Shelton v. State

• Decision Date: 12 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. CR85-77,CR85-77
• Citation: 699 S.W.2d 728,287 Ark. 322
• Parties: , 56 A.L.R.4th 383 James R. SHELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 728

699 S.W.2d 728

287 Ark. 322, 56 A.L.R.4th 383

James R. SHELTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee.

No. CR85-77.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Nov. 12, 1985.

Hubbard, Patton, Peek, Haltom & Roberts by Michael D. Peek, Friedman & Hooper by Donald N. Friedman, David J. Potter, Texarkanna, for appellant.

Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Joel O. Huggins, Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.

HAYS, Justice.

Just after midnight on April 1, 1984 the body of Deputy Sheriff Charles Barnes was found beside his patrol car on Holly Springs Road in Miller County, Arkansas. The headlights and spotlight were on and the motor was running. Officer Barnes had been shot through the back of the head.

Appellant James Shelton was convicted of the capital murder of Officer Barnes and sentenced to life without parole. On appeal, several instances of reversible error are alleged, two of which have merit.

James Shelton, age 17, and Gene Emfinger, Jr., age 14, worked together at Joe Singletary's dairy farm, where they lived in a bunkhouse. On the evening of March 31, 1984 Emfinger's cousin, Roger Dale Porier, picked the boys up to ride around in Porier's car. Porier was thirty-two years old and had a long criminal record. He had recently been released from a Texas prison. Shelton had known him only a few days.

During the evening, the three burglarized the Macedonia Baptist Church, Porier carrying a .30-.30 rifle. They took some articles of little value--paper towels, pencils and crayons and left. Porier then said he was going to ambush a passing motorist and stopped on the side of the road. Shelton and Emfinger stayed in the car as Porier hid with the rifle. Deputy Charles Barnes, patrolling in the area, stopped to investigate and as he spoke with the boys, Porier came up without the rifle, evidently to size up the situation. On a pretext of needing to relieve himself, Porier retrieved the rifle, held it on Officer Barnes and ordered him to lie face down in the ditch. Porier then shot him through the back of the head. A few hours later Roger Porier was killed in a shootout with police officers. He had Deputy Barnes's pistol.

I

We first address the argument that the trial court erred in denying a defense motion to suppress two statements made by Shelton to police officers. After the murder, Porier took Shelton and Emfinger back to the bunkhouse. They say he told them he would kill them if they told anyone what they had seen and that he parked outside the bunkhouse for an hour or so before leaving.

At about 2:30 a.m. Officers Phillips, Casteel and Liles came to the bunkhouse looking for Porier and another suspect named Hendrix. It took the officers ten or fifteen minutes and the use of a P.A. system to get James Shelton to open the door to the bunkhouse. The boys later explained that they were frightened and had hidden in a closet. The officers told them a deputy had been killed and asked if they knew Hendrix and Porier. They said they had not seen Hendrix for some time and denied knowing Porier. The officers asked the boys to show them where their parents lived. In the car the two were told that Roger Dale Porier was suspected of a very serious crime, killing a police officer. At the Shelton residence, Lt. Phillips, Officer Casteel and Emfinger got out and Officer Liles was instructed by Lt. Phillips to stay in the car with Shelton. Officer Liles stressed the seriousness of the crime and told James if he knew anything about it or if he could help locate either suspect, he'd better go ahead and do it. At this point, according to Liles's testimony at the trial, tears came to Shelton's eyes and he said, "We did it. We did it. We were there. We were there." ¹ Liles called to the other two officers, "We have a witness," and at that point the Miranda warnings were given. Shelton and Emfinger were handcuffed and taken to the sheriff's office where detailed statements were given after the Miranda warnings.

