Shelton v. Phalen

• Decision Date: 02 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 47053,47053
• Citation: 214 Kan. 54,519 P.2d 754
• Parties: Edna SHELTON, Appellant, v. Leo J. PHALEN et al., and the Employment Security Board of Review. Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 754

519 P.2d 754

214 Kan. 54

Edna SHELTON, Appellant, v. Leo J. PHALEN et al., and the Employment Security Board of Review. Appellees.

No. 47053.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

March 2, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under federal and Kansas equal protection constitutional provisions, a state statute may single out a class of persons for distinctive treatment only if the classification bears a rational relation to the purpose of the legislation.

2. The constitutional principle of equal protection does not preclude the state from drawing distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.

3. Under the unemployment compensation law the only justification for treating workers who leave their jobs (1) for domestic or family reasons, (2) to retire, (3) to become self-employed, or (4) to attend school, differently from those who leave without good cause and for no reason, is that those in the former group have demonstrated an intention to withdraw from the labor market.

4. An irrebuttable presumption that a person who leaves her job because of domestic or family responsibilities intends to withdraw from the labor market would be unconstitutional.

5. The policy of courts is to uphold legislative intent rather than to defeat it, and if there is any reasonable way to construe legislation as constitutionally valid it will be so construed.

6. K.S.A. 44-706(a) is construed to contain an implied condition that before a claimant for unemployment compensation benefits may be disqualified on the ground that she left her job because of domestic or family responsibilities, it must also be determined that the nature of those responsibilities or her subsequent conduct was such that she must be deemed to have withdrawn from the labor market.

Charles E. Worden, of the Legal Aid Society of Topeka, Inc., Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Marlin A. White, Holton, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellee.

FOTH, Commissioner:

The issue in this case is whether a married woman who quits her job to accompany her husband to a different city is thereby disqualified for unemployment compensation benefits until she again becomes employed and earns eight times what would otherwise be her weekly benefit.

The claimant, Mr. Edna M. Shelton, began working at covered employment in a Topeka nursing home in June, 1967. On June 30, 1971, she quit. Her announced reason was that her husband had found a job in San Antonio, Texas, and she wanted to join him there.

In San Antonio she says she looked for work, but was unsuccessful; on July 22 she applied for unemployment compensation. Her claim was denied by an examiner of the employment security division on August 6, and she appealed. A hearing was held by a referee on October 5, and the examiner's decision was affirmed. (In the meantime claimant had returned to Topeka and had found new employment.) The employment security board of review also affirmed and claimant commenced this statutory action in the district court of Shawnee county to secure judicial review. Her claim met the same fate there, and she has now appealed to this court.

At each level below claimant was held to be disqualified for benefits solely because of the reason she gave for quitting her job, viz., to join her husband in his new home. It was found at all levels that she left 'because of domestic or family responsibilities.' Therefore, it was held, she was disqualified under the first clause of the proviso in K.S.A. 44-706(a). That statute will be discussed below.

Claimant contends that if the statute is construed, as it was below, to deny her benefits simply because of her reason for quitting, it denies her the equal protection of the laws. She makes a two-pronged attack on the classifications in the statute. First, she says that disqualifying those who leave a job because of domestic or family responsibilities creates an unreasonable classification which bears no reasonable relationship to the objectives of the unemployment compensation law. Second, she argues that by disqualifying those in particular who leave their job to accompany their spouses to another state, the statute imposes an unwarranted restriction upon the constitutionally protected right to travel.

Her argument requires first an overall look at and then a detailed analysis of the applicable portions of the employment security law.

K.S.A. 44-705 prescribes qualifications for eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits. Highly summarized, under that statute an unemployed claimant is eligible if he (a) has registered for work, (b) has made a claim for benefits, (c) is able to work and available for work, (d) has gone through a one-week waiting period, and (e) has sufficient work credits.

K.S.A. 44-706 specifies grounds for the disqualification, for the various periods indicated, of an otherwise eligible claimant. These include:

(a) One who quits work voluntarily: 6 weeks, except certain persons who must earn eight times their weekly benefit to remove the disqualification. (This is the paragraph under which claimant was disqualified below.)

(b) One discharged for breach of a duty to his employer: 6 weeks, except that if discharged for 'gross misconduct' he must earn eight times his weekly benefit to remove the disqualification.

(c) Failure to apply for or accept suitable work: 6 weeks.

(d) Participating in a labor dispute: any week of participation.

(e) Receiving benefits from another state: any week of receipt.

(f) Receiving veteran's unemployment benefits: ditto.

(g) Falsifying a claim for benefits: 1 year.

(h) Receiving workman's compensation: any week of receipt.

The two sections, read together, form a fairly consistent pattern. A person meeting all of the requirements of 44-705 is 'eligible' for benefits, but if he fits any one of the categories of 44-706 he is 'disqualified.' The duration of the disqualification is dependent on its nature. The variations, we take it, represent a legislative judgment as to what is appropriate to foster the purpose of the act. That purpose is to protect against the economic hardships attendant on 'involuntary unemployment.' K.S.A. 44-702; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Employment Security Board of Review, 210 Kan. 403, 502 P.2d 645; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Employment Security Board of Review, 205 Kan. 279, 469 P.2d 263, Syl. 1. Thus there runs through 44-706 the common thread of recognizing the volition of the claimant as a disqualifying factor, e. g., as in the case of one who refuses to look for work or take it when offered. If he is 'voluntarily' unemployed, he receives no benefits. In some instances this idea approaches the concept of 'fault,' as where the worker discharged for gross misconduct faces a more severe disqualification than one fired for ordinary breach of duty.

Claimant, as noted, was disqualified under K.S.A. 44-706(a). That paragraph reaches two main groups, which for our purposes we have designated 'I' and 'II.' In turn, group II encompasses four subgroups. For convenience we have editorially inserted our numbers, brackets and parentheses into the paragraph:

'An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:

(I) For the week in which he left work voluntarily without good cause and for the six (6) consecutive weeks which immediately follow such week: (II) Provided, That if an individual leaves work by his own action (1) because of domestic or family responsibilities, not including pregnancy, (2) self-employment or (3) to retire because of disability or old age, or (4) to attend school such individual shall be disqualified for benefits until he again becomes employed and has had earnings of at least eight (8) times his weekly benefit amount.'

Under this paragraph group I consists of those who merely quit their jobs, 'voluntarily without good cause,' and for no particular reason. They are disqualified for the week they quit and the next six. After that they may start drawing benefits if they are still unemployed, and if they meet all the requirements of 44-705 such as actively seeking employment.

Members of group II may also be said to have left 'voluntarily without good cause,' i. e., they have left by their 'own action.' They, however, must do more than merely endure a waiting period and seek employment; they must actually become employed and earn wages of at least eight times their benefits. The only reason for this separate treatment is their reason for quitting.

It is here that claimant makes her first assault on the statute's classifications. There is no justification, she says, for imposing greater disadvantages on those who have a good reason for quitting their jobs than on those who have none at all. Her argument is based on familiar equal protection principles, most recently restated by this court in Henry v. Bauder, (opinion filed January 26, 1974) 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362:

'Under federal and Kansas equal protection constitutional provisions, a state statute may single out a class of persons for distinctive treatment only if the classification bears a rational relation to the purpose of the legislation.'

'The constitutional principle of equal protection does not preclude the state from drawing distinctions between different groups of individuals, but does require that persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment.' (Syl. 1 and 2.)

Applying these principles, she says that if the purpose of the act is to protect against 'involuntary' unemployment, then all who are voluntarily unemployed should be...