn. 122, 134 A. 795; D. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U.S. 439, 59 L.Ed. 1397, 35 S.Ct. 902; Shanks v. D. L. & W. Ry Co., 239 U.S. 556, 60 L.Ed. 436, 36 S.Ct. 188; C. B. & Q. Railroad Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 60 L.Ed. 941, 36 S.Ct. 517, 11 N. C. C. A. 992; Illinois Cent. Railroad Co. v. Cousins, 241 U.S. 641, 60 L.Ed. 1216, 36 S.Ct. 446, reversing 126 Minn. 172, 148 N.W. 58; Vollmers v. N. Y. C. Ry. Co., 223 N.Y. 571, 119 N.E. 1084, reversing 167 N.Y.S. 426, 180 N.Y. 60; G. H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Chojnacky, 163 S.W. 1011; G.N. Railroad Co. v. King, 165 Wis. 159, 161 N.W. 371; 2 Roberts Fed. Liabilities of Carriers (2 Ed.), sec. 787. (a) Plaintiff's cause of action, as shown by her petition, is grounded on interstate transportation, and the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Inasmuch as plaintiff's decedent was not engaged, at the time of his injuries, in interstate transportation, her cause of action fails and the case must be reversed. Cox v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 61 S.W.2d 965; Phillips v. Ry. Co., 328 Mo. 240, 40 S.W.2d 1046. (4) The verdict was and is excessive. Midwest Natl. B. & T. Co. v. Davis, 288 Mo. 563, 233 S.W. 406; Burtch v. Wabash Ry. Co., 236 S.W. 338; Brown v. Railroad, 315 Mo. 409, 286 S.W. 45; Wilgues v. Penn. Ry. Co., 298 S.W. 817; Crecelius v. Railroad, 284 Mo. 26, 223 S.W. 413.

Eagleton, Waechter, Yost, Elam & Clark for respondent.

(1) The elevator in question was an indispensable transporting device maintained by appellant and regularly used in the moving of interstate shipments. It was a permanent instrumentality of interstate commerce, so that the decedent's work of oiling it constituted a direct engagement in interstate transportation, and brought him within the operation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 45 U.S.C. A., Secs 51-59; Sheehan v. Term. Railroad Assn., 81 S.W.2d 305; St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U.S. 156, 33 S.Ct. 651, 57 L.Ed. 1129; Baltimore & O.S. W. Railroad Co. v. Burtch, 263 U.S. 540, 44 S.Ct. 165, 68 L.Ed. 433; Ill. Cent. Railroad Co. v. Porter, 207 F. 311, 125 C. C. A. 55; Swain v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 220 Mo.App. 1088, 291 S.W. 66, certiorari denied, 48 S.Ct. 18; Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 33 S.Ct. 648, 57 L.Ed. 1125; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Holbrook, 235 U.S. 625, 35 S.Ct. 143, 59 L.Ed. 392; New York C. Ry. Co. v. Porter, 249 U.S. 168, 39 S.Ct. 188, 63 L.Ed. 536; Grand Trunk Railroad Co. v. Knapp, 233 F. 950; O'Dell v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 281 S.W. 456; Carter v. St. Louis, T. & E. Ry. Co., 307 Mo. 595, 271 S.W. 358; Brier v. C., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 183 Iowa 1212, 168 N.W. 339; Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Deal, 231 F. 604; Yarde v. Hines, 209 Mo.App. 547, 238 S.W. 151; Truesdell v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 159 Ky. 718, 169 S.W. 471; Jones v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 149 Ky. 566, 149 S.W. 951; Cherry v. Atlantic C. L. Ry. Co., 174 N.C. 263, 93 S.E. 785; Dowell v. Wabash Ry. Co., 190 S.W. 939; Kepner v. Chicago, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 322 Mo. 299, 15 S.W.2d 825, certiorari denied, 280 U.S. 564; Chesapeake & O. Railroad Co. v. Kornhoff, 167 Ky. 353, 180 S.W. 523; Lombardo v. Pittsburgh & L. E. Ry. Co., 91 Pa. S.Ct. 307; Deuel v. C., B. & Q. Ry. Co., 253 F. 857; 2 Roberts' Federal Liability of Carriers (2 Ed.), secs. 725, 726, 766, 767; Freeman v. Frasher, 84 Colo. 67, 268 P. 538; Allen v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 53 S.W.2d 884. (2) There was substantial evidence in the record that the operators of the train failed to give the customary warning, and that issue was properly submissible to the jury because: (a) The testimony of the witness Luna to the effect that the whistle was not blown, although negative in character, is positive evidence of a negative fact, he being in a position to, and having reason to, hear the whistle if it were blown. Sheehan v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 81 S.W.2d 305; Stotler v. C. & A. Ry. Co., 200 Mo. 107, 98 S.W. 509; Toeneboehn v. St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co., 298 S.W. 795; Clay v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 5 S.W.2d 409; Crossno v. Terminal Railroad Assn., 31 S.W.2d 797; Sing v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 30 S.W.2d 37; Henry v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 3 S.W.2d 1004; Grand Trunk W. Railroad Co. v. Heatlie, 48 F.2d 759; Chicago, R. I. & P. Railroad Co. v. Stepp, 164 F. 785; Cannarozzo v. N. Y. St. Ry. Co., 215 N.Y.S. 156, 216 A.D. 243; Cairney v. Cook, 165 N.E. 406; Thuel v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 27 P.2d 910; Clark v. L. A. & S. L. Ry. Co., 275 P. 582; Sharpless v. Delaware, L. & W. Ry. Co., 286 Pa. 439, 133 A. 636; Anderson v. United States Railroad Adm., 211 N.W. 872; Seaboard A. L. Railroad Co. v. Sarman, 144 S.E. 810; Columbus & G. Railroad Co. v. Lee, 149 Miss. 543, 115 So. 782. (b) Luna's testimony in this connection was not entirely negative. He was not only in a position to...