Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 91CA0125
| Decision Date | 10 October 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 91CA0125,91CA0125 |
| Citation | 826 P.2d 396 |
| Parties | Linda SHEID, Petitioner, v. HEWLETT PACKARD, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, and The Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado, Respondents. . I |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Steven U. Mullens, P.C., Steven U. Mullens, Colorado Springs, for petitioner.
Halaby & McCrea, Bruce B. McCrea, Lynda L. Simpson, Denver, for respondent Hewlett Packard.
The Law Office of John M. Connell, Curt Kriksciun, Denver, for respondent Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Michael P. Serruto, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Indus. Claim Appeals Office.
Michael J. Steiner, Denver, for amicus curiae Colorado Compensation Ins. Authority.
Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ.
Linda Sheid, claimant, seeks review of an order of the Industrial Claim Appeals Panel dismissing her workers' compensation claim against the respondent employer, Hewlett Packard, and its insurer, Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. The sole issue on appeal is whether the Panel erred in dismissing the claim as a sanction for claimant's failure to comply with a discovery order. We affirm the dismissal.
This case has a protracted procedural history. In May 1988, claimant filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for an alleged work-related mental disability. The matter was set for hearing on October 13, 1988.
In order to obtain copies of the claimant's medical and psychiatric records, the respondents provided medical release forms for claimant to sign. On the respondents' motion, the October hearing was continued because of the claimant's failure to sign the authorization forms.
Thereafter, the claimant signed qualified releases stating that if her physicians or health care providers believed that disclosure of the actual records "will or may be injurious" to her, that they not disclose those records, but instead, provide written narrative reports or responses to specific questions. The respondents filed an objection to the modification of the releases, but, nonetheless, forwarded the releases to claimant's mental health care providers in hopes of obtaining the requested records.
Claimant's in-patient hospitalization records were released; however, claimant's treating psychiatrist refused to release his records on grounds that claimant had directed him to provide only a narrative summary.
The matter was reset for hearing on March 14, 1989. In January 1989, respondents filed a motion to compel the claimant to sign an unqualified medical release form. Claimant did not object or otherwise respond to the motion to compel. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an order dated February 3, 1989, requiring the claimant to sign the medical releases "without modification" within one week. The order also required claimant's treating psychiatrist to provide claimant's records within ten days of his receipt of the release.
Neither the medical release forms nor the records were provided by the date of hearing, March 14, 1989. After conferring with attorneys for all parties, the ALJ vacated the hearing and ordered claimant's counsel to comply with the February 3, 1989, order.
The hearing was reset for June 6, 1989, but was again vacated because of claimant's refusal to comply with the ALJ's orders. The ALJ's order stated that the hearing would not be rescheduled until claimant had complied with the discovery orders.
A subsequent order, dated March 5, 1990, directed that the case would be dismissed if claimant did not provide the medical release within thirty days. The order provided that: "[I]f there are records which [claimant's physician] considers irrelevant to the case then those records will be reviewed by the Administrative Law Judge in camera and a decision will be made whether or not to release these records to the Respondent-Insurer." (emphasis added)
The claimant once again submitted only qualified releases, and on April 17, 1990, the ALJ dismissed the claim with prejudice "for failure to prosecute," citing the statute now codified as § 8-43-207(1)(n), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.). On review, the Panel affirmed the order, noting, however, that the order of dismissal was in effect a discovery sanction pursuant to § 8-43-207(1)(e), C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.) rather than a dismissal for failure to prosecute pursuant to § 8-43-207(1)(n).
On review, claimant contends the Panel erred in affirming the dismissal order. We disagree.
A patient's psychiatric records are protected by the physician-patient privilege. Section 13-90-107(1)(d), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). However, the law implies a waiver of the privilege if, as here, a patient-litigant has placed his or her mental condition at issue as the basis of a legal claim or affirmative defense. Bond v. District Court, 682 P.2d 33 (Colo.1984).
Here, the claimant alleged in her workers' compensation claim that she had suffered from "mental disability" since July 1986. She alleged that the disability was attributable to "tremendous pressure and stress on the job" which eventually caused "hospitalization for mental disability." These allegations directly implicate the claimant's mental health and constitute a waiver of the privilege.
Claimant, however, contends that her psychiatric records are not discoverable because they are not relevant under C.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). Alternatively, she argues that, because the release of her records was potentially injurious to her mental state, the ALJ was required to conduct an in camera hearing and balance the parties' competing interests before imposing a discovery sanction. We conclude that these contentions are without merit.
As recognized by our supreme court in Bond v. District Court, supra, a trial court has broad discretion under C.R.C.P. 26(c) to manage the discovery process and to protect a party from discovery requests that would cause...
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...from discovery requests that would cause annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue hardship or expense.” Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396, 398 (Colo. App. 1991). An ALJ abuses his or her discretion only if the evidentiary ruling “exceeds the bounds of reason.” Coates, Reid & Wald......
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...note 34, citing, Sears v. Penrose Hospital, 942 P.2d 1345 (Colo.App.1997), cert. denied, 1997. 37. Id., citing, Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo.App.1991) (dismissal authorized for persistent to comply with discovery orders). 38. 30 Colo.Law.. 185-87 (Nov. 2001) (App. No. 01CA00......