The primary issue is whether or not the statement given to Liles in the police car was a result of custodial interrogation. If so, the statement should not have been admitted, as no Miranda warnings were given. If this can be classified as a voluntary, spontaneous statement, whether or not in custody, the warnings would not be required. Hayes v. State, 274 Ark. 440, 625 S.W.2d 498 (1981); Pace v. State, 265 Ark. 712, 580 S.W.2d 689 (1979). Nor are warnings required if the questioning by police is simply investigatory. Parker v. State, 258 Ark. 880, 529 S.W.2d 860 (1975); Dickson v. State, 254 Ark. 250, 492 S.W.2d 895 (1973). Police inquiry is purely investigatory and proper until the suspect is restrained in some significant way. Once in custody however, no interrogation is allowed absent the Miranda warning and a knowing, voluntary waiver. Parker v. State, supra; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1965). Here, appellant's remarks were not volunteered and spontaneous but the result of questioning, so the issue becomes whether under the circumstances the questioning would be deemed custodial interrogation. See Parker, supra; Dickson, supra; Reeves v. State, 258 Ark. 788, 528 S.W.2d 924 (1975).

In Reeves v. State, supra, we said, "Custodial interrogation means not only actual arrest but also any conduct that deprives a person of his freedom of action in any way. Furthermore, the test is an objective one." See also Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1113, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972); Parker, supra. In Reeves the police came to defendant's home to inquire about a crime. They refused to obey the defendant's command and would not let defendant out of their sight. We found from an objective viewpoint that the defendant was in custody.

In Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced the test for determining custodial interrogations, a test similar to that in Reeves. "It is settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest." A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was "in custody" at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."

In People v. P., 21 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.Y.S.2d 225, 233 N.E.2d 255 (1967), cited with approval in Berkemer, the court points out that the purpose of the Miranda warning is to protect the individual's freedom of choice--to answer or not answer--in situations that are inherently coercive. The court went on to say:

The vice of the custodial interrogation * * * [lies] in the psychological coercion implicit in interrogation in the isolated chamber from which the suspect may reasonably believe he cannot leave. In such circumstances the person detained or arrested finds himself completely and suddenly cut off from a freedom of movement. An involuntary immobilization by law enforcement officers dramatizes the fact that the individual stands suspected or accused of crime. Lacking knowledge of his constitutional rights, he may feel that he can extricate himself from the situation only by submitting to interrogation. He may reasonably believe that if he attempts to leave the interrogation chamber the authorities will impose immediate detention. * * *

* * * We hold that custody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived. This is the test which we hold to be the most reasonable. It gives effect to the purpose of the Miranda rules; it is not solely dependent either on the self-serving declarations of the police officers or the defendant nor does it place upon the police the burden of anticipating the frailties or idiosyncrasies of every person whom they question.

In considering the application of this rule, we find two elements that heavily influence our conclusion--appellant's age and the place of interrogation. Although age is not an overriding consideration, when reviewing the circumstances of a defendant's statement, Douglas v. State, 286 Ark. 296, 692 S.W.2d 217 (1985); Smith v. State, 286 Ark. 247, 691 S.W.2d 154 (1985), age has been seen as an important element in determining volition. Little v. State, 261 Ark. 859, 554 S.W.2d 312 (1977). The deference accorded adolescents has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court. In Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966), the court said:

If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright, ignorance or despair.

And in a pre-Gault decision, the court in holding the confession of a fifteen year old involuntary said that juveniles, "... cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overcome and overwhelm a lad in his early teens." Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). In Matter of Hector G., 89 Misc.2d 1081, 393 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1977), the New York court stated, "Adolescents are more likely to succumb to the inherently coercive nature of police interrogation and the police should apply extra caution when dealing with juveniles."

Second, we note that interrogation in a police car has been considered a significant factor in finding an individual under custodial interrogation. 31 A.L.R.3d 365, Custodial Interrogation.

Although nearly eighteen chronologically, Shelton was of marginal intelligence and maturity. One of the officers thought he was younger than Emfinger, who was fourteen. They were awakened at 2:30 in the morning and summoned out...